2004/06/30
Catholicism, Protestantism, and Capitalism - Murray N. Rothbard
Introdução por Joseph Stromberg:
On Aug. 8, 1957, Murray N. Rothbard wrote to Richard C. Cornuelle of the Volker Fund, strongly recommending Emil Kauder's reseaches into the Aristotelian background of marginal utility and Austrian economic theory (Rothbard Papers). In a memo of February 1957, "Catholicism, Protestantism, and Capitalism," reproduced below, Rothbard set down some thoughts on these matters. Rothbard's letters reveal an early and keen interest in the history of economic thought. The memos he wrote for the Volker Fund, from the early fifties down to 1962, on a large variety of books and scholarly journals, show off his growing knowledge of the subject. In addition, Rothbard's dissertation director, Professor Joseph Dorfman, was an authority on the history of American economic thought, and Rothbard was very interested, among other matters, in American contributions to the monetary debates of the early 19th century. Rothbard, as much a historian as an economist, was well-placed, not only to assess books for the Volker Fund, but also to grasp and synthesize economic doctrines logically and in historical perspective. His last major published work, his two-volume History of Economic Thought (1995) certainly stands as proof.
A parte final do texto:
"(...) We may sum up the Case for Catholicism as follows: (1) Smith’s laissez-faire and natural law views descended from the late Scholastics, and from the Catholic Physiocrats; (2) the Catholics had developed marginal utility, subjective value economics, and the idea that the just price was the market price, while the British Protestants grafted on a dangerous and ultimately highly statist labor theory of value, influenced by Calvinism; (3) some of the most "dogmatic" laissez-faire theorists have been Catholics: from the Physiocrats to Bastiat; (4) capitalism began in the Catholic Italian cities of the 14th century; (5) Natural rights and other rationalist views descended from the Scholastics.
I would also recommend, for a chilling example of Protestant-Calvinist influence leading to a philosophy of altruist socialism, reading Melvin Richter, "T. H. Green and His Audience: Liberalism as a Surrogate Faith" Review of Politics (October, 1956).
Although tangential to this particular memo, I would also highly recommend Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Liberty or Equality (Caldwell, Id., 1952), the main gist of which is the thesis that Catholicism makes for a libertarian spirit (albeit "anti-democratic") while Protestantism makes for socialism, totalitarianism, and a collectivist spirit. One example is Kuehnelt-Leddihn’s assertion that the Catholic belief in reason and truth tend toward "extremism" and "radicalism," while Protestant emphasis on intuition leads to belief in compromise, Gallup-polling, etc.
Professor von Mises’ view on the Max Weber thesis should be mentioned here: namely, that Weber reversed the true causal pattern, i.e. that capitalism came in first, and that the Calvinists adapted their teachings to the growing influence of the bourgeoisie – rather than the other way round.
I am not prepared to say that the Protestant case should be thrown overboard completely and Catholic view adopted wholly. But it seems evident that the story is far more complex than the standard view believes.(...)"
Numa nota de rodapé: "Cf. Randall Collins, a Weberian sociologist, who has also inverted the Weber thesis while using Max Weber's methods of historical reconstruction; see Collins's Weberian Sociological Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), where he writes: "Christendom was the main Weberian revolution, creating the institutional forms within which capitalism could emerge. The Protestant Reformation is just a particular crisis at the end of a long-term cycle; it gave rise to a second takeoff, which we mistakenly see as the first" (p. 76)."
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On Aug. 8, 1957, Murray N. Rothbard wrote to Richard C. Cornuelle of the Volker Fund, strongly recommending Emil Kauder's reseaches into the Aristotelian background of marginal utility and Austrian economic theory (Rothbard Papers). In a memo of February 1957, "Catholicism, Protestantism, and Capitalism," reproduced below, Rothbard set down some thoughts on these matters. Rothbard's letters reveal an early and keen interest in the history of economic thought. The memos he wrote for the Volker Fund, from the early fifties down to 1962, on a large variety of books and scholarly journals, show off his growing knowledge of the subject. In addition, Rothbard's dissertation director, Professor Joseph Dorfman, was an authority on the history of American economic thought, and Rothbard was very interested, among other matters, in American contributions to the monetary debates of the early 19th century. Rothbard, as much a historian as an economist, was well-placed, not only to assess books for the Volker Fund, but also to grasp and synthesize economic doctrines logically and in historical perspective. His last major published work, his two-volume History of Economic Thought (1995) certainly stands as proof.
A parte final do texto:
"(...) We may sum up the Case for Catholicism as follows: (1) Smith’s laissez-faire and natural law views descended from the late Scholastics, and from the Catholic Physiocrats; (2) the Catholics had developed marginal utility, subjective value economics, and the idea that the just price was the market price, while the British Protestants grafted on a dangerous and ultimately highly statist labor theory of value, influenced by Calvinism; (3) some of the most "dogmatic" laissez-faire theorists have been Catholics: from the Physiocrats to Bastiat; (4) capitalism began in the Catholic Italian cities of the 14th century; (5) Natural rights and other rationalist views descended from the Scholastics.
I would also recommend, for a chilling example of Protestant-Calvinist influence leading to a philosophy of altruist socialism, reading Melvin Richter, "T. H. Green and His Audience: Liberalism as a Surrogate Faith" Review of Politics (October, 1956).
Although tangential to this particular memo, I would also highly recommend Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Liberty or Equality (Caldwell, Id., 1952), the main gist of which is the thesis that Catholicism makes for a libertarian spirit (albeit "anti-democratic") while Protestantism makes for socialism, totalitarianism, and a collectivist spirit. One example is Kuehnelt-Leddihn’s assertion that the Catholic belief in reason and truth tend toward "extremism" and "radicalism," while Protestant emphasis on intuition leads to belief in compromise, Gallup-polling, etc.
Professor von Mises’ view on the Max Weber thesis should be mentioned here: namely, that Weber reversed the true causal pattern, i.e. that capitalism came in first, and that the Calvinists adapted their teachings to the growing influence of the bourgeoisie – rather than the other way round.
I am not prepared to say that the Protestant case should be thrown overboard completely and Catholic view adopted wholly. But it seems evident that the story is far more complex than the standard view believes.(...)"
Numa nota de rodapé: "Cf. Randall Collins, a Weberian sociologist, who has also inverted the Weber thesis while using Max Weber's methods of historical reconstruction; see Collins's Weberian Sociological Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), where he writes: "Christendom was the main Weberian revolution, creating the institutional forms within which capitalism could emerge. The Protestant Reformation is just a particular crisis at the end of a long-term cycle; it gave rise to a second takeoff, which we mistakenly see as the first" (p. 76)."
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Como as coisas podem correr mal II
Nota: Tal como a Grande Guerra provou, um pequeno incidente, excesso de zelo, a paranóia das alianças, militarismo disfarçado de princípios, nacionalismo de ingenuidade ideolológica, pode concorrer para um grande desastre inútil com o foi em 1914. Os europeus e o último grande império britânico sabem-no especialmente bem.
Attack Iran, US chief ordered British, By Michael Smith, Defence Correspondent
America's military commander in Iraq ordered British troops to prepare a full-scale ground offensive against Iranian forces that had crossed the border and grabbed disputed territory, a senior officer has disclosed.
An attack would almost certainly have provoked open conflict with Iran. But the British chose instead to resolve the matter through diplomatic channels.
Lt Gen Ricardo Sanchez "If we had attacked the Iranian positions, all hell would have broken loose," a defence source said yesterday. "We would have had the Iranians to our front and the Iraqi insurgents picking us off at the rear."
The incident was disclosed by a senior British officer at a conference in London last week and is reported in today's edition of Defence Analysis. The identity of the officer is not given.
"Some Iranian border and observation posts were re-positioned over the border, broadly a kilometre into Iraq," a Ministry of Defence spokesman said.
The incident began last July when Revolutionary Guards pushed about a kilometre into Iraq to the north and east of Basra in an apparent attempt to reoccupy territory which they claimed belonged to Iran.
Lt Gen Ricardo Sanchez then ordered the British to prepare to send in several thousand troops to attack the Revolutionary Guard positions. (...)
The incident is reminiscent of the exchange during the Kosovo conflict between the American general, Wesley Clark, the supreme allied commander Europe, and Gen Sir Mike Jackson, the British commander.
When Gen Clark told Gen Jackson to send British troops into Pristina airport to prevent Russian troops from taking control Gen Jackson refused. He was reported to have said: "I am not going to start World War Three for you."
The Iran-Iraq incident lasted around a week and was resolved by a telephone conversation between Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, and Kamal Kharrazi, his Iranian counterpart, British officials said.
"It did look rather nasty at the time," one official said. "But we were always confident it was a mistake and could be resolved by diplomatic means. We got in touch with Baghdad and said, 'Don't do anything silly; we are talking to the Iranians.' "
While Mr Straw was trying to resolve the issue peacefully, British military commanders on the ground were calming their Iranian counterparts, the ministry said.(...)"
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Attack Iran, US chief ordered British, By Michael Smith, Defence Correspondent
America's military commander in Iraq ordered British troops to prepare a full-scale ground offensive against Iranian forces that had crossed the border and grabbed disputed territory, a senior officer has disclosed.
An attack would almost certainly have provoked open conflict with Iran. But the British chose instead to resolve the matter through diplomatic channels.
Lt Gen Ricardo Sanchez "If we had attacked the Iranian positions, all hell would have broken loose," a defence source said yesterday. "We would have had the Iranians to our front and the Iraqi insurgents picking us off at the rear."
The incident was disclosed by a senior British officer at a conference in London last week and is reported in today's edition of Defence Analysis. The identity of the officer is not given.
"Some Iranian border and observation posts were re-positioned over the border, broadly a kilometre into Iraq," a Ministry of Defence spokesman said.
The incident began last July when Revolutionary Guards pushed about a kilometre into Iraq to the north and east of Basra in an apparent attempt to reoccupy territory which they claimed belonged to Iran.
Lt Gen Ricardo Sanchez then ordered the British to prepare to send in several thousand troops to attack the Revolutionary Guard positions. (...)
The incident is reminiscent of the exchange during the Kosovo conflict between the American general, Wesley Clark, the supreme allied commander Europe, and Gen Sir Mike Jackson, the British commander.
When Gen Clark told Gen Jackson to send British troops into Pristina airport to prevent Russian troops from taking control Gen Jackson refused. He was reported to have said: "I am not going to start World War Three for you."
The Iran-Iraq incident lasted around a week and was resolved by a telephone conversation between Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, and Kamal Kharrazi, his Iranian counterpart, British officials said.
"It did look rather nasty at the time," one official said. "But we were always confident it was a mistake and could be resolved by diplomatic means. We got in touch with Baghdad and said, 'Don't do anything silly; we are talking to the Iranians.' "
While Mr Straw was trying to resolve the issue peacefully, British military commanders on the ground were calming their Iranian counterparts, the ministry said.(...)"
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Three Steps to Sanity
June 28, the day in 2004 that the Americans transferred sovereignty to Iraqis and proconsul Paul Bremer hastily departed Baghdad, is a day freighted with historic significance.
On June 28, 1914, 90 years before, Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip fired the shots that killed the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and led, five weeks later, to World War I.
On June 28, 1919, German representatives, their country under an Allied starvation blockade, prostrate before a threat by Marshal Foch to march on Berlin, signed the Versailles treaty that ended World War I, and set the stage for Hitler and World War II. Seen as an Allied triumph in 1919, Versailles proved a disaster.
(...)
War, Clausewitz reminded us, is but the extension of politics by other means. All wars, even wars in which terror is the weapon of choice of the enemy, are about, as Lenin said: "Who? Whom?" Who shall rule whom? And even in an Arab world where monarchs and autocrats now rule, the victors will be those who win the hearts and minds of Arab peoples.
This is the war we are losing. And to win this struggle, the United States needs to do three things that may go against the political interests of both parties: Stand up for justice for the Palestinians. Remove our imperial presence. Cease to intervene in their internal affairs.
We Americans once stood for all that. And if we go only where we are invited, we would be invited more often to come and help."
Three Steps to Sanity, by Patrick J. Buchanan
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On June 28, 1914, 90 years before, Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip fired the shots that killed the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and led, five weeks later, to World War I.
On June 28, 1919, German representatives, their country under an Allied starvation blockade, prostrate before a threat by Marshal Foch to march on Berlin, signed the Versailles treaty that ended World War I, and set the stage for Hitler and World War II. Seen as an Allied triumph in 1919, Versailles proved a disaster.
(...)
War, Clausewitz reminded us, is but the extension of politics by other means. All wars, even wars in which terror is the weapon of choice of the enemy, are about, as Lenin said: "Who? Whom?" Who shall rule whom? And even in an Arab world where monarchs and autocrats now rule, the victors will be those who win the hearts and minds of Arab peoples.
This is the war we are losing. And to win this struggle, the United States needs to do three things that may go against the political interests of both parties: Stand up for justice for the Palestinians. Remove our imperial presence. Cease to intervene in their internal affairs.
We Americans once stood for all that. And if we go only where we are invited, we would be invited more often to come and help."
Three Steps to Sanity, by Patrick J. Buchanan
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2004/06/29
Axioma da aquisição original de propriedade ("Homesteading principle") e poluição
Em "Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution: Foundation to Austrian law and economics", Murray N. Rothbard
"The “first ownership to first use” principle for natural resources is also popularly called the “homesteading principle.” If each man owns the land that he “mixes his labor with,” then he owns the product of that mixture, and he has the right to exchange property titles with other, similar producers. This establishes the right of free contract in the sense of transfer of property titles. It also establishes the right to give away such titles, either as a gift or bequest.
Most of us think of homesteading unused resources in the oldfashioned sense of clearing a piece of unowned land and farming the soil. There are, however, more sophisticated and modern forms of homesteading, which should establish a property right.
Suppose, for example, that an airport is established with a great deal of empty land around it. The airport exudes a noise level of, say, X decibels, with the sound waves traveling over the empty land. A housing development then buys land near the airport. Some time later, the homeowners sue the airport for excessive noise interfering with the use and quiet enjoyment of the houses.
Excessive noise can be considered a form of aggression but in this case the airport has already homestead X decibels worth of noise. By its prior claim, the airport now “owns the right” to emit X decibels of noise in the surrounding area. In legal terms, we can then say that the airport, through homesteading, has earned an easement right to creating X decibels of noise. This homesteaded easement is an example of the ancient legal concept of “prescription,” in which a certain activity earns a prescriptive property right to the person engaging in the action.
On the other hand, if the airport starts to increase noise levels, then the homeowners could sue or enjoin the airport from its noise aggression for the extra decibels, which had not been homesteaded. Of course if a new airport is built and begins to send out noise of X decibels onto the existing surrounding homes, the airport becomes fully liable for the noise invasion.
It should be clear that the same theory should apply to air pollution. If A is causing pollution of B's air, and this can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then this is aggression and it should be enjoined and damages paid in accordance with strict liability, unless A had been there first and had already been polluting the air before B's property was developed. For example, if a factory owned by A polluted originally unused property, up to a certain amount of pollutant X, then A can be said to have homesteaded a pollution easement of a certain degree and type.
Given a prescriptive easement, the courts have generally done well in deciding its limits. In Kerlin v. Southern Telephone and Telegraph Co. (1941), a public utility had maintained an easement by prescription of telephone poles and wires over someone else's land (called the “servient estate” in law). The utility wished to string up two additional wires, and the servient estate challenged its right to do so. The court decided correctly that the utility had the right because there was no proposed change in the "outer limits of space utilized by the owner of the easement." On the other hand, an early English case that an easement for moving carts could not later be used for the purpose of driving cattle.50
Unfortunately, the courts have not honored the concept of homestead in a noise or pollution easement. The classic case is Sturgis v. Bridgman (1879) in England. The plaintiff, a physician, had purchased land in 1865; on the property next to him the defendant, a pharmacist, used a mortar and pestle, which caused vibrations on the physician's property. There was no problem, however, until the physician built a consultation room 10 years later. He then sued to enjoin the pharmacist, claiming that his work constituted a nuisance. The defendant properly argued that the vibrations were going on before the construction of the consultation room, that they then did not constitute a nuisance, and that therefore he had a prescriptive right to keep operating his business. Nevertheless, defendant's claim was denied."
