2005/03/31

Re: Leituras: State-building 

No Blasfémias. Lê-se na conclusão da análise do livro de Fukuyama pela defesa do Estado "smaller but strong" (o que, desculpem será sempre uma espécie de contradição - mostrem-me uma qualquer fonte de poder forte sem tendência enexorável para crescer...) e que defende também que:

1) "História da Humanidade é mais a História do totalitarismo do que a História da Liberdade"

Não é bem verdade. Totalitarismo é um fenómeno da modernidade, do século 20, em especial do que obtivemos quando as monarquias europeias cairam pós Grande Guerra: as repúblicas fascistas e o comunistas.

Anteriormente na História, o periodo Liberal Clássico surge com o desenvolvimento económico e contra algumas tentativas de absolutismo. Mas o que é preciso lembrar é que o absolutismo em si era também um fenómeno novo (Alexandre Herculano refere isso com insistência) - as localidades e populações ao longo da história até aí, tinham-se deparado com um sistema de poder altamente descentralizado e policêntrico (concorriam diversas fontes de poder e sistemas legais), na Europa (lembremos o antigo Império Sacro-Romano constituido por cerca de 1600 entidade politicas - no inicio do século 18, a Europa central era ainda constituida por 300 entidades autónomas). Em Portugal, em 1890, o total de receita do Estado equivalia a cerca de 5% do PIB ("now, that´s real freedom!").

PS: Para além disso, alguns liberais em que eu me incluo, serão capazes de definir o actual paradigma de social-democracia centralizada como "Totalitarismo da Maioria"

2) Ainda mais estranho é esta afirmação:

"Faltará, porventura, em State-Building, a vontade de ir até às últimas consequências, porventura defendendo, tal como tive já oportunidade de escrever em ocasião anterior, que "um regime só é legítimo se for democrático, o que implica que toda e qualquer ditadura seja ilegítima"

Vamos ver, será o regime do Dubai, Quatar, Koweit, "ilegitimo" (e será totalitário?). Na história, as monarquias eram "ilegítimas"? A cidade comercial de Veneza (como muitas outras na Europa de outros tempos), governada pelos mais ricos comerciantes, vivia perante um regime "ilegitimo"? Já agora, o Estado do Vaticano será "ilegitimo"?

Mas porquê esta obsessão por "ilegitimo" e como definir "ilegitimo"? E de um ponto de vista liberal, será preferivel viver num Estado "ilegitimo" com muita pouca presença desse Estado ou num Estado legitimo que pratica (do ponto de vista liberal e de direitos naturais) ilegitimidades em doses maciças?

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Bush panel rips U.S. intelligence abilities 

CNBC: 'Dead wrong' on Iraq; little known about today's enemies

WASHINGTON - In a scathing report released Thursday, President Bush’s commission on weapons of mass destruction found that America’s spy agencies were “dead wrong” in most of their judgments about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

The commission was also highly critical of U.S. abilities to assess what existing adversaries have, stating that the United States knows “disturbingly little” about their weapons programs.
On Saddam, the commission stated that “we conclude that the intelligence community was dead wrong in almost all of its prewar judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. This was a major intelligence failure"
.

The main cause, the commission said, was the intelligence community’s “inability to collect good information about Iraq’s WMD programs, serious errors in analyzing what information it could gather and a failure to make clear just how much of its analysis was based on assumptions rather than good evidence.On a matter of this importance, we simply cannot afford failures of this magnitude,” the report said.

Nota: Mas o problema principal é que um conjunto simples de reflexões indicava precisamente para esta falha de pressupostos, quer no que respeita ao

- suposto perigo militar (já tinham sido derrotados em meia dúzia de dias no Golfo I e depois de 10 anos de sanções com graves repercussões para os civis...),

- às supostas ligações à AlQaeda (os Estados, nenhum Estado "gosta" de terroristas por causa do seu potencial subversivo, para além disso, o ditador mais secular e a personagem mais fundamentalista dificilmente iriam cooperar),

- às expectativas de serem recebidos com "flores" (como já disse, a única razão porque a stuação é ainda assim controlável é porque os xiitas e Kurdos viram na ocupação e na democracia uma via para as suas pretensões).

Agora, Paul Wolfitz já no fim da guerra fria e da queda pacífica do muro, numa para-comissão especial criada na CIA, também se enganou redondamente ao falar que a URSS estava mais perto do que sempre, da sua força e perigo máximo para o "mundo livre".

Que o fim dos tempos não tenha ocorrido só o podemos agradecer a Ronald Reagan e Margaret Tatcher.


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Terry Shiavo 

O problema perturbante neste caso extremo parece-me ser o facto de existirem pessoas que estão dispostas (os pais e terceiros) a financiar e cuidar dos meios necessários para manter viva "Terry Shiavo" e serem impedidos disso por uma decisão judicial que favorece um marido que não está disposto a fazê-lo. E depois, aparentemente existem considerações que podem ser tecidas, sobre o marido " decisor legal" neste assunto (entretanto com outra relação e dois fiilhos):

"I stand by my earlier comment that the "husband" is a very shady character. He invoked recovered memory syndrome seven years after Terri was hospitalized to say that, when they were newlyweds, she told him to kill her off if she became incapacitated. He got a $700,000 insurance settlement, bought himself two Mercedes and some other goodies, and did not spend one cent on rehabilitation for his wife despite the advice of nurses and doctors that it could help" Via LRCBlog.


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2005/03/30

Taxa Única (ou máxima) de Impostos 

Já várias vezes aqui defendi a implementação do que comecei por designar de Taxa Única de Impostos para o IRS, IVA e IRC:

1) Torna mais claras as propostas políticas
2) Põe de lado a falácia de discutir a forma como se colectam os impostos em vez do montante
3) Impede o jogo político do "desce este para subir aquele"

Eu acho que na prática a aplicação desta taxa materializa-se no fundo, na definição de uma Taxa Máxima porque os diversos impostos podem e devem continuar a prever abatimentos e deduções, taxas diferenciadas, etc, ou seja, não sou grande adepto dos "simplificadores".

Mas falo no assunto por causa de um artigo de Miguel Frasquilho no negocios.pt: "Agora, a vez da Alemanha... e nós?!"

"(...) Mas Schröder foi ainda mais longe, decidindo incumbir o Comité Alemão de Sábios Económicos de apresentar até Outubro uma profunda reforma do sistema fiscal alemão. Não querendo fazer futurologia, sou capaz de apostar que esta reforma aproximará o sistema fiscal germânico do que já vigora em países do leste europeu como a Estónia (desde 1991), a Letónia (1994), a Lituânia (1994), a Eslováquia (2004), a Roménia (2005), a Rússia (2001), a Ucrânia (2003) ou a Sérvia (2003) - sendo que estes cinco últimos ainda nem sequer aderiram à UE! -, e que a Polónia e a Hungria adoptarão em breve. E que é um regime fiscal muito simples, praticamente sem deduções ou benefícios, e baseado numa taxa única (flat rate) para o IRC, o IRS e o IVA. Geralmente, esta taxa única acaba por ser baixa (inferior a 20%), o que por si só desincentiva a fraude e a evasão fiscais (basta o leitor pensar por si: se ganhar 100 unidades monetárias, o pagamento de um imposto de 15% ou de 30%, por exemplo, fará toda a diferença sobre a possibilidade de correr o risco e julgar compensadora uma eventual fuga...). E o seu nível, em alguns casos, foi determinado de molde a não perder receita (por exemplo, na Eslováquia os 19% foram obtidos depois de pedidas estimativas ao FMI, ao INE local, aos próprios serviços do Ministério das Finanças e a um comité de especialistas criado para o efeito).