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"The “first ownership to first use” principle for natural resources is also popularly called the “homesteading principle.” If each man owns the land that he “mixes his labor with,” then he owns the product of that mixture, and he has the right to exchange property titles with other, similar producers. This establishes the right of free contract in the sense of transfer of property titles. It also establishes the right to give away such titles, either as a gift or bequest.
Most of us think of homesteading unused resources in the oldfashioned sense of clearing a piece of unowned land and farming the soil. There are, however, more sophisticated and modern forms of homesteading, which should establish a property right.
Suppose, for example, that an airport is established with a great deal of empty land around it. The airport exudes a noise level of, say, X decibels, with the sound waves traveling over the empty land. A housing development then buys land near the airport. Some time later, the homeowners sue the airport for excessive noise interfering with the use and quiet enjoyment of the houses.
Excessive noise can be considered a form of aggression but in this case the airport has already homestead X decibels worth of noise. By its prior claim, the airport now “owns the right” to emit X decibels of noise in the surrounding area. In legal terms, we can then say that the airport, through homesteading, has earned an easement right to creating X decibels of noise. This homesteaded easement is an example of the ancient legal concept of “prescription,” in which a certain activity earns a prescriptive property right to the person engaging in the action.
On the other hand, if the airport starts to increase noise levels, then the homeowners could sue or enjoin the airport from its noise aggression for the extra decibels, which had not been homesteaded. Of course if a new airport is built and begins to send out noise of X decibels onto the existing surrounding homes, the airport becomes fully liable for the noise invasion.
It should be clear that the same theory should apply to air pollution. If A is causing pollution of B's air, and this can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then this is aggression and it should be enjoined and damages paid in accordance with strict liability, unless A had been there first and had already been polluting the air before B's property was developed. For example, if a factory owned by A polluted originally unused property, up to a certain amount of pollutant X, then A can be said to have homesteaded a pollution easement of a certain degree and type.
Given a prescriptive easement, the courts have generally done well in deciding its limits. In Kerlin v. Southern Telephone and Telegraph Co. (1941), a public utility had maintained an easement by prescription of telephone poles and wires over someone else's land (called the “servient estate” in law). The utility wished to string up two additional wires, and the servient estate challenged its right to do so. The court decided correctly that the utility had the right because there was no proposed change in the "outer limits of space utilized by the owner of the easement." On the other hand, an early English case that an easement for moving carts could not later be used for the purpose of driving cattle.50
Unfortunately, the courts have not honored the concept of homestead in a noise or pollution easement. The classic case is Sturgis v. Bridgman (1879) in England. The plaintiff, a physician, had purchased land in 1865; on the property next to him the defendant, a pharmacist, used a mortar and pestle, which caused vibrations on the physician's property. There was no problem, however, until the physician built a consultation room 10 years later. He then sued to enjoin the pharmacist, claiming that his work constituted a nuisance. The defendant properly argued that the vibrations were going on before the construction of the consultation room, that they then did not constitute a nuisance, and that therefore he had a prescriptive right to keep operating his business. Nevertheless, defendant's claim was denied."
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O ciclo da social-democracia
Asks DeMint, "How can a nation survive when a majority of its citizens, now dependent on government services, no longer have the incentive to restrain the growth of government?" DeMint speaks of an "eleventh-hour crisis in our democracy."
His words echo those of Scottish Professor Alexander Tyler, writing more than 200 years ago, on the fall of the Athenian republic.
"A democracy cannot exist as a permanent form of government," wrote Tyler. "It can only exist until the voters discover that they can vote themselves money from the public treasury. From that moment on, the majority always votes for the candidates promising the most money from the public treasury, with the result that a democracy always collapses over loose fiscal policy followed by a dictatorship."
"The Engines of Government's Growth", by Patrick J. Buchanan
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His words echo those of Scottish Professor Alexander Tyler, writing more than 200 years ago, on the fall of the Athenian republic.
"A democracy cannot exist as a permanent form of government," wrote Tyler. "It can only exist until the voters discover that they can vote themselves money from the public treasury. From that moment on, the majority always votes for the candidates promising the most money from the public treasury, with the result that a democracy always collapses over loose fiscal policy followed by a dictatorship."
"The Engines of Government's Growth", by Patrick J. Buchanan
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2004/06/27
Santana Lopes primeiro-ministro?
Enquanto decorre no Blasfémias uma animada discussão sobre a pertinência/necessidade de realizar eleições legislativas antecipadas, a extrema-esquerda está aparentemente aterrorizada com a hipótese de Pedro Santana Lopes vir a ser primeiro-ministro. Assim sendo, e independentemente da discussão de fundo, há pelo menos uma qualidade a reconhecer a Pedro Santana Lopes...
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Novos links
2004/06/26
Sobre a presidência da Comissão Europeia
Commission Impossible, artigo de Craig Winneker.
Destaque:
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Destaque:
Here's a handy way to gauge the esteem in which the European Commission presidency is held: The man who is almost universally wanted for the job - and not without good reason - cannot be tempted to leave his current post as prime minister of…Luxembourg.
In fact, Jean-Claude Juncker apparently can't even be bullied into taking the job by some of Europe's most powerful leaders, though they are still trying. Why would a man prefer to run a country -it is actually more of a drive-thru bank for tax-dodging Germans and Belgians - of some 400,000 people rather than the cornerstone institution of a bloc of 25 countries and 450 million people? Well, it may be that Juncker, a chain-smoking, 49-year-old, center-right politician, simply wants to extend his record as Europe's longest-serving current head of government. And, yes, he promised his constituents that he would not decamp for Brussels if he was re-elected this year. They handed him an overwhelming victory, making one of the very few European leaders this year to not be repudiated by his own electorate. But more likely, he sees the job as an impossible one: trying to make the EU understandable to Europeans, trying to corral the desires of 25 (and the list is growing) nation-states, many of whom are not so keen on increased integration, trying to run a supranational institution that seems to produce as many laughable initiatives as it does laudable ones.
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2004/06/25
Prémio melhor título de post da semana vai para...
Edmund Burke on Iraque
David Bromwich is editor of "On Empire, Liberty and Reform: Speeches and Letters of Edmund Burke" (Yale University Press, 2000).
June 24, 2004
Edmund Burke, the greatest British political writer of the 18th century, was a principled opponent of wars and revolutions. Hatred of violence and love of liberty were the central motives of his work, and sudden political change, whether imposed from above or below, from within a country or by an external force, inevitably produced an increase of violence and a loss of liberty.
Above all, Burke opposed wars that were entered into from choice and not necessity.
The pertinence of Burke's thinking to the crisis in Iraq, as the United States seeks to impose a good revolution by force of arms on a large portion of the Arab world, requires little comment in view of the startling aptness of his words.
A "Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol," from which all of the passages below are taken, was composed in early 1777 when Burke was a member of Parliament from Bristol. England then appeared to be winning the war with America, yet Burke was alarmed by the means his country employed (for example, its reliance on mercenaries) and deeply skeptical regarding the announced purpose of the war:
the projection of British power into America in order to subdue the resistance of the colonists. (...)North and his administration, the "king's men," had persuaded themselves that America was full of friends who would welcome the stabilizing authority of British arms as soon as a determined show of force was offered.
This was not the first mistake of North and his administration. Burke believed that their preference for force over diplomacy had been the cause of the war. Why did they do it?
"Let them but once get us into a war, and then their power is safe, and an act of oblivion passed for all their misconduct."
"Has any of these gentlemen, who are so eager to govern all mankind, shown himself possessed of the first qualification towards government, some knowledge of the object, and of the difficulties which occur in the task they have undertaken?"
"They promise their private fortunes, and they mortgage their country. They have all the merit of volunteers, without the risk of person or charge of contribution."
"They are continually boasting of unanimity, or calling for it. But before this unanimity can be matter either of wish or congratulation, we ought to be pretty sure that we are engaged in a rational pursuit."
By a recent act of Parliament, England had suspended the protection of habeas corpus. Persons accused of treason in America could now be transported to England and jailed without a chance to confront the charges against them.
(...)
Burke saw a connection between the continuous violence of the war in America and the contempt shown for civil liberties at home:
"Power in whatever hands is rarely guilty of too strict limitations on itself."
"Not one unattacked village which was originally adverse throughout that vast continent, has yet submitted from love or terror. You have the ground you encamp on; and you have no more. The cantonments of your troops and your dominions are exactly of the same extent. You spread devastation, but you do not enlarge the sphere of authority."
Having failed to anticipate the difficulties of the war, the administration blamed the chaotic result on militias organized by the enemies of the empire. Burke, on the contrary, believed that the resistance was largely spontaneous, that it was becoming more virulent because of the presence of an occupying army and that its cause lay in human nature:
"General rebellions and revolts of an whole people never were encouraged, now or at any time. They are always provoked."
"If any ask me what a free government is, I answer that, for any practical purpose, it is what the people think so; and that they, and not I, are the natural, lawful, and competent judges of this matter."
Not only the outlines but many details of Burke's analysis show an uncanny resemblance to what critics of the Bush administration have said; so it may be asked what deeper continuity of political life accounts for the strength of the parallel. A tentative answer seems possible. When imperial conquest is grafted onto the normal structures of constitutional government, the change will produce grotesque distortions of thinking that undermine judgment and common sense."
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June 24, 2004
Edmund Burke, the greatest British political writer of the 18th century, was a principled opponent of wars and revolutions. Hatred of violence and love of liberty were the central motives of his work, and sudden political change, whether imposed from above or below, from within a country or by an external force, inevitably produced an increase of violence and a loss of liberty.
Above all, Burke opposed wars that were entered into from choice and not necessity.
The pertinence of Burke's thinking to the crisis in Iraq, as the United States seeks to impose a good revolution by force of arms on a large portion of the Arab world, requires little comment in view of the startling aptness of his words.
A "Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol," from which all of the passages below are taken, was composed in early 1777 when Burke was a member of Parliament from Bristol. England then appeared to be winning the war with America, yet Burke was alarmed by the means his country employed (for example, its reliance on mercenaries) and deeply skeptical regarding the announced purpose of the war:
the projection of British power into America in order to subdue the resistance of the colonists. (...)North and his administration, the "king's men," had persuaded themselves that America was full of friends who would welcome the stabilizing authority of British arms as soon as a determined show of force was offered.
This was not the first mistake of North and his administration. Burke believed that their preference for force over diplomacy had been the cause of the war. Why did they do it?
"Let them but once get us into a war, and then their power is safe, and an act of oblivion passed for all their misconduct."
"Has any of these gentlemen, who are so eager to govern all mankind, shown himself possessed of the first qualification towards government, some knowledge of the object, and of the difficulties which occur in the task they have undertaken?"
"They promise their private fortunes, and they mortgage their country. They have all the merit of volunteers, without the risk of person or charge of contribution."
"They are continually boasting of unanimity, or calling for it. But before this unanimity can be matter either of wish or congratulation, we ought to be pretty sure that we are engaged in a rational pursuit."
By a recent act of Parliament, England had suspended the protection of habeas corpus. Persons accused of treason in America could now be transported to England and jailed without a chance to confront the charges against them.
(...)
Burke saw a connection between the continuous violence of the war in America and the contempt shown for civil liberties at home:
"Power in whatever hands is rarely guilty of too strict limitations on itself."
"Not one unattacked village which was originally adverse throughout that vast continent, has yet submitted from love or terror. You have the ground you encamp on; and you have no more. The cantonments of your troops and your dominions are exactly of the same extent. You spread devastation, but you do not enlarge the sphere of authority."
Having failed to anticipate the difficulties of the war, the administration blamed the chaotic result on militias organized by the enemies of the empire. Burke, on the contrary, believed that the resistance was largely spontaneous, that it was becoming more virulent because of the presence of an occupying army and that its cause lay in human nature:
"General rebellions and revolts of an whole people never were encouraged, now or at any time. They are always provoked."
"If any ask me what a free government is, I answer that, for any practical purpose, it is what the people think so; and that they, and not I, are the natural, lawful, and competent judges of this matter."
Not only the outlines but many details of Burke's analysis show an uncanny resemblance to what critics of the Bush administration have said; so it may be asked what deeper continuity of political life accounts for the strength of the parallel. A tentative answer seems possible. When imperial conquest is grafted onto the normal structures of constitutional government, the change will produce grotesque distortions of thinking that undermine judgment and common sense."
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Pensamentos anti-federalistas VI
Euro 2004. Eliminamos o nosso maior "inimigo" e o nosso maior "aliado". Agora temos de fazer o mesmo à Constituição Europeia. Por uma Europa inter-governamental.
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2004/06/24
Irão e Iraque e o que pode correr mal
Via Yahoo!News, Thu,Jun24,2004
CIA planned guerrilla campaign in Iran to counter communists in 1953: documents
"(...)The top secret papers, produced in late 1952 and 1953 by the State Department and the National Security Council, provide proof that the widely-known US-British efforts to destabilize the government of prime minister Mossadegh were backed up by broad contingency plans that called for bolstering US military presence in the region and launching an anti-communist guerrilla force in the south of Iran.
The Mossadegh government, which drew the ire of Washington and London because of its persistent attempts to increase control over the country's oil resources, was toppled in an August 19, 1953, coup led by US-backed general Fazlollah Zahedi who allowed pro-American Shah Reza Pahlavi to return from exile.
US officials have grudgingly acknowledged that the coup had become possible due to CIA (news - web sites)-designed Operation "Ajax" that helped plunge Iran into chaos and paved the way for Mossadegh's downfall.(...)"
A razão? Existem sempre razões. Para todos os lados. O Irão quis nacionalizar a indústria petrolífera que foi exactamente o que os Britânicos fizeram à sua.
Com este golpe de Estado e o reinado de Pahlavi, 2 décadas mais tarde dá-se a reacção da Revolução Islâmica (unintended consequence...). Depois o Irão tem de se defender de Saddam, apoiado por americanos. Depois Saddam, em dificuldades com a baixa do preço do petróleo (na altura, o Koweit furava amplamente os acordos da OPEP e existem indícios que estava a colectar petróleo em terreno iraquiano - já para não falar na reivindicação desde sempre do território do Koweit), convencido da neutralidade americana (documentos oficiais mostram que o embaixador americano foi préviamente consultado sobre o assunto pelo próprio Saddam) invade o Koweit e aí temos:
Golfo I, tropas da Arabia Saudita, Sanções e bombardeamentos durante 10 anos pelos "aliados", ocupação israelita perdura e com agravamento de situação, 11/9, Afeganistão, Golfo II sem causas dentro do direito internacional, Ocupação do IRaque. Iraque completamente destabilizado, entre terrorismo fundamentalista e resistência à ocupação e tensões separatistas. Irão ladeado por duas ocupações.
Acho que o Irão irá fazer tudo para ter armas nucleares. E outros também. Já muitos as têm.
O que pode correr ainda mal? Na história, vemos como é provável acontecimentos inesperados ocorrerem a uma tal velocidade que ninguém os consegue parar (a Grande Guerra). Por exemplo, destabilização da monarquia da Arábia Saudita (desejada quer por Bin Laden quer por muitos neocons), EUA mais uma vez obrigados a intervir e ocupar outro país, desta feita, totalmente por causa do petróleo. Tensões crescentes em todo o médio-oriente. Facções internas mais duras no Irão conseguem tomar conta do Poder. Israelitas vêm a oportunidade para atacar a Sìria. E etc e tal.