Por outro lado, é claro que o quase desaparecimento dos benefícios, deduções e isenções facilitou imenso a tarefa de vigilância das administrações fiscais, ajudando igualmente a combater (mais) eficazmente a fraude e a evasão. (...)

E para os mais cépticos, que desconfiem, por exemplo, da progressividade da tributação em sede de IRS, basta atentar que, num sistema deste género, até um determinado rendimento ninguém é tributado; acima desse nível, toda a parcela remanescente é tributada à mesma taxa - o que significa que quanto mais se ganha, maior é a taxa efectivade imposto, isto é, o sistema é progressivo. (...)

Como refere Steve Forbes, dono e director da famosa Forbes Magazine, a propósito do caso eslovaco, «(...) a Eslováquia será a próxima Irlanda ou Hong Kong - um pequeno país que se tornará num verdadeiro potentado económico. Poderá despoletar o efeito dominó que transformará o resto da UE num espaço mais livre e empreendedor para as empresas (...)». Para o que, acrescento eu, a decisão do Sr. Schröder veio dar um valente e decisivo empurrão."

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2005/03/29

Against a priori history 

"The theoretical reason why focussing on democracy or dictatorship misses the point is that States—all States—rule their population and de­cide whether or not to make war. And all States, whether formally a democracy or dictatorship or some other brand of rule, are run by a ruling elite. Whether or not these elites, in any particular case, will make war upon another State is a function of a complex interweaving web of causes, including temperament of the rulers, the strength of their enemies, the inducements for war, public opinion.

While public opinion has to be gauged in either case, the only real difference between a democracy and a dictatorship on making war is that in the former more propaganda must be beamed at one's subjects to engineer their approval. Intensive propaganda is necessary in any case—as we can see by the zealous opinion-moulding behavior of all modern warring States. But the democratic State must work harder and faster. And also the democratic State must be more hypocritical in using rhetoric designed to appeal to the values of the masses: justice, freedom, national interest, patriotism, world peace, etc. So in democratic States, the art of propagan­dizing their subjects must be a bit more sophisticated and refined. But this, as we have seen, is true of all governmental decisions, not just war or peace. For all governments—but especially democratic govern­ments—must work hard at persuading their subjects that all of their deeds of oppression are really in their subjects' best interests.

What we have said about democracy and dictatorship applies equally to the lack of correlation between degrees of internal freedom in a coun­try and its external aggressiveness. Some States have proved themselves perfectly capable of allowing a considerable degree of freedom internally while making aggressive war abroad; other States have shown themselves capable of totalitarian rule internally while pursuing a pacific foreign policy. The examples of Uganda, Albania, China, Great Britain, etc., apply equally well in this comparison.

In short, libertarians and other Americans must guard against a priori history: in this case, against the assumption that, in any conflict, the State which is more democratic or allows more internal freedom is neces­sarily or even presumptively the victim of aggression by the more dictato­rial or totalitarian State. There is simply no historical evidence whatever for such a presumption. (...)

For war and a phony "external threat" have long been the chief means by which the State wins back the loyalty of its subjects. As we have seen, war and militarism were the gravediggers of classical liberalism; we must not allow the State to get away with this ruse ever again." For a New Liberty

PS: Claro que num tempo em que as mentes estão receptivas ao argumento de que as guerras e os seus danos inevitáveis (de curto prazo e longo prazo) são justificadas para derrubar um regime não-democrático e substitui-lo pelas maravilhas da social-democracia (mesmo sendo imprevisivel se é uma mudança estável) fica quase demonstrado que "agora" as democracias são mesmo mais militaristas que as não-democracias (ainda que advoguem que no longo prazo, o que se procura é menos militarismo e menos guerras, e na prática estejamos numa "permanent war for permanet peace").

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Sobran sobre Bastiat, o Liberal Clássico francês 

"(...) Bastiat wrote, “Look at the law, and see whether it does for one citizen at the expense of another what it would be a crime for the first to do to the other himself.” If so, the law itself is criminal.

(...) If Bastiat had written nothing else, The Law would have been enough. Generations of liberty-
loving readers have cherished it; yet most people today have never heard of it, or of Bastiat.

Bastiat (1801–1850) was a devout, reflective man who served briefly, and probably with mounting horror, in the French Assembly. In an age of corrupt democracy, he was a scrupulous old-fashioned liberal who believed that the state should be confined to very few functions, beyond which it became tyrannical.

He lived just long enough to enunciate a few principles he had distilled, dying before age fifty. Bastiat can hardly be said to have an “economic theory.” He merely applied the Golden Rule to politics. He insisted that there is no separate morality for the government. What is wrong for the rest of us is wrong for the state, however the state may try to disguise its criminality as benevolence. And if you allow the state to rob your neighbors on your behalf, don’t kid yourself: you’re criminal too.

One might think a truth so simple and unavoidable would be compelling in every age. But various ideologies — monarchic, Marxist, Machiavellian, democratic — ingeniously evade it. Men persuade themselves that the state is exempt from ordinary moral norms and has a special right to coerce, even to make war. But the same principle applies.

If you have no right to take others’ wealth, neither you nor a majority like you may delegate such a power to the government. If you have no right to kill foreigners who have done you no harm, you can’t delegate the power to do so to the government either. You can’t “delegate” a right that doesn’t exist in the first place. Numbers can’t overrule principles, and complications don’t change axioms.

No human authority can make right what is wrong in its essence. But the state tries to make us all accomplices in its crimes, and many people accept the invitation with gusto, believing they can profit by the system of “organized plunder” the way gamblers are confident that they can beat the house. Some ideas take the world by storm. Bastiat’s ideas haven’t — not because they are too complex, but because they are too obvious. Unable to contradict them, the world goes on ignoring them."

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2005/03/24

George Kennan por Vasco Rato 

(No Independente) Aproveita o que interessa do pai da estratégia da guerra fria mas esquece-se que:

Via Economist: "He wanted America to withdraw from its public advocacy of democracy and human rights: "this whole tendency to see ourselves as the centre of political enlightenment and as teachers...strikes me as unthought-through, vainglorious, and undesirable" Behind this ...was the old George Kennan who had always advocated caution, subtley and patience in the use of power, without shirlness or pushiness..."