Para uns um sonho tornado realidade. Para uns, morte e destruição revolucionária será sempre o caminho para a "Liberdade".
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CIA planned guerrilla campaign in Iran to counter communists in 1953: documents
"(...)The top secret papers, produced in late 1952 and 1953 by the State Department and the National Security Council, provide proof that the widely-known US-British efforts to destabilize the government of prime minister Mossadegh were backed up by broad contingency plans that called for bolstering US military presence in the region and launching an anti-communist guerrilla force in the south of Iran.
The Mossadegh government, which drew the ire of Washington and London because of its persistent attempts to increase control over the country's oil resources, was toppled in an August 19, 1953, coup led by US-backed general Fazlollah Zahedi who allowed pro-American Shah Reza Pahlavi to return from exile.
US officials have grudgingly acknowledged that the coup had become possible due to CIA (news - web sites)-designed Operation "Ajax" that helped plunge Iran into chaos and paved the way for Mossadegh's downfall.(...)"
A razão? Existem sempre razões. Para todos os lados. O Irão quis nacionalizar a indústria petrolífera que foi exactamente o que os Britânicos fizeram à sua.
Com este golpe de Estado e o reinado de Pahlavi, 2 décadas mais tarde dá-se a reacção da Revolução Islâmica (unintended consequence...). Depois o Irão tem de se defender de Saddam, apoiado por americanos. Depois Saddam, em dificuldades com a baixa do preço do petróleo (na altura, o Koweit furava amplamente os acordos da OPEP e existem indícios que estava a colectar petróleo em terreno iraquiano - já para não falar na reivindicação desde sempre do território do Koweit), convencido da neutralidade americana (documentos oficiais mostram que o embaixador americano foi préviamente consultado sobre o assunto pelo próprio Saddam) invade o Koweit e aí temos:
Golfo I, tropas da Arabia Saudita, Sanções e bombardeamentos durante 10 anos pelos "aliados", ocupação israelita perdura e com agravamento de situação, 11/9, Afeganistão, Golfo II sem causas dentro do direito internacional, Ocupação do IRaque. Iraque completamente destabilizado, entre terrorismo fundamentalista e resistência à ocupação e tensões separatistas. Irão ladeado por duas ocupações.
Acho que o Irão irá fazer tudo para ter armas nucleares. E outros também. Já muitos as têm.
O que pode correr ainda mal? Na história, vemos como é provável acontecimentos inesperados ocorrerem a uma tal velocidade que ninguém os consegue parar (a Grande Guerra). Por exemplo, destabilização da monarquia da Arábia Saudita (desejada quer por Bin Laden quer por muitos neocons), EUA mais uma vez obrigados a intervir e ocupar outro país, desta feita, totalmente por causa do petróleo. Tensões crescentes em todo o médio-oriente. Facções internas mais duras no Irão conseguem tomar conta do Poder. Israelitas vêm a oportunidade para atacar a Sìria. E etc e tal.
Para uns um sonho tornado realidade. Para uns, morte e destruição revolucionária será sempre o caminho para a "Liberdade".
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Pensamentos anti-federalistas V: The Antifederalist Papers
Muitos conhecem os "federalists papers" que defenderam o modelo federal para os EUA na sua fundação. Mais raro é encontrar alguém que conheça os "anti-federalists papers" escritos por aqueles que se opuseram a uma Constituição (Jefferson por exemplo era céptico, Benjamim Franklin quando regressou ao seu Estado depois da assinatura da Constituição, perguntaram-lhe: "então o que é que resultou?", ao que respondeu: " A republic, if you can keep it"), porque já existiam os "Articles of Confederation" para organizar políticamente as relações entre os Estados soberanos que saíram da Revolução Americana (na verdade, um acto de separatismo do Império Britânico, que...incluiu...sim...actos de "terrorismo". Muitos esqueçem até que já depois da Revolução, James Madison em 1812 fez tudo para os EUA declarassem guerra aos Britânicos por causa do Canadá, precisamente quando aqueles combatiam contra Napoleão. A verdade é que, até muito tarde nesse século, o espírito anti-britânico era muito comum (e assim, talvez alguns perceberão melhor a oferta da Estátua da Liberdade pelos Franceses).
Para já fica aqui a lista, espero comentar alguns deles mais tarde, mas passem os olhos pelos títulos. No meu julgamento, quase tudo que os anti-federalists disseram acabou por passar-se. A primeira dos quais foi:
"Se aprovarem uma Constituição vamos acabar por ter uma Guerra Civil (bem, um Guerra entre Estados)." (No. 7 ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION WILL LEAD TO CIVIL WAR )
A outra foi que a partir do momento que se criava a figura de um Governo Federal, mesmo que estipulado para ter funções mínimas, este acabaria por submergir a soberania dos Estados. E assim foi. Novas interpretações da Constituição, o crescimento natural de qualquer poder político e as crises que inevitávelmente provoca e ainda as guerras em que se envolveu, tornaram (ou cada vez mais fazem do)o sonho americano em mais um Estado Social-democrata de poder centralizado, com tendências de Império, o que a prazo, só nos vai fazer esperar, pela sua queda. É o ciclo natural das civilizações que acabam por desabar no seu próprio peso (que deriva da inevitável centralização a prazo).
Introdução:
During the period from the drafting and proposal of the federal Constitution in September, 1787, to its ratification in 1789 there was an intense debate on ratification. The principal arguments in favor of it were stated in the series written by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay called the Federalist Papers, although they were not as widely read as numerous independent local speeches and articles. The arguments against ratification appeared in various forms, by various authors, most of whom used a pseudonym. Collectively, these writings have become known as the Anti-Federalist Papers.
No. 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION: A DANGEROUS PLAN OF BENEFIT ONLY TO THE "ARISTOCRATICK COMBINATION"
No. 2 "WE HAVE BEEN TOLD OF PHANTOMS"
No. 3 NEW CONSTITUTION CREATES A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; WILL NOT ABATE FOREIGN INFLUENCE; DANGERS OF CIVIL WAR AND DESPOTISM
No. 4 FOREIGN WARS, CIVIL WARS, AND INDIAN WARS - THREE BUGBEARS
No. 5 SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND - A CASE IN POINT
No. 6 THE HOBGOBLINS OF ANARCHY AND DISSENSIONS AMONG THE STATES
No. 7 ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION WILL LEAD TO CIVIL WAR
No. 8 "THE POWER VESTED IN CONGRESS OF SENDING TROOPS FOR SUPPRESSING INSURRECTIONS WILL ALWAYS ENABLE THEM TO STIFLE THE FIRST STRUGGLES OF FREEDOM"
No. 9 A CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT IS A TYRANNY
No. 10 ON THE PRESERVATION OF PARTIES, PUBLIC LIBERTY DEPENDS
No. 11 UNRESTRICTED POWER OVER COMMERCE SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
No. 12 HOW WILL THE NEW GOVERNMENT RAISE MONEY?
No. 13 THE EXPENSE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT
No. 14 EXTENT OF TERRITORY UNDER CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT TOO LARGE TO PRESERVE LIBERTY OR PROTECT PROPERTY
No. 15 RHODE ISLAND IS RIGHT!
No. 16 EUROPEANS ADMIRE AND FEDERALISTS DECRY THE PRESENT SYSTEM
No. 17 FEDERALIST POWER WILL ULTIMATELY SUBVERT STATE AUTHORITY
No. 18-20 WHAT DOES HISTORY TEACH? (PART 1)
No. 18-20 WHAT DOES HISTORY TEACH? (PART II)
No. 21 WHY THE ARTICLES FAILED
No. 22 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION SIMPLY REQUIRES AMENDMENTS, PARTICULARLY FOR COMMERCIAL POWER AND JUDICIAL POWER; CONSTITUTION GOES TOO FAR
No. 23 CERTAIN POWERS NECESSARY FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE, CAN AND SHOULD BE LIMITED
No. 24 OBJECTIONS TO A STANDING ARMY (PART I)
No. 25 OBJECTIONS TO A STANDING ARMY (PART II)
No. 26 THE USE OF COERCION BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT (PART 1)
No. 27 THE USE OF COERCION BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT (PART 2)
No. 28 THE USE OF COERCION BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT (PART III)
No. 29 OBJECTIONS TO NATIONAL CONTROL OF THE MILITIA
No. 30-31 A VIRGINIA ANTIFEDERALIST ON THE ISSUE OF TAXATION
No. 32 FEDERAL TAXATION AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED POWERS (PART I)
No. 33 FEDERAL TAXATION AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED POWERS (PART II)
No. 34 THE PROBLEM OF CONCURRENT TAXATION
No. 35 FEDERAL TAXING POWER MUST BE RESTRAINED
No. 36 REPRESENTATION AND INTERNAL TAXATION
No. 37 FACTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION
No. 38 SOME REACTIONS TO FEDERALIST ARGUMENTS
No. 39 APPEARANCE AND REALITY-THE FORM IS FEDERAL; THE EFFECT IS NATIONAL
No. 40 ON THE MOTIVATIONS AND AUTHORITY OF THE FOUNDING
FATHERS
No. 41-43 (Part 1) Richard Henry Lee "THE QUANTITY OF POWER THE UNION MUST POSSESS IS ONE THING; THE MODE OF EXERCISING THE POWERS GIVEN IS QUITE A DIFFERENT CONSIDERATION"
No. 41-43 (Part II) (Richard Henry Lee) "THE QUANTITY OF POWER THE UNION MUST POSSESS IS ONE THING; THE MODE OF EXERCISING THE POWERS GIVEN IS QUITE A DIFFERENT CONSIDERATION"
No. 44 WHAT CONGRESS CAN DO; WHAT A STATE CAN NOT
No. 45 POWERS OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DANGEROUS TO STATE GOVERNMENTS; NEW YORK AS AN EXAMPLE
No. 46 "WHERE THEN IS THE RESTRAINT?"
No. 47 "BALANCE" OF DEPARTMENTS NOT ACHIEVED UNDER NEW CONSTITUTION
No. 48 NO SEPARATION OF DEPARTMENTS RESULTS IN NO RESPONSIBILITY
No. 49 ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS (PART 1)
No. 50 ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS (PART 2)
No. 51 DO CHECKS AND BALANCES REALLY SECURE THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE?
No. 52 ON THE GUARANTEE OF CONGRESSIONAL BIENNIAL ELECTIONS
No. 53 A PLEA FOR THE RIGHT OF RECALL
No. 54 APPORTIONMENT AND SLAVERY: NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN VIEWS
No. 55 WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? (PART 1)
No. 56 WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? (PART 2)
No. 57 WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? (PART 3)
No. 58 WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? (PART 4)
No. 59 THE DANGER OF CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ELECTIONS
No. 60 WILL THE CONSTITUTION PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF FAVORITE CLASSES?
No. 61 QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS REGARDING THE ELECTION OF CONGRESSMEN
No. 62 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART 1)
No. 63 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART 2)
No. 64 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART 3)
No. 65 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART 4)
No. 66 From North Carolina
No. 67 VARIOUS FEARS CONCERNING THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
No. 68 ON THE MODE OF ELECTING THE PRESIDENT
No. 69 THE CHARACTER OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE
No. 70 THE POWERS AND DANGEROUS POTENTIALS OF HIS ELECTED MAJESTY
No. 71 THE PRESIDENTIAL TERM OF OFFICE
No. 72 ON THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE; ON REELIGIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT
No. 73 DOES THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO POWER INFRINGE ON THE SEPARATION OF DEPARTMENTS?
No. 74 THE PRESIDENT AS MILITARY KING
No. 75 A NOTE PROTESTING THE TREATY-MAKING PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION
Nos. 76-77 AN ANTIFEDERALIST VIEW OF THE APPOINTING POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
Nos. 78-79 THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 1)
No. 80 THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 2)
No. 81 THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 3)
No. 82 THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 4)
No. 83 THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND THE ISSUE OF TRIAL BY JURY
No. 84 ON THE LACK OF A BILL OF RIGHTS
No. 85 CONCLUDING REMARKS: EVILS UNDER CONFEDERATION EXAGGERATED; CONSTITUTION MUST BE DRASTICALLY REVISED BEFORE ADOPTION
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Para já fica aqui a lista, espero comentar alguns deles mais tarde, mas passem os olhos pelos títulos. No meu julgamento, quase tudo que os anti-federalists disseram acabou por passar-se. A primeira dos quais foi:
"Se aprovarem uma Constituição vamos acabar por ter uma Guerra Civil (bem, um Guerra entre Estados)." (No. 7 ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION WILL LEAD TO CIVIL WAR )
A outra foi que a partir do momento que se criava a figura de um Governo Federal, mesmo que estipulado para ter funções mínimas, este acabaria por submergir a soberania dos Estados. E assim foi. Novas interpretações da Constituição, o crescimento natural de qualquer poder político e as crises que inevitávelmente provoca e ainda as guerras em que se envolveu, tornaram (ou cada vez mais fazem do)o sonho americano em mais um Estado Social-democrata de poder centralizado, com tendências de Império, o que a prazo, só nos vai fazer esperar, pela sua queda. É o ciclo natural das civilizações que acabam por desabar no seu próprio peso (que deriva da inevitável centralização a prazo).
Introdução:
During the period from the drafting and proposal of the federal Constitution in September, 1787, to its ratification in 1789 there was an intense debate on ratification. The principal arguments in favor of it were stated in the series written by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay called the Federalist Papers, although they were not as widely read as numerous independent local speeches and articles. The arguments against ratification appeared in various forms, by various authors, most of whom used a pseudonym. Collectively, these writings have become known as the Anti-Federalist Papers.
No. 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION: A DANGEROUS PLAN OF BENEFIT ONLY TO THE "ARISTOCRATICK COMBINATION"
No. 2 "WE HAVE BEEN TOLD OF PHANTOMS"
No. 3 NEW CONSTITUTION CREATES A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; WILL NOT ABATE FOREIGN INFLUENCE; DANGERS OF CIVIL WAR AND DESPOTISM
No. 4 FOREIGN WARS, CIVIL WARS, AND INDIAN WARS - THREE BUGBEARS
No. 5 SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND - A CASE IN POINT
No. 6 THE HOBGOBLINS OF ANARCHY AND DISSENSIONS AMONG THE STATES
No. 7 ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION WILL LEAD TO CIVIL WAR
No. 8 "THE POWER VESTED IN CONGRESS OF SENDING TROOPS FOR SUPPRESSING INSURRECTIONS WILL ALWAYS ENABLE THEM TO STIFLE THE FIRST STRUGGLES OF FREEDOM"
No. 9 A CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT IS A TYRANNY
No. 10 ON THE PRESERVATION OF PARTIES, PUBLIC LIBERTY DEPENDS
No. 11 UNRESTRICTED POWER OVER COMMERCE SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
No. 12 HOW WILL THE NEW GOVERNMENT RAISE MONEY?
No. 13 THE EXPENSE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT
No. 14 EXTENT OF TERRITORY UNDER CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT TOO LARGE TO PRESERVE LIBERTY OR PROTECT PROPERTY
No. 15 RHODE ISLAND IS RIGHT!