Via Chicago Tribune:

"(...) As today's neoconservatives praise Kennan for his call to arms against the Soviet Union, they miss the deeper and darker conservatism that motivated him.Kennan belonged to a conservative tradition that dated back to and celebrated the 18th Century world, an era when conservatives sounded like the political philosopher Edmund Burke, not today's Straussians. Kennan desired a world of fixed hierarchies, in which wise statesman acted on behalf of subjects, not one in which politicians followed popular polls. He called himself "an expatriate in his own time," more suited to the 18th Century than the 20th or 21st, even though he would hardly have prospered in such a time, being born to immigrants in the provinces.
(...)
His call for "realism" in foreign relations--acting solely on the basis of national interest--was a plea for the fickle American public to leave diplomacy to diplomats like himself better able to discern the country's interests.This realism led him to propose "containing" the Soviet Union through the application of "counter-pressure" in the two writings that catapulted him to fame, his "Long Telegram" of 1946 and "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" in 1947. (...) He quickly complained that containment became too militaristic and too political for reasonable men like himself to pursue American interests. While no friend of the USSR, he envisioned an era of coexistence, where superpowers opposed each other without risking mutual destruction. For this reason, he criticized the accelerating arms race. Realism amounted to self-preservation of a nation, but also of elite prerogatives to shape policy.

(...) He opposed the American war in Vietnam because he doubted that the nation could ever become a democracy. Besides, he added, no direct U.S. interests were at stake.

Kennan's last published statement, a little-noticed 2002 interview appearing in a weekly for Washington insiders, applied this same logic to Iraq. He castigated President Bush for pushing the nation to war and congressional Democrats for not slowing the president down. (...) Saddam Hussein, though dictatorial, did not threaten American interests directly--and besides, were Iraqis really likely to end up with anyone better?

(...) As the Bush administration seeks to bring democracy to some parts of the world where it is least known, its diplomats have tried to associate Kennan's ideas with their plans to radically remake the Middle East through war, nation-building and the export of democracy. These appeals show just how far conservatism has evolved. One of the last words to associate with Kennan is "neo." Rather than remaking the future around American ideas, he sought to conserve a bygone world, even if it was a world he had never known."

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A Republic, Not a Democracy 

"(...) There is a critical difference between a republic and a democracy, Williams notes, citing our second president: “John Adams captured the essence of that difference when he said: ‘You have rights antecedent to all earthly governments; rights that cannot be repealed or restrained by human laws; rights derived from the Great Legislator of the Universe.’ Nothing in our Constitution suggests that government is a grantor of rights. Instead, government is a protector of rights.”

The Founders deeply distrusted democracy. Williams cites Adams again: “Remember, democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts and murders itself. There was never a democracy yet that did not commit suicide.” Chief Justice John Marshall seconded Adams’s motion: “Between a balanced republic and a democracy, the difference is like that between order and chaos.” When the Constitution was framed,” wrote historian Charles Beard, “no respectable person called himself or herself a democrat.”

Democracy-worship suggests a childlike belief in the wisdom and goodness of “the people.” But the people supported the guillotine in the French Revolution and Napoleon. The people were wild with joy as the British, French, and German boys marched off in August 1914 to the Great War. The people supported Hitler and the Nuremburg Laws.

Our Founding Fathers no more trusted in the people always to do the right thing than they trusted in kings. In the republic they created, the House of Representatives, the people’s house, was severely restricted in its powers by a Bill of Rights and checked by a Senate whose members were to be chosen by the states, by a president with veto power, and by a Supreme Court.

What kind of government do we have?” the lady asked Benjamin Franklin, as he emerged from the Constitutional Convention. Said Franklin, “A republic—if you can keep it.”

Let us restore that republic. As Jefferson said, “Hear no more of trust in men, but rather bind them down from mischief with the chains of the Constitution.” The American Conservative, Patrick J. Buchanan


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Max Boot (Neocon) versus Thomas Woods: Grande Guerra 

No American Conservative: "A Factually Correct Guide for Max Boot" Thomas E. Woods Jr

"(...) Boot is particularly enraged at my World War I chapter (our reviewer being one of the seven or so people who still consider American entry into that war a good idea).

According to Boot, I am “sympathetic to German militarists” and I think it was “Woodrow Wilson’s fault that Germany began sinking American ships without warning, which led the United States into the war.” Boot is actually surprised that American merchant ships, outfitted on Wilson’s orders with Navy guns and staffed with Navy crews and instructed to fire upon any surfacing submarine, would be sunk by the Germans.

As for the Belgian atrocities, which I describe as “largely fabricated” (since they were), Boot also dissents. The point he misses is that although the Germans were indeed brutal in Belgium in suppressing a guerrilla uprising whose size they gravely overestimated, it was the tales of children having their hands cut off and corpses being made into margarine that outraged civilized opinion. And it was these sadistic and bizarre crimes, described in the Bryce Report, that were fabrications for propaganda purposes. When Clarence Darrow offered to pay $1,000 ($17,000 in today’s money) to anyone who could show him a Belgian boy whose hands had been cut off by a German soldier, no one took him up on it.

Boot continues: “The real atrocity, [Woods] thinks, was Britain’s naval blockade of Germany.” Well, yes, as a matter of fact that is what I think. Britain’s hunger blockade of Germany, which violated accepted norms of international law in more than one respect, resulted in 750,000 civilian deaths—about 150 times the number of Belgian civilians most scholars say were killed by the Germans.

Boot then proceeds to mischaracterize the Zimmerman telegram as “the document in which Germany’s foreign minister offered Mexico the return of the American Southwest if it would declare war on the United States.” Some might consider it relevant that the telegram began by noting that the Germans hoped to keep the U.S. neutral but that if they were unsuccessful and the United States entered the war against them, they wished to contract an alliance with Mexico.

Shortly after the Second World War, George Kennan wondered, “Today if one were offered the chance of having back again the Germany of 1913—a Germany run by conservative but relatively moderate people, no Nazis and no Communists—a vigorous Germany, full of energy and confidence, able to play a part again in the balancing-off of Russian power in Europe, in many ways it would not sound so bad.”

In other words, U.S. intervention in World War I, undertaken with the best of intentions, had been an exceedingly costly mistake. My point exactly.(...)"

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2005/03/23

Apontamentos sobre deflação 

1) Descida de preços não é deflação

A descida de preços causada pelo aumento da produção/produtividade não deve ser denominada de "deflação" e não causa nenhum problema económico.

"...falling prices caused by increases in production and supply are not deflation. Such falling prices are not deflation, because they result neither in a reduction in the average nominal rate of profit on capital in the economic system nor in any generally greater difficulty in repaying debts, which are two essential symptoms of any genuine deflation.

(...)The fall in prices that accompanies it is theresult of the increase in production and supply exceeding this increase in thequantity of money and volume of spending."

"Such falling prices occurred in the United States in the generation prior to the discovery of the California gold fields in 1848, and again in the generation following 1873. Because of the fall in prices in these two generations, prices inthe United States are estimated to have fallen by half over the nineteenth century as a whole. The fall in prices, of course, would probably be significantlymore pronounced under a 100-percent-reserve gold standard."

Quando os preços baixam por efeito do aumento da produtividade, (imaginemos uma economia com quantidade monetária fixa e em sistema de 100% de reservas e uma descida de preços num determinado produto por efeito de inovação tecnológica) significa que sobram unidades monetárias para serem aplicadas entre maior consumo (do mesmo produto ou outros produtos) e maior investimento (=poupança) para fazer face ao aumento da procura do mesmo produto ou novos produtos. A descida de preços representa assim a libertação de recursos para maior investimento (=poupança) e consumo e "production creates its own demand"

Por último, a descida de preços numa economia com quantidade fixa de dinheiro não dificulta os devedores porque no limite as vendas totais nominais são constantes (representam é maior quantidade de bens) assim como a sua capacidade de sustentar determinado serviço de dívida nominal.

2) Deflação

Ocorre quando assistimos à contração monetária só possível no actual sistema em que o crédito ao investimento está suportado em parte no crescimento da massa monetária e não por poupança real.

Resulta assim, que a contrapartida dos depósitos à ordem - são os créditos concedidos às empresas (e deixaram de representar a posse de uma determinada quantidade de ouro colocado à guarda/depósito) o que potencialmente levanta a possibilidade da massa monetária poder contrair por "default" (neste caso, o que é de esperar dos Bancos Centrais é a emissão de toda e qualquer quantidade monetária necessária, ou seja inflação monetária, para faze face à insolvência dos depósitos).

A principal causa para os ciclos económicos é um sistema monetário que para seu proveito (e do financiamento do déficit do Estado quando a sua dívida pública acaba nos Bancos Centrais), tem a capacidade de conceder crédito por emissão monetária e não pela captação de poupança (abstenção de consumo materializada na acumulação de valores monetários disponíveis para serem voluntáriamente emprestados a troco de um juro ou dividendos/ganhos), o que se reflecte numa taxa de juro abaixo da taxa natural, criando a ilusão de sustentabilidade dos investimentos realizados.

"Such deflation, as I have said, is a decrease in the quantity of money and/orvolume of spending in the economic system. That is what produces not only afall in prices but at the same time a sharp reduction or even total wiping out ofbusiness profitability and a greatly increased difficulty of repaying debts andthus widespread insolvencies and bankruptcies.

Profits are cut because the monetary contraction reduces sales revenuesimmediately, but aggregate costs, specifically aggregate depreciation cost andaggregate cost of goods sold, fall only with a time lag in response to thereduction in business firms’ expenditures for the factors of production.14At the same time, the monetary contraction increases the difficulty ofrepaying debt, simply because there is less money out there to earn."

3) 100% Padrão Ouro

"There are two basic reasons why the 100-percent-reserve gold standard wouldbe a guarantee against deflation.

First, under a 100-percent-reserve goldstandard, nothing could happen that would suddenly reduce the quantity of money in the economic system. Once gold money comes into existence, it stays inexistence. It is not wiped out by the failure of debtors, as are fiduciary media.

Second, nothing could happen that would suddenly increase the need or desire ofpeople to hold money rather than spend it, because none of the artificial inducementsto a lower demand for money for holding would exist that set the stage forsuch an increase.

It must be recalled that what creates the potential for a suddenincrease in the need and desire to hold money is that first, people are misled intoexperiencing an artificial decrease in their need and desire to hold money. All theinducements that mislead them into this decrease are caused by the prior undueincrease in the quantity of money, especially in the form of credit expansion.

A100-percent-reserve gold standard would thus be a system in which the quantityof money would not decrease and the demand for money for holdingwould not suddenly increase. As a result, it would be a system in which totalspending in the economy would virtually never contract. Thus . . . it would bea system that was deflation proof as well as inflation proof."

THE GOAL OF MONETARY REFORM - George Reisman


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2005/03/22

Os primeiros passos são como as primeiras pedras 

Re: "Escolhas difíceis", no Insurgente:

"Para mim, é uma questão muito complicada e não é nada claro quem está a interferir nos direitos de quem. A única razão relativamente clara (e não ambígua) que vejo para fundamentar uma oposição à lei é o facto de não ser uma competência federal."

1. Um sinal de que todo o federalismo é difícil de praticar... pelos orgãos federais. E isto está inteiramente certo:"Attorneys for Michael Schiavo, her husband, say they will argue the new law that enabled federal involvement is unconstitutional."

2. Como está bem visivel em Rothbard en "THE RIGHT TO KILL, WITH DIGNITY?", "O" defensor da eutanásia acabou por sugerir, num caso específico em que uma doente que tinha expressamente manifestado a vontade de continuar viva mesmo que "caísse" num estado vegetativo e tendo assegurado os meios financeiros para isso, que:

"If overwhelming medical opinion says treatment is pointless, courts should arbitrate disputes between doctors and families." E Rothbard remata com : Now just a minute, where do courts get the right to decide life or death? Does government have more of a right to commit murder than doctors, or what? And on what principles are the courts supposed to decide that "arbitration"?

O que podemos tirar daqui é que muitas e muitas vezes, é dificil antever que caminhos serão percorridos depois de determinados passos serem dados. Passos estes que parecem ser evidentes, demasiado evidentes. Mas cada passo traz consigo um novo passo e um caminho desconhecido.

A eugenia foi defendida no inicio do século 20 de forma alargada um pouco por todo o mundo em termos muito objectivos e de propostas de aplicação necessáriamente muito limitada parecendo assim até muito racional e justificada, creio que até Churchill teceu considerações sobre o assunto. Mas depois, uma sucessão de acontecimentos, levou a que uns quantos dessem um passo gigante em direcção ao mal absoluto - o necessário para nunca mais se falar no assunto, mas um preço excessivo.

O filme de Clint Eastwood é sobre um conflito moral individual. Não sobre "legalização", não sobre chegar a uma verdade colectiva que se aplica universalmente, proclamada e sancionada pelo monopólio uniformizador sobre "legal"/"ilegal" que o estatismo reivindica.

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2005/03/21

The Amount vs. the Form of Taxation 

"We conclude with the observation that there has been far too much concentration on the form, the type of taxation, and not enough on its total amount. The result has been endless tinkering with kinds of taxes, coupled with neglect of a far more critical question: how muchof the social product should be siphoned away from the producers? Or, how much income should be retained by the producers and how much income and resources coercively diverted for the benefit of non-producers?

(...) Even more egregious was an early doctrine of another group of supposed free-market advocates, the supply-siders. In their original Laffer-curve manifestation, now happily consigned to the dustbin of history, the supply-siders maintained that the tax rate that maximizes tax revenue is the "voluntary" rate, and a rate that should be diligently pursued. It was never pointed out in what sense such a tax rate is "voluntary," or what in the world the concept of "voluntary" has to do with taxation in the first place. Much less did the supply-siders in their Lafferite form ever instruct us why we must all uphold inaximizing government revenue as our beau ideal. Surely, for free-market proponents, one might think that minimizing government depredation of the private product would be a bit more appealing" The Consumption Tax: A Critique By Murray N. Rothbard


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2005/03/20

Frei Bento Domingues, O.P, P-in-C? 

No Público: "(...) As calúnias entre judeus e cristãos atingiram, ao longo de dois milénios, expressões inacreditáveis. É evidente que a noção de culpa colectiva e herdada pela morte de Jesus de Nazaré é absurda, maldosa e teve efeitos terríveis.