No. 16 EUROPEANS ADMIRE AND FEDERALISTS DECRY THE PRESENT SYSTEM
No. 17 FEDERALIST POWER WILL ULTIMATELY SUBVERT STATE AUTHORITY
No. 18-20 WHAT DOES HISTORY TEACH? (PART 1)
No. 18-20 WHAT DOES HISTORY TEACH? (PART II)
No. 21 WHY THE ARTICLES FAILED
No. 22 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION SIMPLY REQUIRES AMENDMENTS, PARTICULARLY FOR COMMERCIAL POWER AND JUDICIAL POWER; CONSTITUTION GOES TOO FAR
No. 23 CERTAIN POWERS NECESSARY FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE, CAN AND SHOULD BE LIMITED
No. 24 OBJECTIONS TO A STANDING ARMY (PART I)
No. 25 OBJECTIONS TO A STANDING ARMY (PART II)
No. 26 THE USE OF COERCION BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT (PART 1)
No. 27 THE USE OF COERCION BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT (PART 2)
No. 28 THE USE OF COERCION BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT (PART III)
No. 29 OBJECTIONS TO NATIONAL CONTROL OF THE MILITIA
No. 30-31 A VIRGINIA ANTIFEDERALIST ON THE ISSUE OF TAXATION
No. 32 FEDERAL TAXATION AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED POWERS (PART I)
No. 33 FEDERAL TAXATION AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED POWERS (PART II)
No. 34 THE PROBLEM OF CONCURRENT TAXATION
No. 35 FEDERAL TAXING POWER MUST BE RESTRAINED
No. 36 REPRESENTATION AND INTERNAL TAXATION
No. 37 FACTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION
No. 38 SOME REACTIONS TO FEDERALIST ARGUMENTS
No. 39 APPEARANCE AND REALITY-THE FORM IS FEDERAL; THE EFFECT IS NATIONAL
No. 40 ON THE MOTIVATIONS AND AUTHORITY OF THE FOUNDING
FATHERS
No. 41-43 (Part 1) Richard Henry Lee "THE QUANTITY OF POWER THE UNION MUST POSSESS IS ONE THING; THE MODE OF EXERCISING THE POWERS GIVEN IS QUITE A DIFFERENT CONSIDERATION"
No. 41-43 (Part II) (Richard Henry Lee) "THE QUANTITY OF POWER THE UNION MUST POSSESS IS ONE THING; THE MODE OF EXERCISING THE POWERS GIVEN IS QUITE A DIFFERENT CONSIDERATION"
No. 44 WHAT CONGRESS CAN DO; WHAT A STATE CAN NOT
No. 45 POWERS OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DANGEROUS TO STATE GOVERNMENTS; NEW YORK AS AN EXAMPLE
No. 46 "WHERE THEN IS THE RESTRAINT?"
No. 47 "BALANCE" OF DEPARTMENTS NOT ACHIEVED UNDER NEW CONSTITUTION
No. 48 NO SEPARATION OF DEPARTMENTS RESULTS IN NO RESPONSIBILITY
No. 49 ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS (PART 1)
No. 50 ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS (PART 2)
No. 51 DO CHECKS AND BALANCES REALLY SECURE THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE?
No. 52 ON THE GUARANTEE OF CONGRESSIONAL BIENNIAL ELECTIONS
No. 53 A PLEA FOR THE RIGHT OF RECALL
No. 54 APPORTIONMENT AND SLAVERY: NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN VIEWS
No. 55 WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? (PART 1)
No. 56 WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? (PART 2)
No. 57 WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? (PART 3)
No. 58 WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? (PART 4)
No. 59 THE DANGER OF CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ELECTIONS
No. 60 WILL THE CONSTITUTION PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF FAVORITE CLASSES?
No. 61 QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS REGARDING THE ELECTION OF CONGRESSMEN
No. 62 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART 1)
No. 63 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART 2)
No. 64 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART 3)
No. 65 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART 4)
No. 66 From North Carolina
No. 67 VARIOUS FEARS CONCERNING THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
No. 68 ON THE MODE OF ELECTING THE PRESIDENT
No. 69 THE CHARACTER OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE
No. 70 THE POWERS AND DANGEROUS POTENTIALS OF HIS ELECTED MAJESTY
No. 71 THE PRESIDENTIAL TERM OF OFFICE
No. 72 ON THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE; ON REELIGIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT
No. 73 DOES THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO POWER INFRINGE ON THE SEPARATION OF DEPARTMENTS?
No. 74 THE PRESIDENT AS MILITARY KING
No. 75 A NOTE PROTESTING THE TREATY-MAKING PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION
Nos. 76-77 AN ANTIFEDERALIST VIEW OF THE APPOINTING POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
Nos. 78-79 THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 1)
No. 80 THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 2)
No. 81 THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 3)
No. 82 THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 4)
No. 83 THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND THE ISSUE OF TRIAL BY JURY
No. 84 ON THE LACK OF A BILL OF RIGHTS
No. 85 CONCLUDING REMARKS: EVILS UNDER CONFEDERATION EXAGGERATED; CONSTITUTION MUST BE DRASTICALLY REVISED BEFORE ADOPTION
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2004/06/23
Pensamentos anti-federalistas IV
Governo Propõe Referendo à Constituição Europeia em 2005
Agora pergunto eu:
51% de votos, no meio de 50% de abstenção, pode obrigar a restante população a uma integração política com perda de soberania?
Não seria natural que apenas 2/3 dos votos ou até 4/5 o pudessem fazer? Não têm as constituições o cuidado de reservar maiores requisitos para determinadas decisões?
É que de contrário, também 51% de votos no meio de 50% de abstenção pode pedir a saída novamente.
Pior (ou melhor) ainda é pensar que uma qualquer região (a Madeira? o Algarve?) pode então evocar o princípio democrático (pela qual guerras se fazem para ser imposta e como substituição à não revolução pelos próprios interessados) para num referendo local de 51% de votos com 50% de abstenção pedir a secessão e tornarem-se independentes.
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Agora pergunto eu:
51% de votos, no meio de 50% de abstenção, pode obrigar a restante população a uma integração política com perda de soberania?
Não seria natural que apenas 2/3 dos votos ou até 4/5 o pudessem fazer? Não têm as constituições o cuidado de reservar maiores requisitos para determinadas decisões?
É que de contrário, também 51% de votos no meio de 50% de abstenção pode pedir a saída novamente.
Pior (ou melhor) ainda é pensar que uma qualquer região (a Madeira? o Algarve?) pode então evocar o princípio democrático (pela qual guerras se fazem para ser imposta e como substituição à não revolução pelos próprios interessados) para num referendo local de 51% de votos com 50% de abstenção pedir a secessão e tornarem-se independentes.
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Grand Delusion: Two Leaders Who See What They Want to See
"I believe Cheney.
I believe the vice president when he claims that there was a link of some sort between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda -- and by intended implication with the events of Sept. 11, 2001. I believe, that is, that he is not necessarily lying, not making things up.
I believe, in other words, that Cheney's -- and President Bush's -- insistence on this association is just more evidence that the two of them are blinkered by ideology and seeing precisely what they want.
I'll tell you a story.
There was a man who went to see a psychiatrist. First, the shrink showed him a picture of crossed sticks and then one of hundreds of little dots. "What's that?" the shrink asked. Snakes and ants having sex, the man replied. The shrink told the man he was obsessed with sex. "What do you expect," the patient replied, "when you keep showing me dirty pictures?" By Richard Cohen, Tuesday, June 22, 2004; Page A17
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I believe the vice president when he claims that there was a link of some sort between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda -- and by intended implication with the events of Sept. 11, 2001. I believe, that is, that he is not necessarily lying, not making things up.
I believe, in other words, that Cheney's -- and President Bush's -- insistence on this association is just more evidence that the two of them are blinkered by ideology and seeing precisely what they want.
I'll tell you a story.
There was a man who went to see a psychiatrist. First, the shrink showed him a picture of crossed sticks and then one of hundreds of little dots. "What's that?" the shrink asked. Snakes and ants having sex, the man replied. The shrink told the man he was obsessed with sex. "What do you expect," the patient replied, "when you keep showing me dirty pictures?" By Richard Cohen, Tuesday, June 22, 2004; Page A17
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"Homesteading Principle" ou o axioma da aquisição original de propriedade
Tenho sustentado que é impossível refutar o axioma da aquisição original, que foi formulado por John Locke e recuperado por Murray N. Rothbard para a sua enorme importância como princípio ético.
Se um individuo não adquire propriedade, usando/ocupando/transformando recursos no "estado da natureza" pensemos nas consequências:
Por exemplo, um agricultor que emigrou para as Américas ou qualquer outro território "livre" ou no "estado da natureza" (no sentido de, um local, onde nenhum titulo de propriedade pode ser reclamado), constrói a sua casa e usa determinado espaço para cultivar, pode a qualquer momento ser confrontado com a violência de um terceiro (por exemplo, um suposto liberal que não reconhece o homesteading principle)ou com um grupo de terceiros (socialistas que não reconhecem de todo direitos de propriedade a ninguém ou a atribuem a todos por princípio) a reclamar essa mesma propriedade.
Ora, a Ética existe para estabelecer regras que permitam a sustentação da vida humana sem conflitos, tendo em conta o livre arbítrio do indivíduo e perante recursos escassos. Num universo não escasso não existe necessidade de Ética. O direito de propriedade é a regra ética por excelência sem a qual o conflito será permanente e o desenvolvimento económico desaparece. Portanto, agora fica a questão: Como se adquirem direitos de propriedade de forma honesta?
Acho que alguns confundem dificuldades técnicas em situações particulares que devem ser resolvidas pela ciência jurídica com o princípio geral.
Devem estes reflectir que se aquisição de propriedade não é um processo independente de agentes externos (o Estado), ou seja, se não são os actos voluntários do indivíduo pela ocupação-uso-transformação ou a livre troca/contrato, a alternativa é qual?
É o Estado que atribui direitos de propriedade? Não, isso seria o mesmo que dizer que o Estado precede os direitos, quando a única - e mesmo essa é muito discutível - justificação para o Estado como monopolista no uso da violência num determinado território, é defender direitos e não defini-los (já agora, porque um Estado tem esse monopólio numa determinada área e outro noutra, é a razão para todos os conflitos territoriais, ou seja, todas as guerras são feitas por Estados na procura de um Status Quo).
Fica o texto de Murray N. Rothbard sobre o assunto:
Toward a Theory of Justice in Property
(...) Let Locke summarize these principles: "... every man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then, he removes out of the state that nature hath...he hath mixed his labour with it ... and thereby makes it his property."
We conclude, then, with the permise of absolute universal right of self-ownership as our first principle of justice in property. This principle, of course, automatically rejects slavery as totally incompatible with our primary right. (...)
Let us now turn to the more complex case of property in material objects.
(...) For if every mas has the right to own his body, and if he must grapple with the material objects of the world in order to survive (...) he has placed the stamp of his person upon the raw material by "mixing his labour" (...). (...) we again have three logical alternatives: (1) either the transformer, the "creator", has the property right (...); or (2) another man or set of men have the right to appropriate it by force (...); or (3) the "communal solution" - every individual in the world has an equal, quotal share in the ownership (...). (...)
The pioneer, the homesteader, the first user and transformer of his land, is the man who first brings this simple valueless thing into production and use. It is difficult to see the justice of dipriving him of ownership in favor of people who have never gotten within a thousand miles of the land (...). It is more difficult to see the justice of a group of outside oligarchs owning the property, and at the expense of expropriating the creator or the homesteader who had originally brought the product into existence. (...) The moral issue involved here is even clearer if we consider the case of animals. Animals are "economic land", since they are original nature-given resources. Yet, will anyone deny full title to a horse to the man who finds and domesticates it?
From our two basic axioms, the right of every man to selfownership and the right of every man to own previously unused natural resources that he first transforms by his labour - the entire system of property rights can be deduced. (...) We have thus established the property-right justification for the free-market process. For the free-market economy, as complex as the system appears to be on the surface, is yet nothing more than a vast network of voluntary and mutually agreed upon two-person or two-party exchanges of property titles (...). (...)"
Fica a referência também ao meu texto:
Alexandre Herculano, o axioma da aquisição original e como a desigualdade social emana da igualdade civil
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Se um individuo não adquire propriedade, usando/ocupando/transformando recursos no "estado da natureza" pensemos nas consequências:
Por exemplo, um agricultor que emigrou para as Américas ou qualquer outro território "livre" ou no "estado da natureza" (no sentido de, um local, onde nenhum titulo de propriedade pode ser reclamado), constrói a sua casa e usa determinado espaço para cultivar, pode a qualquer momento ser confrontado com a violência de um terceiro (por exemplo, um suposto liberal que não reconhece o homesteading principle)ou com um grupo de terceiros (socialistas que não reconhecem de todo direitos de propriedade a ninguém ou a atribuem a todos por princípio) a reclamar essa mesma propriedade.
Ora, a Ética existe para estabelecer regras que permitam a sustentação da vida humana sem conflitos, tendo em conta o livre arbítrio do indivíduo e perante recursos escassos. Num universo não escasso não existe necessidade de Ética. O direito de propriedade é a regra ética por excelência sem a qual o conflito será permanente e o desenvolvimento económico desaparece. Portanto, agora fica a questão: Como se adquirem direitos de propriedade de forma honesta?
Acho que alguns confundem dificuldades técnicas em situações particulares que devem ser resolvidas pela ciência jurídica com o princípio geral.
Devem estes reflectir que se aquisição de propriedade não é um processo independente de agentes externos (o Estado), ou seja, se não são os actos voluntários do indivíduo pela ocupação-uso-transformação ou a livre troca/contrato, a alternativa é qual?
É o Estado que atribui direitos de propriedade? Não, isso seria o mesmo que dizer que o Estado precede os direitos, quando a única - e mesmo essa é muito discutível - justificação para o Estado como monopolista no uso da violência num determinado território, é defender direitos e não defini-los (já agora, porque um Estado tem esse monopólio numa determinada área e outro noutra, é a razão para todos os conflitos territoriais, ou seja, todas as guerras são feitas por Estados na procura de um Status Quo).
Fica o texto de Murray N. Rothbard sobre o assunto:
Toward a Theory of Justice in Property
(...) Let Locke summarize these principles: "... every man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then, he removes out of the state that nature hath...he hath mixed his labour with it ... and thereby makes it his property."
We conclude, then, with the permise of absolute universal right of self-ownership as our first principle of justice in property. This principle, of course, automatically rejects slavery as totally incompatible with our primary right. (...)
Let us now turn to the more complex case of property in material objects.
(...) For if every mas has the right to own his body, and if he must grapple with the material objects of the world in order to survive (...) he has placed the stamp of his person upon the raw material by "mixing his labour" (...). (...) we again have three logical alternatives: (1) either the transformer, the "creator", has the property right (...); or (2) another man or set of men have the right to appropriate it by force (...); or (3) the "communal solution" - every individual in the world has an equal, quotal share in the ownership (...). (...)
The pioneer, the homesteader, the first user and transformer of his land, is the man who first brings this simple valueless thing into production and use. It is difficult to see the justice of dipriving him of ownership in favor of people who have never gotten within a thousand miles of the land (...). It is more difficult to see the justice of a group of outside oligarchs owning the property, and at the expense of expropriating the creator or the homesteader who had originally brought the product into existence. (...) The moral issue involved here is even clearer if we consider the case of animals. Animals are "economic land", since they are original nature-given resources. Yet, will anyone deny full title to a horse to the man who finds and domesticates it?
From our two basic axioms, the right of every man to selfownership and the right of every man to own previously unused natural resources that he first transforms by his labour - the entire system of property rights can be deduced. (...) We have thus established the property-right justification for the free-market process. For the free-market economy, as complex as the system appears to be on the surface, is yet nothing more than a vast network of voluntary and mutually agreed upon two-person or two-party exchanges of property titles (...). (...)"
Fica a referência também ao meu texto:
Alexandre Herculano, o axioma da aquisição original e como a desigualdade social emana da igualdade civil
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2004/06/22
UE e a paz na Europa
A propósito da UE como factor de "pacificação" da Europa, vale a pena ler este texto no EU Referendum.
Destaque:
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Destaque:
This myth has its variations. One that we shall hear more of in the next few months goes something like this: the EU has kept peace in Europe for almost sixty years and if it did not exist, there would undoubtedly be war between the various protagonists.
(...)
It is easy to go through the facts and point to the truth about peace.
Fact number one: peace was kept only in a small part of Europe, which happened to be under NATO protection and the nuclear umbrella.