Mas a responsabilidade não deve ser atribuída só aos cristãos.

Segundo uma penetrante obra de Israel Shahak, o judaísmo está imbuído de um ódio profundo contra o cristianismo, combinado com a ignorância a seu respeito.Os relatos sobre Jesus que figuram no Talmude e na literatura pós-talmúdica são inexactos e mesmo caluniosos. São, no entanto, aquilo que os judeus acreditavam até ao séc. XIX e que muitos, em particular em Israel, ainda hoje acreditam. (3)Segundo o Talmude, Jesus foi executado - mediante sentença de um apropriado tribunal rabínico - por idolatria, por incitar outros judeus à idolatria e por desprezo da autoridade rabínica.

Todas as fontes clássicas judaicas que referem esta execução sentem-se orgulhosas de assumir a responsabilidade por ela. No relato talmúdico, os romanos nem sequer são mencionados! Os relatos mais populares - mas tomados muito a sério -, como o conhecido Toldot Yeshu, são ainda piores. Além dos crimes já apontados, também acusam Jesus de feitiçaria. O próprio nome Jesus era, para os judeus, o símbolo de tudo o que era abominável.

Esta tradição popular continua. Os Evangelhos são igualmente detestados. Não podem ser citados - muito menos ensinados - mesmo nas modernas escolas judaicas israelitas. Em 23 de Março de 1980, centenas de cópias do Novo Testamento foram queimadas pública e cerimonialmente em Jesusalém sob os auspícios do Yad Le"akhim, uma organização religiosa judaica subsidiada pelo Ministério israelita das Religiões.Segundo Israel Shahak, por razões teológicas, radicadas principalmente na ignorância, o cristianismo é uma religião classificada pelo ensino rabínico como idolatria. Isto baseia-se numa interpretação tosca das doutrinas cristãs sobre a Trindade e a Incarnação. Todas as representações pictóricas e emblemas cristãos são encarados como ídolos, mesmo por aqueles judeus que adoram literalmente manuscritos, pedras ou relíquias de "homens santos".

Pelos vistos, ainda há muito caminho a percorrer para que cristãos e judeus aprendam, pelo menos, a respeitarem-se mutuamente!"

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O Prémio Nobel de Hayek 

"Three books of Hayek’s in particular deserve great praise in this connection: Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, Prices and Production, and Monetary Nationalism. It is probably fair to say that this early work of Hayek’s is his least well-known work. Far better known (and far more dubious) are his later (post World War II) lucubrations in the field of political philosophy. The more important, then, is it to emphasize that Hayek’s 1974 Nobel Prize was not awarded for his later, better-known work, but in explicit recognition of his early contributions to the so-called Mises-Hayek business cycle theory. Given this, Hayek’s Nobel Prize was certainly well deserved.

Incidentally, among Austrian economists there has been some speculation why Hayek’s recognition came so late (in 1974). One highly plausible explanation is this: If the prize is awarded for the development of the Mises-Hayek business cycle, then as long as both Mises and Hayek are still alive you can hardly give the prize to Hayek without giving it also to Mises. Yet Mises was a life-long opponent of paper money (and a proponent of the classical gold standard) and of government central banking—and the prize money for the economics “Nobel” was “donated” by the Swedish National Bank. Mises, then, so to speak, was persona non grata for the “donors.” Only after Mises had died in 1973, then, was the way free to give the prize to Hayek, who, in contrast to his “intransigent” master and mentor, had shown himself sufficiently willing to compromise, “flexible,” and “reasonable." Hans-Hermann Hoppe: Interviewed by Mateusz Machaj


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Somalia e o Terceiro Mundo versus FMI/Banco Mundial/UN 

"(...) the World Bank, as John Perkins points out, has done more than its share to crush the hopes of the world’s impoverished peoples. The problem with the World Bank is not that sometimes it is run by the "wrong" people, but rather that it exists at all.

"Throughout sub-Saharan Africa," observed Ian Vasquez of the Cato Institute’s Project on Global Economic Liberty more than a decade ago, "the IMF and World Bank have been loaning enormous sums to oppressive socialist and authoritarian regimes for decades, with pretty much the same abysmal results: a steady decline in per capita income, agricultural production, food production, and many other areas as well."

Somalia, described by the World Bank as "the quintessential failed state," also perfectly illustrates the point made by Vasquez. Between the 1960s and the early 1990s, Somalia was the "beneficiary" of huge loans from the World Bank; by 1987, those loans accounted for 37 percent of the country’s GNP. Siad Barre, the Marxist thug on whom the World Bank bestowed that beneficence, lived in opulent splendor even as the nation’s infrastructure rotted away.

The 1991 collapse of the Barre regime and the ensuing civil war resulted in an abortive UN-commanded "humanitarian" military intervention — following the formula described by Perkins, Conable, and Barnett.

But the constituency for that mission proved fragile, and the mission ended in the early 1990s. Confounding the expectations of globalist humanitarians, Somalia flourished precisely because of the "world community’s" neglect.

In Somalia, "the very absence of a government may have helped nurture an African oddity — a lean and efficient business sector that does not feed at a public trough controlled by corrupt officials," wrote Peter Maas in the May 2001 issue of The Atlantic Monthly.

Tele-communications, transportation, and shipping companies were organized up to provide services to the liberated private sector. Internet cafes have sprung up in Mogadishu. Private security firms helped businessmen protect their investments and property.

A recent World Bank study grudgingly admitted: "Somalia boasts lower rates of extreme poverty and, in some cases, better infrastructure than richer countries in Africa." This is almost certainly because it is not cursed with a World Bank-subsidized central government to siphon away the nation’s wealth. "

Wolfowitz at the World Bank's Door by William Norman Grigg - The New American

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Democracia política e o SISTEMA 

Quando se fala de escolhas democráticas (no sentido político, porque convenhamos, a democracia civil precedeu a primeira - as assembleias de associações, accionistas , proprietários, etc) temos que ter presentes que falamos quae sempre de escolhas de "sim" ou "não" em que uma determinada resolução ou é aprovada e aplicada compulsóriamente a todos ou não.

Por exemplo, no caso da Segurança Social no que respeita a pensões de reforma, a decisão até afecta significativamente as gerações seguintes, recebendo estas uma responsabilidade que não pediram e que nem temos a certeza que se revejam nela.

Seguramente, à medida que as "reformas" implementem a necessária

- diminuição gradual do "subsídio" de reforma (a que chamam de "alterações ao cálculo")
- aumento da idade de reforma
- aumento de impostos ou do défict estrutural (inflação monetária e dívida pública)

...aumentará também a percepção do risco de falência do sistema, o chamado contrato entre gerações será cada vez mais posto em causa e ainda que o presente paradigma sobreviva (Estados Sociais-Democratas centralizados com a capacidade de um incontestado monopólio legal e monetário sobre todo o território nacional e vigência de ordens supra-nacionais alargadas) porque nenhum evento o ponha em causa (guerras entre Estados, conflitos intra-Estados, crise monetária e económica profunda, ou uma mistura de eventos destruturantes, ou simples alteração ideológica alargada - um efeito de queda do muro de Berlim da social-democracia e do Estado Moderno).

A Segurança Social nunca seria implementada se fosse proposta individual/ e voluntáriamente (como os seguros e produtos de poupança de longo prazo o são) e ruiria se hoje fosse perguntado ao "indivíduo" se prefere ver o seu rendimento liquido aumentado em 33% ou auferir dos serviços (transferências de rendimento): concerteza assistiriamos a respostas diferentes conforme a probabilidade e prazo temporal do sujeito o puser mais próximo de ser (ou já ou actuarialmente) receptor líquido de fundos ou contribuinte líquido, e ainda também conforme a sua percepção da sustentabilidade do SISTEMA - que é ainda hoje, muito elevada.

O problema da democracia política centralizada (e que um efectivo federalismo minimiza) é o conflito de interesses que as resoluções compulsórias levantam, principalmente quando os efeitos de uma decisão colectiva não recaiem sobre todos, e quando a escala humana se perdeu e nenhuma proximidade ou mútua identificação previne esse efeito:

Seria mais difícil que numa aldeia uma maioria política fosse capaz de aprovar - embora em tese para isso tivesse legitimidade - um SISTEMA de transferência de rendimentos similar ao que temos hoje no Estado Moderno. Porquê? Porque as pessoas e famílias se conhecem, incluindo as razões mútuas presentes e históricas porque uns têm mais rendimentos e património e outros menos, quer porque é mais homogéneo o reconhecimento dos efeitos danosos de incentivar comportamentos, que em última análise, são no médio prazo, gravosos para a comunidade a que todos pertencem.

Por outro, quanto maior for o "circulo político único" ou similar, onde o direito de voto político confere um direito real de propriedade sobre a "liberdade, vida e propriedade" de todos os outros, mais nos aproximamos da ilusão de o considerar um instrumento de auto-governo.

Qualquer analista sincero de sistemas sociais fechados saberá prever o desfecho ou pelo menos o caminho (e independentemente do ponto de partida, que por exemplo, nos EUA, foi quase de uma total ausência de efeitos da representação política sobre a vida das pessoas e comunidades locais) que se irá percorrer (com altos e baixos, recuos e avanços). o SISTEMA evolui para uma crescente centralização de funções compulsórias e legitimada por uma maioria flutuante mas estável de exercicio do direito de dispor da liberdade-vida-propriedade de todos os outros:

Um efeito de "51% sobre 49%" maximiza o conflito de interesses: a menor maioria necessária para manter o maior número de beneficiários líquidos à custa do menor número de constribuintes líquidos (isto aplica-se tanto em efeitos monetários como legislativos e regulamentares).

Este é o SISTEMA e que detém a sabedoria de um parasita consciente que tem de (apesar de tudo) manter a vitima viva - mesmo que seja no limiar da vida - para sobreviver. Apesar do SISTEMA incentivar comportamentos que tirem partido do SISTEMA em interesse próprio (os estudantes não querem propinas, os subsídios à doença incentivam os doentes, etc, e todos votam - exercem o direito de propriedade sobre os outros - por isso), ele mantém em prática todo o aparato necessário para sobreviver à custa dos contribuintes líquidos que quase irracionalmente teimam em escapar à desordem ordem moral e ética.

O sistema político-partidário adapta-se a este conflito de interesses (bem visível na acepção de que 45% da populaçao activa depender directamente do SISTEMA) e torna-se renitente em qualquer reforma de regime que o ponha em causa, e que em termos gerais se pode denominar de Federalização Interna e que pode ter diferentes graus conforme:

- autonomia e independência financeira e regulamentar local
- capacidade de veto das decisões nacionais
- forma de representação local nos orgãos nacionais (circulos uninominais e deputados independentes no parlamento, existência de um "senado", etc).

O SISTEMA irá preferir sempre estar legitimado por maiorias cada vez mais abstractas (caso de um único circulo e representação proporcional) e desconectadas dos interesses locais - porque é assim que se socorre de uma legitimidade macro-"democrática" - para absorver as realidades micro-democráticas das suas partes e no limite as dos direitos naturais do indivíduo e da comunidade local.

O SISTEMA incentiva os políticos que o mantém: prometer o máximo possível à custa do menor número de população possível e sem pôr em causa o SISTEMA.

Mas o SISTEMA também sabe que tem de responder aos interesses de uns poucos à custa de todos, porque esses poucos têm uma grande capacidade do o pôr em causa quando são enfrentados. De vez em quando, assistimos à ilusão do ataque a interesses instalados e que nos é proporcionado quando de tempos a tempos, o SISTEMA muda de parceiros estratégicos, efectuando uma mera rotação dos alvos:

E é aqui que surgem os "Reformistas", são aqueles que abandonam e enfrentam os interesses de uma determinada Classe que perdeu a sua antiga capacidade de pôr em perigo o SISTEMA (por mudanças sociais, económicas, tecnológicas, etc) para, sem publicidade, passar a responder às necessidades de outra qualquer Classe ou Elite emergente menos visível. Os "Reformistas", são na verdade muitas vezes, os maiores perpetuadores do "SISTEMA".

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2005/03/18

"Remember that a government big enough to give you everything you want is also big enough to take away everything you have." Davy Crockett


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Estatísticas 

"There's a joke in the fixed income world that the PPI and CPI excluding everything is zero." Via MisesBlog

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Impostos e conflitos de interesse 

"No fundo, os portugueses votaram contra o desmantelamento do Estado-providência. Não admira, porque há 750.000 funcionários públicos e, diz Medina Carreira, 45 por cento dos eleitores vivem directamente ou indirectamente do Estado." Rui Moreira PLENOS PODERES

Remédio: os funcionários públicos deixarem de votar em eleições nacionais. Como pode 45% da população (que não paga impostos e sim "vive" deles - não é uma afirmação de estigmatização dos funcionário públicos, apenas uma constatação) votar em interesse próprio, sendos os efeitos suportados pelos restantes?

Mas a adopção de circulos uninominais e deputados independentes provavelmente já ajudava.

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2005/03/17

TRICKLE-DOWN KEYNESIANISM 

"(...) John Maynard Keynes in 1936 proposed a counter-depressionary program of large government deficits. Heargued that rich people were saving far too much money. They were building up monetary assets. They were notspending enough money to create opportunities forinvestment and expansion.

So, he concluded, the government ought to borrow moneyfrom these people and start spending. It did not matterwhat the government spends money for, he said. Anythingwill do. Even pyramids.

Ancient Egypt was doubly fortunate, and doubtless owed to this its fabled wealth, in that it possessed two activities, namely, pyramid-building as well as the search for precious metals, the fruits of which, since they could not serve the needs of many by being consumed, did not stale with abundance. The Middle Ages built cathedrals and sang dirges. Two pyramids, two masses for the dead, are twice as good as one; but not so two railways from London to York. ("General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money," p. 131)

He was a defender of make-work projects. As children, teachers assigned us busy work to keep us occupied. Eventually, we caught on: the work was not meaningful. Itwas wasting our time. Keynes advised the governments ofhis era to imitate our teachers.