Fact number two: this part of Europe also had American troops stationed in it and was amply provided with American military hardware. Like it or not, and many in western Europe, particularly France do not like it, but a great deal of American foreign policy in the fifty years after the World War II was taken up with the problem of protecting Western Europe.
Fact number three: the countries that contributed most to the protection of Western Europe and keeping the peace in it were not always those involved in the European project. Apart from the UK, the main contributions came from Turkey and Norway.
Fact number four: the main crises of the post war period happened outside the whole European project even if they happened in Europe. Where was the peace-keeping qualities of “Europe” when the Berlin blockade was defied, when Eastern Europe rose in revolt, when the Berlin wall went up? Discussing the Common Agricultural Policy, that’s where. There is no need even to mention problems outside Europe, like the Cuban crisis, the Vietnam war, the wars in Africa and Latin America.
Fact number five: the actual creation of a European Union in the Treaty of Maastricht coincided with the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. While the EU’s influence on events in the former USSR was strictly limited, in the former Yugoslavia it played a baneful part: by trying to construct a common foreign policy through encouraging Serbia under Milosevic to keep the “country” together at whatever cost and by imposing an arms ban on all the other participants, the EU helped to prolong the war and increase the number of victims. Fierce hostilities and massacres were taking place on European soil once again as the European Union was entering what was perceived to be the final stage of integration and, as expected, it was NATO, led by the Americans that imposed some kind of a temporary solution.
Fact number six: The EU is now systematically undermining the one successful alliance that did keep the peace in Western Europe: NATO, without putting very much by way of protection in its place. And all for what? To give itself a notional and structural foreign and security policy.
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Time to face down Iran
Perry de Havilland defende no Samizdata o endurecimento da posição britânica face ao Irão:
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The seizure of eight British sailors and their small patrol boats by Iranian forces means it is time for the British government to show that unless a swift accommodation is reached, the consequences will be severe for the Iranian state. If the UK forces did indeed stray into Iranian waters, nothing more than a curt apology is due the Iranian state, and only that if they return the British sailors and their equipment without delay. The Iranian state is a vile tyranny and the sooner they are put under real pressure the better.
(...)
But if the Iranians want to turn this into a hostage crisis however, the only response should be to use whatever force is required to resolve the situation, not just via anti-regime dissidents but directly by Britain against the Iranian state, and as soon as it is practical.
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Sobre o "Europeísmo" (3)
Uma reflexão interessante sobre a União Europeia n'O Observador:
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A União Europeia erra ao querer transformar uma boa ideia (um mercado livre, de livre circulação de pessoas, bens e capitais, com uma moeda única que facilite as trocas comerciais) num enorme pesadelo: A tentativa de uma união política que, por ser artificial, nunca existirá sem esmagar as pretensões de alguns países que, por essa mesma razão, a quererão, de futuro, abandonar.
O que me preocupa, na verdade, não é o texto constitucional europeu. É o enorme imbróglio em que nos estão a meter e as enormes chatices que iremos ter para o desfazer, sem guerras nem ressentimentos.
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Pensamentos Anti-federalistas III
A Europa das Nações é muito mais descentralizada que o actual federalismo nos Estados Unidos da América (que por sinal, acabaram por impor o seu federalismo pela força na sua Guerra da Secessão).
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Pensamentos anti-federalistas II
Não precisamos de federalismo para descentralizar aquilo que em primeiro lugar não está nem precisa de estar centralizado.
A "Europa" como organização inter-governamental não precisa de descentralizar (pelo Federalismo), aquilo que à partida não está centralizado (impostos federais, politicas economicas federais, segurança federal, etc).
Ou seja, a melhor forma de descentralizar na Europa é recusar o federalismo.
A melhor aplicação do federalismo é aplicá-lo aos Estados nacionais internamente.
A confusão que reina sobre este assunto, é de facto a melhor arma dos federalistas.
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A "Europa" como organização inter-governamental não precisa de descentralizar (pelo Federalismo), aquilo que à partida não está centralizado (impostos federais, politicas economicas federais, segurança federal, etc).
Ou seja, a melhor forma de descentralizar na Europa é recusar o federalismo.
A melhor aplicação do federalismo é aplicá-lo aos Estados nacionais internamente.
A confusão que reina sobre este assunto, é de facto a melhor arma dos federalistas.
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Rothbard versus Ayn Rand
Murray's own experience with the Randians was a case in point. In the late 50s, Murray and a group of his libertarian friends in New York City became interested in the burgeoning Objectivist movement, which had taken off as a result of the success of Rand's novel, Atlas Shrugged.
Murray wrote Rand a letter complimenting her on the novel, and soon joint meetings of the Randian "Senior Collective" and Rothbard's Circle Bastiat were being held. As advocates of laissez-faire capitalism, avowedly committed to the supremacy of reason, it seemed as if the Randians would be valuable allies.
But the Randians did not understand the concept of "allies": in their universe, you either agreed with all of their positions, or else you were consigned to the Outer Darkness. (Curiously, on the level of macro-politics, the Randians were grossly opportunistic.)
The Randian ideology was not so much an integrated philosophical system as a mythos, based as it was on Rand's novels. Unfortunately, as she got older, she imagined herself to be a philosopher, and gave up fiction writing to become the leader of a movement.
In her nonfiction tirades, Rand quotes mainly from her own works; this was due not only to her inflated self-estimate, but also to a colossal ignorance. She read almost nothing but detective novels, and her followers, usually considerably younger, were even worse. Although her philosophy of rational self-interest was an eccentric modern variation on a much older philosophical tradition, the only precedent she acknowledged was Aristotle.
While claiming not to be militant atheist – "It would be paying religion a compliment it does not deserve" – she denounced conservatives for their devotion to religion and tradition, dismissing them as "moth-eaten mystics."
Religion was also the main issue in the events leading up to Murray's break with the Randians: although Murray was an agnostic, his wife, JoAnn, was (and is) a Presbyterian. Apprised of this, Rand grilled Joey on the reasons for her religious faith and suggested that she read a pamphlet put out by the Randians that "disproved" the existence of God.
When Joey refused to recant her heresy, Murray was told that he had better find himself a more "rational" mate. That was enough for Murray. The break was finalized by his formal "trial" held by the Randian Senior Collective, which Murray declined to attend.
Murray's real talent as a satirist comes through in his deft characterizations: in Carson Sand, the imperious author of The Brow of Zeus, Murray has Rand down to a tee. With one well-placed brushstroke – "Jonathan's nose was permanently tilted at a 45 degree angle from horizontal" – Murray paints a vivid picture of cult leader Nathaniel Branden. His subtle portrayal of Rand's husband, the quiet, amiable, and rather intelligent Frank O'Connor, in the character of George, is imaginative and structurally clever: at key points in the drama, it is George, always speaking quietly amid the grandiose histrionics of the others, who asks key questions of Keith Hackley, the bewildered neophyte, and moves the action along.
Here, then, is "Mozart Was a Red," which represents the lighter side of Murray Rothbard, the side that those of us who knew him will always treasure and remember.
Introdução de Justin Raimundo à peça de teatro a propósito de Ayn Rand: "Mozart Was a Red", A Morality Play In One Act, by Murray N. Rothbard
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Murray wrote Rand a letter complimenting her on the novel, and soon joint meetings of the Randian "Senior Collective" and Rothbard's Circle Bastiat were being held. As advocates of laissez-faire capitalism, avowedly committed to the supremacy of reason, it seemed as if the Randians would be valuable allies.
But the Randians did not understand the concept of "allies": in their universe, you either agreed with all of their positions, or else you were consigned to the Outer Darkness. (Curiously, on the level of macro-politics, the Randians were grossly opportunistic.)
The Randian ideology was not so much an integrated philosophical system as a mythos, based as it was on Rand's novels. Unfortunately, as she got older, she imagined herself to be a philosopher, and gave up fiction writing to become the leader of a movement.
In her nonfiction tirades, Rand quotes mainly from her own works; this was due not only to her inflated self-estimate, but also to a colossal ignorance. She read almost nothing but detective novels, and her followers, usually considerably younger, were even worse. Although her philosophy of rational self-interest was an eccentric modern variation on a much older philosophical tradition, the only precedent she acknowledged was Aristotle.
While claiming not to be militant atheist – "It would be paying religion a compliment it does not deserve" – she denounced conservatives for their devotion to religion and tradition, dismissing them as "moth-eaten mystics."
Religion was also the main issue in the events leading up to Murray's break with the Randians: although Murray was an agnostic, his wife, JoAnn, was (and is) a Presbyterian. Apprised of this, Rand grilled Joey on the reasons for her religious faith and suggested that she read a pamphlet put out by the Randians that "disproved" the existence of God.
When Joey refused to recant her heresy, Murray was told that he had better find himself a more "rational" mate. That was enough for Murray. The break was finalized by his formal "trial" held by the Randian Senior Collective, which Murray declined to attend.
Murray's real talent as a satirist comes through in his deft characterizations: in Carson Sand, the imperious author of The Brow of Zeus, Murray has Rand down to a tee. With one well-placed brushstroke – "Jonathan's nose was permanently tilted at a 45 degree angle from horizontal" – Murray paints a vivid picture of cult leader Nathaniel Branden. His subtle portrayal of Rand's husband, the quiet, amiable, and rather intelligent Frank O'Connor, in the character of George, is imaginative and structurally clever: at key points in the drama, it is George, always speaking quietly amid the grandiose histrionics of the others, who asks key questions of Keith Hackley, the bewildered neophyte, and moves the action along.
Here, then, is "Mozart Was a Red," which represents the lighter side of Murray Rothbard, the side that those of us who knew him will always treasure and remember.
Introdução de Justin Raimundo à peça de teatro a propósito de Ayn Rand: "Mozart Was a Red", A Morality Play In One Act, by Murray N. Rothbard
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Pensamentos anti-federalistas
Ainda não percebi o que passa na cabeça dos liberais federalistas.
É certo que todos comungam mais na confiança da democracia (apenas um meio) do que no liberalismo em si (um fim em si mesmo), portanto podemos esperar mais uma confusão entre meios e fins.
O federalismo é um meio de descentralização, é óptimo para Estados Nação homogéneos devolverem soberania às comunidades, ou para evitar os separatismos em Estados de várias Nações (ex: Espanha). Por exemplo, no Iraque, só o federalismo poderá evitar que desabe mais um Estado artificial (tal com a Checo-eslováquia ou a Jugoslávia) desenhado pelos Impérios ganhadores da Grande Guerra (mas como os árabes não são suiços, acho que é uma esperança vã).
Agora, quanto à Europa. Qual a necessidade de federalizar? Nenhuma. Qual a necessidade de uma Constituição Europeia? Nenhuma. Sempre a confusão entre integração económica (que é feita pela sociedade civil) com a integração política.
E depois, o que legitima a federalização ou a Constituição? Se 51% de votos (e provávelmente apenas 25% da população) pode impor uma integração política ao resto da população, 51% de votos pode pedir a saída, ou um pedaço do território nacional pode pedir a secessão.
Claro que os federalistas têm uma solução...só fazem referendos quando e se lhes convém.
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É certo que todos comungam mais na confiança da democracia (apenas um meio) do que no liberalismo em si (um fim em si mesmo), portanto podemos esperar mais uma confusão entre meios e fins.
O federalismo é um meio de descentralização, é óptimo para Estados Nação homogéneos devolverem soberania às comunidades, ou para evitar os separatismos em Estados de várias Nações (ex: Espanha). Por exemplo, no Iraque, só o federalismo poderá evitar que desabe mais um Estado artificial (tal com a Checo-eslováquia ou a Jugoslávia) desenhado pelos Impérios ganhadores da Grande Guerra (mas como os árabes não são suiços, acho que é uma esperança vã).
Agora, quanto à Europa. Qual a necessidade de federalizar? Nenhuma. Qual a necessidade de uma Constituição Europeia? Nenhuma. Sempre a confusão entre integração económica (que é feita pela sociedade civil) com a integração política.
E depois, o que legitima a federalização ou a Constituição? Se 51% de votos (e provávelmente apenas 25% da população) pode impor uma integração política ao resto da população, 51% de votos pode pedir a saída, ou um pedaço do território nacional pode pedir a secessão.
Claro que os federalistas têm uma solução...só fazem referendos quando e se lhes convém.
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Sobre o "Europeísmo" (2)
Recomendo também a leitura do post A Europa que Resta, de CAA, no Blasfémias.
Destaque:
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Destaque:
Será que ainda vale a pena falar da Europa? Aqui ou no UK? Merece a pena lutar contra a aceitação generalizada e acentuadamente ruminante deste desenlace cinzento?
O silêncio acéfalo triunfou. A Europa dos burocratas, sem réstea de sonho fundador, a Europa triste, sem rumo, que solavanca de cimeira em cimeira culpando os outros das suas lacunas, a Europa de um modelo social esclerosado e anacrónico, a Europa dos políticos sem rosto, sem projecto para além do pessoal, sem nada, agora até sem pátrias, está aí para ficar.
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2004/06/21
Sobre o "Europeísmo"
Recomendo a leitura do post Pois é.., de MP no Eclético.
Destaque:
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Destaque:
Por mais que os 'eurocratas' tentem, de tudo e mais alguma coisa, para 'impingirem' o federalismo europeu aos, ou mais concretamente a alguns, Povos da Europa, tal não é, nem histórica nem sociologicamente, possível!
(...)
Aquilo que podia ser uma Cooperação entre Estados Soberanos, está a transformar-se numa 'feira de vaidades alemã' e no 'seu império tão almejado'!
Europeísta?
Nem pensar. Não serei, jamais.
Acredito na cooperação voluntária entre Estados Soberanos; e desprezo o falso consenso europeísta favorável à obtenção da 'cultura de subsídios'!!
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Ethical Rules and Human Rights
"...If a person A were not the owner of his physical body and all goods originally appropriated, produced or voluntarily acquired by him, there would only exist two alternatives.
Either another person, B, must then be regarded as the owner of A and the goods appropriated, produced,
or contractually acquired by A, or both parties, A and B, must be regarded as equal co-owners of both bodies and goods.
1) In the first case, A would be B's slave and subject to exploitation. B would own A and the goods originally appropriated, produced, or acquired by A, but A would not own B and the goods homesteaded, produced, or acquired by B. With this rule, two distinct classes of people would be created—exploiters (B) and exploited (A)—to whom different "law" would apply.
Hence, this rule fails the "universalization test" and is from the outset disqualified as even a potential human ethic, for in order to be able to claim a rule to be a "law" (just), it is necessary that such a rule be universally—equally—valid for everyone.
2) In the second case of universal co-ownership, the requirement of equal rights for everyone is obviously fulfilled. Yet this alternative suffers from another fatal flaw, for each activity of a person requires the employment of scarce goods (at least his body and its standing room). Yet if all goods were the collective property of everyone, then no one, at any time and in any place, could ever do anything with anything unless he had every other co-owner's prior permission to do what he wanted to do. And how can one give such a permission if one is not even the sole owner of one's very own body (and vocal chords)? If one were to follow the rule of total collective ownership, mankind would die out instantly. Whatever this is, it is not a human either.
Thus, one is left with the initial principles of self-ownership and original appropriation, homesteading. They pass the universalization test—they hold for everyone equally—and they can at the same time assure the survival of mankind. They and only they are therefore non-hypothetically or absolutely true ethical rules and human rights."
The Ethics of Liberty - introduction by Hans-Hermann Hoppe
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Either another person, B, must then be regarded as the owner of A and the goods appropriated, produced,
or contractually acquired by A, or both parties, A and B, must be regarded as equal co-owners of both bodies and goods.
1) In the first case, A would be B's slave and subject to exploitation. B would own A and the goods originally appropriated, produced, or acquired by A, but A would not own B and the goods homesteaded, produced, or acquired by B. With this rule, two distinct classes of people would be created—exploiters (B) and exploited (A)—to whom different "law" would apply.