If the Treasury were to fill old bottles with banknotes, bury them at suitable depths in disused coal mines which are then filled up to the surface with town rubbish, and leave it to private enterprise on well tried principles of laissez-faire to dig the notes up again. (Ibid., p. 129)

What Keynes and his followers ignored is the fact thatcapital investment is driven by the hope of future income,and future income depends on future sales. Sellers don'tplan to give away their future output. They plan to sellit to consumers.

But how will consumers buy this output? With money. But where will they obtain this money? In one of fourways: exchanging their productive assets, including theirlabor, for money; borrowing money; stealing money; orprinting money.

Keynes proposed to add to the monetary reserves of consumers by having the government borrow and then spend the money any old way. To this income stream would beadded whatever money the government could extract by taxes: theft by majority vote. His disciples added counterfeiting, also known as counter-cyclical central bank monetary policy.

The consumer would supply the rest of the moneythrough his labor. What is the free market's solution to recessions? Price competition (to clear the market) and thrift (to expand productivity). Why thrift? To provide tools for workers, i.e., to increase their productivity. Their increasing level of output will then provide them with thepurchasing power they will need to increase spending.

The free market's answer to the Great Depression wa sthrift: the purchase of assets, including corporate debt.

Keynes's answer to the Great Depression was thrift: thepurchase of government debt. What did it matter which agency served as the pipelineof money from rich savers to employees?

It mattered agreat deal. Capital produces output. Government debt\produces dependency: dependency of income recipients on thestate and dependency of the state on taxpayers.

(...) The Keynesian theory taught that in recessions,governments would run deficits. In boom times, they wouldrun surpluses. In the long run, deficits and surpluseswould balance out. There would be no piling up of debt.

We know how that theory has worked out. The Federal government has run huge deficits during recessions andmerely large deficits during boom times. It has runofficial surpluses only by siphoning enough money out ofthe officially off-budget Social Security Trust Fund to cover up the red ink in the on-budget deficit.

Under the guidance of Keynesian economists andpoliticians, the Federal government never experiences a surplus. The debt national debt keeps growing.

(...) So, in boom times they reduce the percentage of their income devoted tothrift, and in bad times, they borrow more and save evenless. Keynes' solution to national economic recession was more thrift by the rich, more spending by the government,and more spending by the common people.

When does government debt get paid off? Never. When does consumer debt get paid off? Never." Gary North


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Anti-federalismos: Balkans' present is the EU's future? 

"Built on the postmodern, postnational, post-religious, post-logical, welfare-state legacy of the mass-murderous 20th century, the Brussels Leviathan is basically a rebirth of the Soviet Union, dressed in velvet(...). What few understand is that the Balkans' present is the EU's future. Seeking to outrun entropy, the Leviathan will eventually run out of people, welfare money, or both. And when that happens, there may well be a Succession War on a continental scale that would easily dwarf the 1990s tragedy in the former Yugoslavia. One peek behind the curtain of false prosperity – no more than the legacy of a once-powerful civilization now dying – would make it obvious that the difference between Balkans kleptocrats and the Brussels Eurocrats is not one of principle, but of scale." Eastern Empire Rising? EU Back in the Balkans, by Nebojsa Malic


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Re: A estratégia chinesa 

No Insurgente: "Vista por Tom Donnelly, no Daily Standard. Enquanto a América se distrai com a Coreia do Norte, o governo chinês tem caminho livre para espalhar os seus domínios e aumentar a sua influência. Pouco a pouco, o gigante acorda. Depois não se queixem. "

Na realidade o que eu acho que se passa +e que enquanto a América se distrai no Médio Oriente ...

a bem de Israel, da democracia tribalista é étnica dos outros, e lutando contra um perigo menor (o terrorismo do ponto de vista de defesa nacional e "geo-estratégico" não oferece ameaça alguma) arriscando-se apenas a aumentar o risco de um efeito de entropia política na zona (reformistas versus fundamentalismo versus actuais regimes, conflitos étnico-religiosos, separatismo, etc) e a aumentar o terrorismo.

...afunda-se cada vez mais na areia dos déficits, da queda do dólar e da dispersão da capacidade militar e do focus estratégico, enquanto a China (e a Rússia, não esquecer) acorda. Vamos lembrar o antigo Império Chinês e Russo de outros tempos, o Império Comunista e agora, com a re-descoberta dos benefícios que o crescimento económico providenciados por uma economia capitalistapodem dar a um poder politico central desejoso de mais recursos (económicos e militares - via impostos, a moeda e tecnologia).

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2005/03/16

Sigilo Bancário e Fiscal 

Sigilo é uma expressão algo falaciosa neste contexto. Fala-se de sigilo como se fosse um direito criado e atribuido pelo Estado às pessoas. Mas não é. Resulta apenas da obrigação contratual entre prestadores e clientes. Isto numa altura em que a legislação pretende regular toda a espécie de bases de dados (como se o litigio civil não chegasse), com a desculpa de proteger toda e qualquer informação privada das pessoas.

O "sigilo" é um direito bem mais real do que os chamados direitos ao bom nome e à privacidade, que têm muito de abstractos e indefinidos (não resultam de nenhum contrato) funcionando na prática como protecção um pouco artificial (e a bem) de políticos e elites.

Assim, se a teoria do contrato social diz que determinados direitos podem ser repudiados por consenso maioritário (a base do sistema democrático), o caso do "sigilo" devia ser então referendado. E tal como nas decisões de perda de soberania, devia ser necessária uma maioria qualificada.

Sempre que direitos específicos são postos em causa pelo sistema político (o parlamento), deviam passar pelo referendo e uma maioria qualificada. O parlamento propõe e supõe-se aprova, mas o referendo pode vetar. Os referendos deve assim realizar-se como medida incluida num edifício de "check and balance" de resoluções que determinam perdas objectivas de direitos.

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What? 

Wolfowitz tapped to lead World Bank

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A ler 

Burke e a democracia no Pasquim da Reacção

"Hoje em dia existe muita gente a utilizar Edmund Burke para justificar as suas teorias.Os neo-conservadores prosseguem a utilização utilitária derivada dos liberais vitorianos. Defendem que a oposição de Burke à abstracção é um ódio ao constructivismo social, uma defesa do material contra o espiritual, um manifesto de cepticismo (ao estilo da escola escocesa) contra a especulação e a realidade espiritual, a defesa última da Liberdade.
(...)

Os neo-conservadores recuperam Burke, mas um Burke amputado. Tomam a doutrina de Burke como alheia à sua posição filosófica primordial. Como se as posições anti-revolucionárias do irlandês fossem passíveis de transplantar para defender as posições democráticas e as doutrinas de Direitos Humanos que Burke tentava denunciar. Tentam colar as posições de Burke a uma concepção de “Paz Perpétua” democrática a que Burke se referiu muitas vezes como a mais grave ameaça à comunidade cristã de países da Europa"

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Destaque 

Sobre o conceito de externalidades, o qual é frequentemente usado e abusado para justificar o estatismo.