Hence, this rule fails the "universalization test" and is from the outset disqualified as even a potential human ethic, for in order to be able to claim a rule to be a "law" (just), it is necessary that such a rule be universally—equally—valid for everyone.
2) In the second case of universal co-ownership, the requirement of equal rights for everyone is obviously fulfilled. Yet this alternative suffers from another fatal flaw, for each activity of a person requires the employment of scarce goods (at least his body and its standing room). Yet if all goods were the collective property of everyone, then no one, at any time and in any place, could ever do anything with anything unless he had every other co-owner's prior permission to do what he wanted to do. And how can one give such a permission if one is not even the sole owner of one's very own body (and vocal chords)? If one were to follow the rule of total collective ownership, mankind would die out instantly. Whatever this is, it is not a human either.
Thus, one is left with the initial principles of self-ownership and original appropriation, homesteading. They pass the universalization test—they hold for everyone equally—and they can at the same time assure the survival of mankind. They and only they are therefore non-hypothetically or absolutely true ethical rules and human rights."
The Ethics of Liberty - introduction by Hans-Hermann Hoppe
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Como Terminam as Democracias
Como Terminam as Democracias: Uma crítica actual aos órfãos da Praça Vermelha
Magnífico artigo de Jorge Pereira da Silva sobre o livro "Como Terminam as Democracias", de Jean-François Revel.
Destaque:
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Magnífico artigo de Jorge Pereira da Silva sobre o livro "Como Terminam as Democracias", de Jean-François Revel.
Destaque:
Seria salutar nestes tempos de cinismo socialista, lembrar os defensores do estatismo colectivista que foram eles os responsáveis pelas desgraças que se abateram sobre a Humanidade no século XX.
Os socialistas e não os liberais foram os responsáveis por todas essas desgraças. Seria bom lembrar, desde logo, que os totalitarismos do século XX tiveram uma única fonte: o colectivismo socialista.
Dessa raiz provieram as grandes ideologias que alimentaram o totalitarismo. O nacional-socialismo alemão não era nada mais do que uma forma nacionalista de socialismo coletivista. O mesmo podemos afirmar do fascismo de Mussolini. Os restantes intentos socialistas estão aí, com a variada gama de micro-modelos marxistas-leninistas, responsáveis pelas maiores massacres do século XX, como muito bem ficou ilustrado no livro de Stéphane Courtois, Nicolas Werth e outros, intitulado “O livro negro do comunismo”, já editado entre nós.
Jean-François Revel, da Academia Francesa, é um dos mais lúcidos críticos liberais do estatismo na tradição política do seu país e na actual conjuntura internacional.
O seu grande mérito consiste em lembrar a opinião pública dos riscos do colectivismo socialista, bem como do cinismo dos seus arautos.
(...)
Embora seja bastante simplório o arrazoado dos intelectuais socialistas, a desinformação por eles propalada, no sentir de Revel, tem conseguido ocupar espaços na imprensa e estender um cordão de isolamento contra aqueles que ousarem divergir do seu ponto de vista.
O próprio Revel confessa ter sido vítima, em França e nos Estados Unidos, da “censura” ideológica dos órfãos da Praça Vermelha e daqueles que, não sendo socialistas militantes, sentem-se contudo presos pelo imperativo categórico do politicamente correcto.
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Let Europe be Europe
Artigo de Victor Davis Hanson:
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To the small degree Mr. Bush supposedly encountered a more conciliatory attitude from Europeans, it was likely because wiser heads in Germany finally saw that their animus had nearly succeeded in generating an American consensus to end the free defense of Europe — not because of a new remorseful "multilateralism" by the president. A quarter of Americans now see France as an enemy — not an ally or even a neutral — and the number is growing. Any sane person who carefully examined America's relationship to Europe over the last 60 years would have advised the Germans and French not to throw away something so advantageous to their own national interests. But they did, and now we must move on.
It was moving to commemorate the Normandy invasion on its 60th anniversary, but politely left unsaid amid the French-hosted celebrations was the real story of 1944 and 1945. We owe it to the dead, not just the living, to remember it with some integrity and honesty. Most of the Nazis' own European subjects did little to stop their mass murdering. There was no popular civilian uprising inside Germany or out. Most Germans were hostile to the onslaught of American armies in their country, preferring Hitler and the Nazis even by 1945 to so-called American liberators. When they did slur the Fuhrer it was because he brought them ruin, not the blood of millions on their hands. When they did stop fighting the Americans, it was because the thought of surrendering to the Russians was far worse.
(...)
We seek not to punish Europe by our departure, but to save it from itself. The problem is not just that our troops are doing nothing in places like Germany, or merely that they are more needed elsewhere — they do real damage by their presence in enabling an increasingly strident and opportunistic pacifism and an anti-Americanism fueled by dependency and ignited by resentment.
(...)
But isn't the Atlantic Alliance critical to American security? Sadly, no. Right now it de facto does not exist and we are in no greater danger due to its absence. Instead, the key is not to force Europe to be an ally, but to ensure by our absence that it is a friend — or at least a Swiss-like neutral — in the present fight against terrorists and their sponsors. Shared intelligence and mutual encouragement against terrorists do not require NATO. Perhaps Mr. Powell needs to give up on expecting Europeans to do anything real in the present war, and Mr. Rumsfeld needs to praise them far more for doing nothing.
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Entrevista a Milton Friedman (3)
Nobel Prize-Winning Economist With David Asman
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DA: I've always wanted to ask you who you consider to have been the greatest president?
MF: Well, you have the almost mythic presidents like Washington and Lincoln. Let me talk, rather, of those presidents who I've known in my own lifetime. And there, there's no doubt in my mind that Ronald Reagan was by far the greatest.
DA: Why?
MF: Because he had real principles and he stuck by them. He made clear what he was going to do, and he did it. He didn't back down. And it took real principles to do what he did. For example, one of the things he was determined to do was to end inflation. Now, there's no way to end inflation without having recession. The month after Reagan became president, Paul Volker (then head of the Federal Reserve) started to slow down the rate of monetary growth. And that did lead to a recession. And that recession led to a sharp decline in the President's poll ratings. In my mind there is no other president in my lifetime who would have stood by to support the Fed in those circumstances.
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Entrevista a Milton Friedman (2)
Nobel Prize-Winning Economist With David Asman
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DA: In a time of war, how do we maintain our freedom?
MF: We don't. We invariably reduce our freedom. But that doesn't mean it's a permanent reduction. As long as we really keep in mind what we're doing, that we keep it temporary, we need not destroy our freedom.
DA: Are you concerned that some of the measures we're taking now to fight the war, like the Patriot Act, may be more than just temporary?
MF: It's not clear. The Patriot Act is a very complicated issue, and I'm not going to get involved in that. But I think that on the whole, this war is small enough relative to our economy that it is not going to be a serious impediment to our freedom. But the sooner we can get rid of it and out of it, the better.
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Inflação
"(...)In the last five months $213 billion new dollars have been added to the U.S money supply (M2). Amazingly, no one in the mainstream financial community questions this.
Looking over some past Federal Reserve archives one finds that $213 billion was all the money in circulation in 1962. Currently it is $6.2 trillion
(...)
My late friend, Nobel laureate (economics), F.A. Hayek told me years ago when I visited him in Germany that decades before he had a discussion with the renowned economist John Maynard Keynes, where Keynes told him that he (Keynes) had made a terrible mistake and was prepared to write an important piece to disavow deficit spending and hence paper money creation. But two weeks later Keynes died. World governments have all embraced Keynes’ mixed up theories because it gave them a convenient solution to cover up their economic mismanagement. Because of this, huge debts and huge piles of paper money have been fostered on populations creating what is now an economic tidal wave that is now on the horizon.
As inflation is always the result of excessive expansions of money in a society, we should simply do the math. Huge money increases equal huge producer and consumer price increases eventually. There is no doubt about the money supply increases, so there should be no doubt about a strong and prolonged inflation that has obviously started.(..."
THE FED AND THE GOLD PRICE, By Kenneth J. Gerbino, June 18, 2004
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Looking over some past Federal Reserve archives one finds that $213 billion was all the money in circulation in 1962. Currently it is $6.2 trillion
(...)
My late friend, Nobel laureate (economics), F.A. Hayek told me years ago when I visited him in Germany that decades before he had a discussion with the renowned economist John Maynard Keynes, where Keynes told him that he (Keynes) had made a terrible mistake and was prepared to write an important piece to disavow deficit spending and hence paper money creation. But two weeks later Keynes died. World governments have all embraced Keynes’ mixed up theories because it gave them a convenient solution to cover up their economic mismanagement. Because of this, huge debts and huge piles of paper money have been fostered on populations creating what is now an economic tidal wave that is now on the horizon.
As inflation is always the result of excessive expansions of money in a society, we should simply do the math. Huge money increases equal huge producer and consumer price increases eventually. There is no doubt about the money supply increases, so there should be no doubt about a strong and prolonged inflation that has obviously started.(..."
THE FED AND THE GOLD PRICE, By Kenneth J. Gerbino, June 18, 2004
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Entrevista a Milton Friedman
Nobel Prize-Winning Economist With David Asman
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David Asman: Are we more or less free today than we were in 1980, when your book "Free to Choose" (search) was published?
Milton Friedman: That depends on what you mean by "we." If "we" means the world, the answer is: by all means. After all, since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, millions of people who were under the Iron Curtain are much freer to chose now than they were then. Similarly, over the past two decades, in China, 1.3 billion people are freer to choose. Within the last half dozen years, in India, another billion people are freer to choose.
When you come to the Western nations, like the United States or Europe, the situation is not so obvious. Our freedom to choose has lessened. So we have a continuing fight between socialism and freedom.
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2004/06/20
Bill O'Reilly versus Rothbard
Bill O'Reilly, 2004:
Radio host and FOX News Channel host Bill O'Reilly told listeners that he has "no respect for" the Iraqi people; that he thinks "they're a prehistoric group"; that they are "primitive"; and that the lesson from the Iraq war is that "we cannot intervene in the Muslim world ever again. What we can do is bomb the living daylights out of them." His remarks on the June 17 broadcast of The Radio Factor came during a discussion of a recent poll -- commissioned by the Coalition Provisional Authority and obtained by the Associated Press -- that found that only 2 percent of Iraqis view U.S. troops as liberators and 55 percent would feel safer if U.S. troops left the country immediately."
Rothbard, 1994:
"Troops are usually sent first as purely "humanitarian" missionaries, to safeguard the "humane" aid of the UN "peacekeepers." But in short order, the benighted natives, irrationally turning against all this help and altruism, begin shooting at their beloved helpers, and the fat is in the fire, and the U.S. must face the prospects of sending troops who are ordered to shoot to kill."
Tendo em conta que foi escrito em 1994, também tem piada ler hoje:
"Wherever the problem is, the liberal-neocon pundits and laptop bombardiers are all invariably whooping it up for U.S. intervention, for outright war, or for the slippery-slope favorite of "sanctions." Sanctions, the step-by-step escalation of intervention, is a favorite policy of the warmongers.
Calling for immediate bombing or invading of Country X as soon as a grievance starts would seem excessive and even nutty to most Americans, who don't feel the same sense of deep commitment to the U.S.A. as Global Problem-Solver as do the pundits and elites. And sanctions can temporarily slake the thirst for belligerence.
And so it's sanctions: starving the villains, cutting off transportation, trade, confiscating their property in terms of financial assets, and finally, when that doesn't work, bombing, sending troops, etc."
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Radio host and FOX News Channel host Bill O'Reilly told listeners that he has "no respect for" the Iraqi people; that he thinks "they're a prehistoric group"; that they are "primitive"; and that the lesson from the Iraq war is that "we cannot intervene in the Muslim world ever again. What we can do is bomb the living daylights out of them." His remarks on the June 17 broadcast of The Radio Factor came during a discussion of a recent poll -- commissioned by the Coalition Provisional Authority and obtained by the Associated Press -- that found that only 2 percent of Iraqis view U.S. troops as liberators and 55 percent would feel safer if U.S. troops left the country immediately."
Rothbard, 1994:
"Troops are usually sent first as purely "humanitarian" missionaries, to safeguard the "humane" aid of the UN "peacekeepers." But in short order, the benighted natives, irrationally turning against all this help and altruism, begin shooting at their beloved helpers, and the fat is in the fire, and the U.S. must face the prospects of sending troops who are ordered to shoot to kill."
Tendo em conta que foi escrito em 1994, também tem piada ler hoje:
"Wherever the problem is, the liberal-neocon pundits and laptop bombardiers are all invariably whooping it up for U.S. intervention, for outright war, or for the slippery-slope favorite of "sanctions." Sanctions, the step-by-step escalation of intervention, is a favorite policy of the warmongers.
Calling for immediate bombing or invading of Country X as soon as a grievance starts would seem excessive and even nutty to most Americans, who don't feel the same sense of deep commitment to the U.S.A. as Global Problem-Solver as do the pundits and elites. And sanctions can temporarily slake the thirst for belligerence.
And so it's sanctions: starving the villains, cutting off transportation, trade, confiscating their property in terms of financial assets, and finally, when that doesn't work, bombing, sending troops, etc."
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Tony Blair e os anti-federalistas em self-denial
Insiste que a Constituição Europeia não é o caminho para uma Europa Federal. E parece que existe quem acredite, e assim se junte aos Liberais (ou será democratas?) que por razão desconhecida parecem acreditar que a palavra "Federalismo" é uma espécie de encantamento, uma evocação com propriedades mágicas que vai resolver problemas assim sejam soletradas pelas pessoas certas - os nossos líderes.
Problemas...mas que problemas afinal? Serão problemas de liberais? O Comércio Livre não carece de integração política, tudo o que é necessário é abrir as fronteiras, mas "abrir" não é própriamente uma acção que carece de esforço, apenas uma acção de abstenção pelo Estado de impedir os seus cidadãos de comprar aquilo que bem lhes apetece adquirir...livremente. Seguramente não é preciso um referendo para tal e ainda menos perder soberania - que radicais quem o contrário pensa, sempre a procurarem uma qualquer supra-estrutura humana e com a crença (não sei onde a arranjam, não será na história certamente) que ela pode ser contida com checks and balances.
Se existem territórios onde ainda subsistem algumas das liberdades do Liberalismo Clássico é precisamente em territórios ultra-pequenos e desintegrados (coitados) como Lichestein, Suiça, Andorra, Monaco, Dubai, Qatar, e todos os chamados pequenos paraisos fiscais (reparem, são "paraísos" porque os seus cidadãos não são objecto da extorsão em massa pelos seus próprios estados democráticos).
Serão os problemas das guerras europeias? Mas hoje já não temos os velhos Impérios, nem o Inglês - o que já era o maior de todos antes da Grande Guerra e ainda ficou maior depois, nem o Austro-Húngaro, nem os Germanicos, nem o Italiano, nem o Otomano, nem o Russo - tudo isso foi, infelizmente devorado no meio de um conflito estúpido, por causa das "alianças", e ajudado pelo idealismo ingénuo e perigoso de um Presidente americano que fez o favor de ajudar à queda das monarquias europeias para serem substituidas por repúblicas comunistas e fascistas e a inevitável Segunda Guerra. O que tem piada é que é comum encontrar Federalistas pela paz eterna de Kant que não perdem uma oportunidade de defender uma boa intervenção militar em qualquer parte do mundo, como dizia Rothbard:
"...Is someone starving somewhere, however remote from our borders? .... Is someone or some group killing some other group anywhere in the world? ... Is some government not a "democracy" as defined by our liberal-neocon elites? ... Is someone committing Hate Thought anywhere on the globe? ..."
E assim chegamos ao ponto em que a cada pequeno passo que se dá em direcção ao Federalismo ouvimos uns a negar que assim o seja e os Federalistas caladinhos a sonhar com a sua utopia.
A social-democracia também foi assim que se instalou, a cada pequeno aumento do estatismo - seja o fim coercivo do padrão ouro (e o princípio das grandes crises), o imposto sobre o rendimento (primeiro por liquidação depois por retenção), obrigar a poupar (a grande treta com que o Estado vendeu a ideia) para a reforma, o salário minimo, os aumentos graduais dos impostos (1% aqui, 1 % acolá, 3% por medida de emergência temporária que se tornou permanente) - não se chamava de socialismo (credo!), não, é apenas uma necessidade de consolidar o Estado - esse grande regulador dos excessos do livre contrato.
No Federalismo Europeu é o mesmo, cada escada que se sobe (ou será desce?) não é para construir um Super-Estado-Supra-Nacional. Não, é apenas para racionalizar e tornar mais eficiente a Europa das Nações e até, acreditam alguns, para regular uma grande sociedade liberal.
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Problemas...mas que problemas afinal? Serão problemas de liberais? O Comércio Livre não carece de integração política, tudo o que é necessário é abrir as fronteiras, mas "abrir" não é própriamente uma acção que carece de esforço, apenas uma acção de abstenção pelo Estado de impedir os seus cidadãos de comprar aquilo que bem lhes apetece adquirir...livremente. Seguramente não é preciso um referendo para tal e ainda menos perder soberania - que radicais quem o contrário pensa, sempre a procurarem uma qualquer supra-estrutura humana e com a crença (não sei onde a arranjam, não será na história certamente) que ela pode ser contida com checks and balances.
Se existem territórios onde ainda subsistem algumas das liberdades do Liberalismo Clássico é precisamente em territórios ultra-pequenos e desintegrados (coitados) como Lichestein, Suiça, Andorra, Monaco, Dubai, Qatar, e todos os chamados pequenos paraisos fiscais (reparem, são "paraísos" porque os seus cidadãos não são objecto da extorsão em massa pelos seus próprios estados democráticos).
Serão os problemas das guerras europeias? Mas hoje já não temos os velhos Impérios, nem o Inglês - o que já era o maior de todos antes da Grande Guerra e ainda ficou maior depois, nem o Austro-Húngaro, nem os Germanicos, nem o Italiano, nem o Otomano, nem o Russo - tudo isso foi, infelizmente devorado no meio de um conflito estúpido, por causa das "alianças", e ajudado pelo idealismo ingénuo e perigoso de um Presidente americano que fez o favor de ajudar à queda das monarquias europeias para serem substituidas por repúblicas comunistas e fascistas e a inevitável Segunda Guerra. O que tem piada é que é comum encontrar Federalistas pela paz eterna de Kant que não perdem uma oportunidade de defender uma boa intervenção militar em qualquer parte do mundo, como dizia Rothbard:
"...Is someone starving somewhere, however remote from our borders? .... Is someone or some group killing some other group anywhere in the world? ... Is some government not a "democracy" as defined by our liberal-neocon elites? ... Is someone committing Hate Thought anywhere on the globe? ..."
E assim chegamos ao ponto em que a cada pequeno passo que se dá em direcção ao Federalismo ouvimos uns a negar que assim o seja e os Federalistas caladinhos a sonhar com a sua utopia.
A social-democracia também foi assim que se instalou, a cada pequeno aumento do estatismo - seja o fim coercivo do padrão ouro (e o princípio das grandes crises), o imposto sobre o rendimento (primeiro por liquidação depois por retenção), obrigar a poupar (a grande treta com que o Estado vendeu a ideia) para a reforma, o salário minimo, os aumentos graduais dos impostos (1% aqui, 1 % acolá, 3% por medida de emergência temporária que se tornou permanente) - não se chamava de socialismo (credo!), não, é apenas uma necessidade de consolidar o Estado - esse grande regulador dos excessos do livre contrato.
No Federalismo Europeu é o mesmo, cada escada que se sobe (ou será desce?) não é para construir um Super-Estado-Supra-Nacional. Não, é apenas para racionalizar e tornar mais eficiente a Europa das Nações e até, acreditam alguns, para regular uma grande sociedade liberal.
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2004/06/18
Lusitano
Parabéns e obrigado
Após completar um ano de vida, acaba o Comprometido Espectador. Obrigado a Luciano Amaral por um ano cheio de posts de qualidade.
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Democratas Liberais
Depois de passar os olhos pelo "Warfare state - o novo bunker:(...)comprometido com o ideário democrático liberal..." apanho o esperado:
"Continuo acreditando que a Guerra do Iraque foi absolutamente justa, pelo simples fato que sempre me porei a favor de Guerra que pretenda substituir um ditador assassino por uma democracia"
Mas isso significa exactamente o quê? Não sei porque insistem em dizer que são "democratas liberais", porque parece que só acreditam no direito a "INVADIR O MUNDO" 1) para trazer o paraíso à terra que nos é conferido ao conferir o sagrado direito da maioria em repudiar direitos naturais do homem que não podem ser anulados por qualquer "mob rule".
Mas para isso mesmo, todas as guerras valem a pena (o que só acontece quando a alma é pequena)porque ... better you dead and free than you alive and not making the revolution that i dare you to do, but you insist in not doing it, and even if it´not my dam own business anyway.
1) INVADE THE WORLD , Murray N. Rothbard, September 1994:
"(...)But the liberal/neocon alliance, now tighter than ever before (now that Soviet Communism, which the neocons were harder on, has disappeared), pretended to agree, and then simply and cunningly redefined "national interest" to cover every ill, every grievance, under the sun.
Is someone starving somewhere, however remote from our borders? That's a problem for our national interest. Is someone or some group killing some other group anywhere in the world? That's our national interest. Is some government not a "democracy" as defined by our liberal-neocon elites? That challenges our national interest. Is someone committing Hate Thought anywhere on the globe? That has to be solved in our national interest.(...)
Wherever the problem is, the liberal-neocon pundits and laptop bombardiers are all invariably whooping it up for U.S. intervention, for outright war, or for the slippery-slope favorite of "sanctions." Sanctions, the step-by-step escalation of intervention, is a favorite policy of the warmongers. Calling for immediate bombing or invading of Country X as soon as a grievance starts would seem excessive and even nutty to most Americans, who don't feel the same sense of deep commitment to the U.S.A. as Global Problem-Solver as do the pundits and elites. And sanctions can temporarily slake the thirst for belligerence. And so it's sanctions: starving the villains, cutting off transportation, trade, confiscating their property in terms of financial assets, and finally, when that doesn't work, bombing, sending troops, etc. Troops are usually sent first as purely "humanitarian" missionaries, to safeguard the "humane" aid of the UN "peacekeepers." But in short order, the benighted natives, irrationally turning against all this help and altruism, begin shooting at their beloved helpers, and the fat is in the fire, and the U.S. must face the prospects of sending troops who are ordered to shoot to kill.
And then the whole world will subsist under the U.S. and UN flags, happy, protected, free of crime and poverty and hate. What could be more inspiring?
A few isolationist, narrow-minded, selfish, callous, and probably anti-Semitic gripers, however, are bound to complain. They like to talk about various "lessons," for example, Somalia. They like to say: well sure we can get in and "win" easily, but how do we get out? In order to fix up democracy, genocide, poverty, hate, etc., we the United States, must create the country's infrastructure, set up and train its entire army and police (preferably in the U.S.).
We must teach the benighted country about freedom and free elections, create its two Respectable political parties, and begin with a massive multi-billion dollar aid program to make everyone healthy, wealthy, and wise, provide an educational program (replete with dropping huge bags of food by plane so CNN can do handsprings – even if some of the "helped" are killed by the bags), outlaw smoking and junk food, and feed them all with tofu and organically grown mangoes.
But what about the Getting Out Party? What about our universal experience that when U.S. troops get out, the whole aid, infrastructure, etc. go down the drain? The solution is simple, though it has been far overlooked because some narrow-minded selfish fascist stick-in-the-muds will raise a fuss.
The solution: We Don't Get Out! Ever. So we don't have to worry about preparing the natives for transition. We should stay in there and cheerfully Run the World. Permanently for the good of all. A Paradise on Earth. (...)"
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"Continuo acreditando que a Guerra do Iraque foi absolutamente justa, pelo simples fato que sempre me porei a favor de Guerra que pretenda substituir um ditador assassino por uma democracia"
Mas isso significa exactamente o quê? Não sei porque insistem em dizer que são "democratas liberais", porque parece que só acreditam no direito a "INVADIR O MUNDO" 1) para trazer o paraíso à terra que nos é conferido ao conferir o sagrado direito da maioria em repudiar direitos naturais do homem que não podem ser anulados por qualquer "mob rule".
Mas para isso mesmo, todas as guerras valem a pena (o que só acontece quando a alma é pequena)porque ... better you dead and free than you alive and not making the revolution that i dare you to do, but you insist in not doing it, and even if it´not my dam own business anyway.
1) INVADE THE WORLD , Murray N. Rothbard, September 1994:
"(...)But the liberal/neocon alliance, now tighter than ever before (now that Soviet Communism, which the neocons were harder on, has disappeared), pretended to agree, and then simply and cunningly redefined "national interest" to cover every ill, every grievance, under the sun.
Is someone starving somewhere, however remote from our borders? That's a problem for our national interest. Is someone or some group killing some other group anywhere in the world? That's our national interest. Is some government not a "democracy" as defined by our liberal-neocon elites? That challenges our national interest. Is someone committing Hate Thought anywhere on the globe? That has to be solved in our national interest.(...)
Wherever the problem is, the liberal-neocon pundits and laptop bombardiers are all invariably whooping it up for U.S. intervention, for outright war, or for the slippery-slope favorite of "sanctions." Sanctions, the step-by-step escalation of intervention, is a favorite policy of the warmongers. Calling for immediate bombing or invading of Country X as soon as a grievance starts would seem excessive and even nutty to most Americans, who don't feel the same sense of deep commitment to the U.S.A. as Global Problem-Solver as do the pundits and elites. And sanctions can temporarily slake the thirst for belligerence. And so it's sanctions: starving the villains, cutting off transportation, trade, confiscating their property in terms of financial assets, and finally, when that doesn't work, bombing, sending troops, etc. Troops are usually sent first as purely "humanitarian" missionaries, to safeguard the "humane" aid of the UN "peacekeepers." But in short order, the benighted natives, irrationally turning against all this help and altruism, begin shooting at their beloved helpers, and the fat is in the fire, and the U.S. must face the prospects of sending troops who are ordered to shoot to kill.
And then the whole world will subsist under the U.S. and UN flags, happy, protected, free of crime and poverty and hate. What could be more inspiring?
A few isolationist, narrow-minded, selfish, callous, and probably anti-Semitic gripers, however, are bound to complain. They like to talk about various "lessons," for example, Somalia. They like to say: well sure we can get in and "win" easily, but how do we get out? In order to fix up democracy, genocide, poverty, hate, etc., we the United States, must create the country's infrastructure, set up and train its entire army and police (preferably in the U.S.).
We must teach the benighted country about freedom and free elections, create its two Respectable political parties, and begin with a massive multi-billion dollar aid program to make everyone healthy, wealthy, and wise, provide an educational program (replete with dropping huge bags of food by plane so CNN can do handsprings – even if some of the "helped" are killed by the bags), outlaw smoking and junk food, and feed them all with tofu and organically grown mangoes.
But what about the Getting Out Party? What about our universal experience that when U.S. troops get out, the whole aid, infrastructure, etc. go down the drain? The solution is simple, though it has been far overlooked because some narrow-minded selfish fascist stick-in-the-muds will raise a fuss.
The solution: We Don't Get Out! Ever. So we don't have to worry about preparing the natives for transition. We should stay in there and cheerfully Run the World. Permanently for the good of all. A Paradise on Earth. (...)"
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Lista contra a Constituição Europeia e uma Europa Federal
Como Europa Federal designo a existência de um Presidente Federal, Governo Federal, um Parlamento ou qualquer outro orgão político "representativo", eleições gerais europeias, impostos federais, uma Constituição, política externa e de defesa comum suportado em exércitos ou polícias federais, e/ou todos os passos dados que vão nessa direcção.
Como Europa não Federal designo uma organização Inter-governamental, presumindo-se a completa autonomia pelos sistemas legislativos nacionais na aprovação de legislação concebida ou proposta por Instituições Europeias, ainda que subsistam alguns mecanismos automáticos de transposição, mas que, formalmente poderão sempre ser postos em causa se assim for julgado necessário ou conveniente. O direito de não adoptar ou abandonar o Euro não exclui a capacidade de continuar presente nesta organização.
Proponho que se manifestem aqui quem é contra uma Europa Federal, identificando-se com o nome através dos comentários/"comentar", e actualizando-se, a lista periódicamente.
Lista:
1- Carlos Novais Gonçalves
2- João Carvalho Fernandes
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Como Europa não Federal designo uma organização Inter-governamental, presumindo-se a completa autonomia pelos sistemas legislativos nacionais na aprovação de legislação concebida ou proposta por Instituições Europeias, ainda que subsistam alguns mecanismos automáticos de transposição, mas que, formalmente poderão sempre ser postos em causa se assim for julgado necessário ou conveniente. O direito de não adoptar ou abandonar o Euro não exclui a capacidade de continuar presente nesta organização.
Proponho que se manifestem aqui quem é contra uma Europa Federal, identificando-se com o nome através dos comentários/"comentar", e actualizando-se, a lista periódicamente.
Lista:
1- Carlos Novais Gonçalves
2- João Carvalho Fernandes
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James Madison, Russel Kirk e Edmund Burke versus Michael Ledeen
Escrevia James Madison:
"The Constitution expressly and exclusively vests in the Legislature the power of declaring a state of war . . . the power of raising armies . . . A delegation of such powers [to the President] would have struck, not only at the fabric of our Constitution, but at the foundation of all well organized and well checked governments. The separation of the power of declaring war from that of conducting it, is wisely contrived to exclude the danger of its being declared for the sake of its being conducted."
E porquê esta preocupação?
Dizia Madison:
"Of all the enemies to public liberty war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes; and armies, and debts, and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few. In war, too, the discretionary power of the Executive is extended; its influence in dealing out offices, honors, and emoluments is multiplied; and all the means of seducing the minds, are added to those of subduing the force, of the people. . . . [There is also an] inequality of fortunes, and the opportunities of fraud, growing out of a state of war, and . . . degeneracy of manners and of morals. . . . No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare. . ."
Nota: Só o Congresso Americano pode declarar guerras (a última vez que isso aconteceu foi na Segunda Grande Guerra, todas as posteriores terão sido anti-constitucionais? - pensemos sobre o "valor" das constituições escritas...).
Nels Stemm falando sobre Russel Kirk e Edmund Burke:
In his essay "The Essence of Conservatism" Russell Kirk defines a conservative as "a person who endeavors to conserve the best in our traditions and our institutions, reconciling that best with necessary reform from time to time."
For most of us our best traditions and institutions are private voluntary institutions that have developed through the course of time; family, church, local community and government, the ties of honest commerce that create common interest.
These are institutions that provide meaning and beauty in life but more than their benefits in themselves they serve as intermediary institutions, protecting our local liberties and community against encroachments by what Edmund Burke called the various "armed ideologies" of egalitarianism and militant socialism. Conservatism has set itself against innovation in government – big government – because its ultimate effect is to diminish these institutions, weakening the ultimate foundation of a free government; civil society.
Diz Nels Stemm:
"You will notice the quote above calls out for conserving our institutions, that subtle distinction is a major component of conservatism. American conservatism is rooted in American culture and history and can not be separated from it; conservatism seeks to guard our institutions and our culture against its enemies. This is why the Wilsonian impulses of the Bush administration are so contrary to true American conservatism, they profess that our values are "universal" rather than particular to us.
American mass democracy (not the founding intent of this country but that is another story) has a messianic mission, in the words of neoconservative theorist Michael Ledeen:
"Creative destruction is our middle name, both within our own society and abroad. We tear down the old order every day, from business to science, literature, art, architecture, and cinema to politics and the law. Our enemies have always hated this whirlwind of energy and creativity, which menaces their traditions (whatever they may be) and shames them for their inability to keep pace. Seeing America undo traditional societies, they fear us, for they do not wish to be undone. They cannot feel secure so long as we are there, for our very existence – our existence, not our politics – threatens their legitimacy. They must attack us in order to survive, just as we must destroy them to advance our historic mission."
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"The Constitution expressly and exclusively vests in the Legislature the power of declaring a state of war . . . the power of raising armies . . . A delegation of such powers [to the President] would have struck, not only at the fabric of our Constitution, but at the foundation of all well organized and well checked governments. The separation of the power of declaring war from that of conducting it, is wisely contrived to exclude the danger of its being declared for the sake of its being conducted."
E porquê esta preocupação?
Dizia Madison:
"Of all the enemies to public liberty war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes; and armies, and debts, and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few. In war, too, the discretionary power of the Executive is extended; its influence in dealing out offices, honors, and emoluments is multiplied; and all the means of seducing the minds, are added to those of subduing the force, of the people. . . . [There is also an] inequality of fortunes, and the opportunities of fraud, growing out of a state of war, and . . . degeneracy of manners and of morals. . . . No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare. . ."
Nota: Só o Congresso Americano pode declarar guerras (a última vez que isso aconteceu foi na Segunda Grande Guerra, todas as posteriores terão sido anti-constitucionais? - pensemos sobre o "valor" das constituições escritas...).
Nels Stemm falando sobre Russel Kirk e Edmund Burke:
In his essay "The Essence of Conservatism" Russell Kirk defines a conservative as "a person who endeavors to conserve the best in our traditions and our institutions, reconciling that best with necessary reform from time to time."
For most of us our best traditions and institutions are private voluntary institutions that have developed through the course of time; family, church, local community and government, the ties of honest commerce that create common interest.
These are institutions that provide meaning and beauty in life but more than their benefits in themselves they serve as intermediary institutions, protecting our local liberties and community against encroachments by what Edmund Burke called the various "armed ideologies" of egalitarianism and militant socialism. Conservatism has set itself against innovation in government – big government – because its ultimate effect is to diminish these institutions, weakening the ultimate foundation of a free government; civil society.
Diz Nels Stemm:
"You will notice the quote above calls out for conserving our institutions, that subtle distinction is a major component of conservatism. American conservatism is rooted in American culture and history and can not be separated from it; conservatism seeks to guard our institutions and our culture against its enemies. This is why the Wilsonian impulses of the Bush administration are so contrary to true American conservatism, they profess that our values are "universal" rather than particular to us.
American mass democracy (not the founding intent of this country but that is another story) has a messianic mission, in the words of neoconservative theorist Michael Ledeen:
"Creative destruction is our middle name, both within our own society and abroad. We tear down the old order every day, from business to science, literature, art, architecture, and cinema to politics and the law. Our enemies have always hated this whirlwind of energy and creativity, which menaces their traditions (whatever they may be) and shames them for their inability to keep pace. Seeing America undo traditional societies, they fear us, for they do not wish to be undone. They cannot feel secure so long as we are there, for our very existence – our existence, not our politics – threatens their legitimacy. They must attack us in order to survive, just as we must destroy them to advance our historic mission."
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2004/06/17
The State
"(...)once an agency possesses any judiciary monopoly, it will naturally tend to employ this privileged position for the further expansion of its range of jurisdiction. Constitutions, after all, are state-constitutions, and whatever limitations they may contain—what is or is not constitutional—is determined by state courts and judges."
(...) a territorial monopoly of protection and jurisdiction—a state—from the outset on an impermissible act of expropriation, and it provides the monopolist and his agents with a license to from discontinuing his cooperation with his supposed protector, and that no one except the monopolist may exercise ultimate jurisdiction over his own property.
Rather, everyone (except the monopolist) has lost his right to physical protection and defense against possible invasion by the state and is thus rendered defenseless vis-à-vis the actions of his own alleged protector.
Consequently, the price of justice and protection will continually rise and the quality of justice and protection will continually fall. A tax-funded protection agency is a contradiction in terms—an invasive protector—and will, if permitted, lead to increasingly more taxes and ever less protection.
Likewise, the existence of a judicial monopoly will lead to a steady deterioration of justice. For if no one can appeal for justice except to the state and its courts and judges, justice will be constantly perverted in favor of the state until the idea of immutable laws of human conduct ultimately disappears and is replaced with the idea of law as positive state-made legislation.
Based on this analysis, Rothbard considered the classical-liberal solution to the fundamental human problem of protection—of a minimal or night-watchman state, or an otherwise "constitutionally limited" government—as a hopelessly confused and naive idea.
Every minimal state has the inherent tendency to become a maximal state, for once an agency is permitted to collect any taxes, however small and for whatever purpose, it will naturally tend to employ its current tax revenue for the collection of ever more future taxes for the same and/or other purposes. Similarly, once an agency possesses any judiciary monopoly, it will naturally tend to employ this privileged position for the further expansion of its range of jurisdiction.
(...) Hence, there is no other possible way of limiting state power except by eliminating the state altogether and, in accordance with justice and economics, establishing a free market in protection and security services.
Hans-Hermann Hoppe
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(...) a territorial monopoly of protection and jurisdiction—a state—from the outset on an impermissible act of expropriation, and it provides the monopolist and his agents with a license to from discontinuing his cooperation with his supposed protector, and that no one except the monopolist may exercise ultimate jurisdiction over his own property.
Rather, everyone (except the monopolist) has lost his right to physical protection and defense against possible invasion by the state and is thus rendered defenseless vis-à-vis the actions of his own alleged protector.
Consequently, the price of justice and protection will continually rise and the quality of justice and protection will continually fall. A tax-funded protection agency is a contradiction in terms—an invasive protector—and will, if permitted, lead to increasingly more taxes and ever less protection.
Likewise, the existence of a judicial monopoly will lead to a steady deterioration of justice. For if no one can appeal for justice except to the state and its courts and judges, justice will be constantly perverted in favor of the state until the idea of immutable laws of human conduct ultimately disappears and is replaced with the idea of law as positive state-made legislation.
Based on this analysis, Rothbard considered the classical-liberal solution to the fundamental human problem of protection—of a minimal or night-watchman state, or an otherwise "constitutionally limited" government—as a hopelessly confused and naive idea.
Every minimal state has the inherent tendency to become a maximal state, for once an agency is permitted to collect any taxes, however small and for whatever purpose, it will naturally tend to employ its current tax revenue for the collection of ever more future taxes for the same and/or other purposes. Similarly, once an agency possesses any judiciary monopoly, it will naturally tend to employ this privileged position for the further expansion of its range of jurisdiction.
(...) Hence, there is no other possible way of limiting state power except by eliminating the state altogether and, in accordance with justice and economics, establishing a free market in protection and security services.
Hans-Hermann Hoppe
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Lista contra a Constituição Europeia e uma Europa Federal
Como Europa Federal designo a existência de um Presidente Federal, Governo Federal, um Parlamento ou qualquer outro orgão político "representativo", eleições gerais europeias, impostos federais, uma Constituição, política externa e de defesa comum suportado em exércitos ou polícias federais, e/ou todos os passos dados que vão nessa direcção.
Como Europa não Federal designo uma organização Inter-governamental, presumindo-se a completa autonomia pelos sistemas legislativos nacionais na aprovação de legislação concebida ou proposta por Instituições Europeias, ainda que subsistam alguns mecanismos automáticos de transposição, mas que, formalmente poderão sempre ser postos em causa se assim for julgado necessário ou conveniente. O direito de não adoptar ou abandonar o Euro não exclui a capacidade de continuar presente nesta organização.
Proponho que se manifestem aqui quem é contra uma Europa Federal, identificando-se com o nome através dos comentários/"comentar", e actualizando-se, a lista periódicamente.
Lista:
1- Carlos Novais Gonçalves
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Como Europa não Federal designo uma organização Inter-governamental, presumindo-se a completa autonomia pelos sistemas legislativos nacionais na aprovação de legislação concebida ou proposta por Instituições Europeias, ainda que subsistam alguns mecanismos automáticos de transposição, mas que, formalmente poderão sempre ser postos em causa se assim for julgado necessário ou conveniente. O direito de não adoptar ou abandonar o Euro não exclui a capacidade de continuar presente nesta organização.
Proponho que se manifestem aqui quem é contra uma Europa Federal, identificando-se com o nome através dos comentários/"comentar", e actualizando-se, a lista periódicamente.
Lista:
1- Carlos Novais Gonçalves
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2004/06/16
The Greatest Generation?
By Joseph Sobran
"(...)I’m put off by all this raving about World War II veterans as “the greatest generation.”
(...)
we to think they all pondered the merits of the war, and independently arrived at the same conclusion? Or did they merely obey the state en masse, just as Japanese and German boys did?
What is really being glorified is not the veteran, but the war itself. It was a war most Americans at the time wanted to stay out of, and rightly so; but Franklin Roosevelt did all he could to involve us anyway, provoking the Germans and Japanese at every opportunity.
Yes, the United States won. It gained a global empire and nuclear weapons, but was unable to control the genie that had been released. The government became far bigger than ever, fantastically different from the modest federation designed by its Founders; militaristic and bureaucratic habits became second nature to Americans, who have lost all sense of proportion about themselves and are baffled and irritated by the inevitable result: anti-Americanism around the world. (...)
It’s not that Americans are especially wicked; it’s just that power has severely damaged their capacity for objectivity about themselves, as witness President Bush’s identification of America with invincible virtue. That attitude is a legacy of the total victory of World War II. It’s what the Greeks called hubris. No wonder people around the world are rejoicing at our failure in Iraq.
Those who call World War II “the good war” love to recall the alliance between Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. Actually, the two men disliked each other. Roosevelt despised the British Empire; he saw the Soviet Union as America’s postwar partner in ruling the world, and he much preferred Joseph Stalin to Churchill. At the Tehran and Yalta conferences, he enjoyed amusing Stalin by slighting Churchill. For the wary Stalin, Roosevelt was a pleasant surprise, easy to manipulate.
Stalin too emerged from the war — “the Great Patriotic War,” as he dubbed it — with a greatly enlarged empire. Soon he also had nuclear weapons. He never said he had conquered the countries of Eastern Europe; no, they had been “liberated.”
(...)
In wartime, hatred becomes mandatory; neutrality is impermissible, a cowardly refusal to choose between good and evil. Thoughtful people with humane reservations about the war are apt to find their loyalty suspect, or to be branded as traitors, whose very doubts, if expressed, lend aid and comfort to the enemy. Even the line between the soldier and the civilian may be erased, as when Bush is called “our commander in chief,” when, properly speaking, the president is merely commander in chief of the armed forces. The tendency to make the executive a dictator is also typical of wartime.(...)
The naive view of the president as dictator is expressed in the common belief that Lincoln “abolished slavery” — as if any president, at any time, might have abolished it with a stroke of the pen. The twin myths of Lincoln and Roosevelt as great wartime presidents serve to exalt the power of the U.S. Government. So does the myth of “the greatest generation.”
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"(...)I’m put off by all this raving about World War II veterans as “the greatest generation.”
(...)
we to think they all pondered the merits of the war, and independently arrived at the same conclusion? Or did they merely obey the state en masse, just as Japanese and German boys did?
What is really being glorified is not the veteran, but the war itself. It was a war most Americans at the time wanted to stay out of, and rightly so; but Franklin Roosevelt did all he could to involve us anyway, provoking the Germans and Japanese at every opportunity.
Yes, the United States won. It gained a global empire and nuclear weapons, but was unable to control the genie that had been released. The government became far bigger than ever, fantastically different from the modest federation designed by its Founders; militaristic and bureaucratic habits became second nature to Americans, who have lost all sense of proportion about themselves and are baffled and irritated by the inevitable result: anti-Americanism around the world. (...)
It’s not that Americans are especially wicked; it’s just that power has severely damaged their capacity for objectivity about themselves, as witness President Bush’s identification of America with invincible virtue. That attitude is a legacy of the total victory of World War II. It’s what the Greeks called hubris. No wonder people around the world are rejoicing at our failure in Iraq.
Those who call World War II “the good war” love to recall the alliance between Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. Actually, the two men disliked each other. Roosevelt despised the British Empire; he saw the Soviet Union as America’s postwar partner in ruling the world, and he much preferred Joseph Stalin to Churchill. At the Tehran and Yalta conferences, he enjoyed amusing Stalin by slighting Churchill. For the wary Stalin, Roosevelt was a pleasant surprise, easy to manipulate.
Stalin too emerged from the war — “the Great Patriotic War,” as he dubbed it — with a greatly enlarged empire. Soon he also had nuclear weapons. He never said he had conquered the countries of Eastern Europe; no, they had been “liberated.”
(...)
In wartime, hatred becomes mandatory; neutrality is impermissible, a cowardly refusal to choose between good and evil. Thoughtful people with humane reservations about the war are apt to find their loyalty suspect, or to be branded as traitors, whose very doubts, if expressed, lend aid and comfort to the enemy. Even the line between the soldier and the civilian may be erased, as when Bush is called “our commander in chief,” when, properly speaking, the president is merely commander in chief of the armed forces. The tendency to make the executive a dictator is also typical of wartime.(...)
The naive view of the president as dictator is expressed in the common belief that Lincoln “abolished slavery” — as if any president, at any time, might have abolished it with a stroke of the pen. The twin myths of Lincoln and Roosevelt as great wartime presidents serve to exalt the power of the U.S. Government. So does the myth of “the greatest generation.”
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2004/06/15
Os federalistas...
têm muita piada.
Perante a elevada abstenção conseguem concluir que o problema é não existir um Governo Federal.
Pois por mim já temos federalismo a mais, acabem com o Parlamento Europeu e mantenham apenas o carácter inter-governamental das instituições europeias.
Outro truque dos federalistas é apontarem para o carácter "não" democrático da Comissão Europeia, como se os governos nacionais o fossem - ou seja, como se os membros de um governo fossem nomeados por eleições directas. Repetem esta lenga lenga para claro, estabelecer o seu tão desejado sonho de eleições europeias "realmente" importantes.
E por último, o problema dos federalistas (principalmente os que confundem globalização económica com globalização política) é pensarem (é o que está implícito na sua teoria) que o mundo seria mais livre se tivessemos um governo mundial eleito por eleições mundiais (metade seria chinês e outra indiana, uns tantos muçulmanos e talvez um simbólico representante cristão).
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Perante a elevada abstenção conseguem concluir que o problema é não existir um Governo Federal.
Pois por mim já temos federalismo a mais, acabem com o Parlamento Europeu e mantenham apenas o carácter inter-governamental das instituições europeias.
Outro truque dos federalistas é apontarem para o carácter "não" democrático da Comissão Europeia, como se os governos nacionais o fossem - ou seja, como se os membros de um governo fossem nomeados por eleições directas. Repetem esta lenga lenga para claro, estabelecer o seu tão desejado sonho de eleições europeias "realmente" importantes.
E por último, o problema dos federalistas (principalmente os que confundem globalização económica com globalização política) é pensarem (é o que está implícito na sua teoria) que o mundo seria mais livre se tivessemos um governo mundial eleito por eleições mundiais (metade seria chinês e outra indiana, uns tantos muçulmanos e talvez um simbólico representante cristão).
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2004/06/14
Euro-cepticismo aumenta
Shock swing towards euroscepticism in European Parliament elections
With most of the results counted, it is clear that smaller, eurosceptic or populist parties have triumphed at the expense of more well-established parties.
The biggest shock for the establishment undoubtedly comes from the UK, where the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which wants complete withdrawal from the EU, secured 17 p