"
The End of the Externality Revolution" by Andy Barnett and Bruce Yandle (Auburn University and Clemson University)

"The externalities literature spans 100 years, thousands of journal articles and more than a few books, that collectively brought about a virtual revolution in views on market failure and the proper role of government. This literature includes a staggering array of instances in which authors find market failure, and a wide variety of proposed government mechanisms to be used in correcting the market’s errant ways. The authors of this paper are as guilty as others. We have also analyzed externalities and proposed government imposed solutions, but now wish to
repent for the sins of our youth.


Simply put, markets seldom fail because of externalities. Non-trivial externalities that arise in the use of private goods can persist only if governments prevent markets from working. In the absence of government impediments to market transactions, only public goods can yield externalities that can persist, and even this case is subject to qualification. Externality may be a term that is useful in categorizing resource allocation problems, but it adds little more.

More to the point, a great deal of public policy is inappropriately based on the externality rationale. Neoclassical welfare economists let this genie out of the conceptual bottle. It is time to do what we can to put it back."

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2005/03/15

Acerca da Eutanásia: "THE RIGHT TO KILL, WITH DIGNITY?" 

Ou o problema de relaxarmos determinados princípios...um caso analisado por Murray N. Rothbard passado em 1991:

"For a long time now we have been subjected to a barrage of pro-death propaganda by left-liberals, and by their cheering squad, left, or modal, Libertarians. The "right to die," the "right to die with dignity" (whatever that means), the right to get someone to assist you in suicide, the "right to euthanasia," etc. Up till now, left-liberals have at least appeared to be scrupulous in stressing the crucial importance of consent by the killed victim, because otherwise the right to die with dignity looks very much like the right to commit murder. For what is compulsory euthanasia but murder, pure and simple?

But now the mask has begun to slip.(...)

Helga Wanglie, an elderly lady in Minneapolis, wrote a Living Will, but she opted for being kept alive if she lapsed into a vegetative state. Now 87, she is indeed in such a state, and her husband, respecting Helga's wishes in realizing that only while there is life can there be hope, is anxious to respect Helga's wishes and keep her alive. Note, too, that Helga's medical cost is being covered privately, by private health insurance; Helga is no burden on the taxpayer.

So what's the problem?

The problem is that the medical authorities, in their wisdom, have decided that since Helga's case is hopeless, they should have the right to pull the plug, overriding the wishes of Helga on this issue. But what are the medical authorities, whose very profession pledges them to keep patients alive to the best of their ability, advocating here if it is not mere murder? The Minnesota doctors having decided that Helga Wanglie is not fit to live, propose to murder her, and they, and other liberals, are sneering at the Wanglies for being backward Neanderthals in trying to affirm her life. Will somebody explain to me how this attitude differs from that of Nazi doctors, with their zeal to exterminate people whose lives they considered unfit?

The right to kill seems to be the established medical position. Thus, Minnesota "medical ethicist" Dr. Steven Miles: "We are certain this person cannot change from her present condition. Shouldn't we be making sure that we're responsible in allocating the resources...to keep costs down for everybody?" Notice the paramount consideration given to the collective "we," with individuals not allowed to decide their own costs, and with the Doctor, long professionally accustomed to playing God, now playing Satan.

(...) Our final specimen is Derek Humphry, head of the Hemlock Society, the most venerable of the right to suicide groups, and careful up to now to stress consent. Where does he stand on the case of Helga Wanglie? Humphry begins by saying that patients "should always have the right of choice to live or die," and if they are in a persistent vegetative state, their families should decide. OK, so what about Helga Wanglie? Here is Humphry's new and contradictory position: "If overwhelming medical opinion says treatment is pointless, courts should arbitrate disputes between doctors and families." Now just a minute, where do courts get the right to decide life or death? Does government have more of a right to commit murder than doctors, or what? And on what principles are the courts supposed to decide that "arbitration"?

(...) The excuses of these killers is that far more important than prolonging life is the "quality of life." But what if a key part of preserving and enhancing that quality is getting rid of this crew of murdering liberals, people whom Isabel Paterson, with wonderful perception and prophetic insight termed "the humanitarian with the guillotine"? What then? So where do we sign up to assist their death? "

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Liberais Franceses 

Para reforçar o que aqui disse, "JCE diz que "Gertrude Himmerfarb sugeriu recentemente que esta ideia de um poder central unitário, intérprete infalível da razão contra os interessses particulares dos indivíduos e das instituições particulares, permeia todo o pensamento francês do século xviii"...e acaba mais À frente com "...porque são os povos de lingua inglesa os primeiros a levantar-se em defesa...".

Eu observo apenas que da cultura francesa saiu muito do pensamento liberal clássico e também da produção de teoria económica, muita dela, antecedente da Escola Austriaca (que corrigiu alguns rumos da teoria económica clássica com origem inglesa)."

Fica a chamada de atenção para Remembering Gustave de Molinari, no Mises Institute:

"March 3 marks the 185th anniversary of economist and philosopher Gustave de Molinari's birth in Belgium. It is a date worth commemorating, because according to David Hart, "He was the leading representative of the laissez-faire school of classical liberalism in France in the second half of the 19th century."

Onde estão expostas algumas citações:

"Government must confine itself to the naturally collective functions of providing external and internal security."

"Society is heavily taxed in the increased costs which follow government appropriation of products and services naturally belonging to the sphere of private enterprise."

"Citizens of constitutional States have obtained a right of consent to public expenditure, and to the taxes which furnish it, but the right has proved sterile. Their representatives have never checked the progressive rise in taxation and expenditure which has occurred in every State…And this process must continue indefinitely for just so long as governments, charged with guaranteeing national security, maintain their right of unlimited requisition upon the life, liberty, and property of the individual."

"[Individual sovereignty] is the right of each man to dispose freely of his person and his property and to govern himself."

"A natural instinct reveals to these men that their persons, the land they occupy and cultivate, the fruits of their labor, are their property, and that no one, except themselves, has the right to dispose of or touch this property."

"…when the sphere of collective government has been reduced to its natural limits, and individual action has obtained perfect freedom, the influence of individuals upon the destinies of society and the race will rapidly increase."



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2005/03/14

Libano V 

CNN - Massive protest marks former PM's death: "Last week, Syria began pulling its 14,000 troops to the Bekaa Valley near the border, and vowed to bring all the troops and intelligence officials across the border into Syria later on.To counteract the opposition, Hezbollah -- an official party in Lebanon, considered a terrorist organization by the United States and Israel -- organized an enormous pro-Syria rally. Monday's opposition rally in Beirut was designed to pull even greater numbers. It was not immediately clear which rally was larger. "

Esperemos que as guerras fiquem pelos números. É em situações destas que a ingerência externa se torna visivelmente perigosa, podendo mesmo ser contraproducente. Pode resultar bem como mal, mas mesmo que resulte bem, qual será o resultado de se tornar norma que todos os países e blocos políticos começem a disputar activamente (e não só a tomar posições de princípio) influências em todos os momentos críticos de outros países? Foi assim que um atentado terrorista na Bósnia levou a um conflito mundial.

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Time preference and Elton john 

"...the article tells of how Elton once went on an $80 million shopping spree in a 20 month period, even spending $200,000 on flowers "because I like them." In one year he spent $18 million on house purchases around the world, and owns more than 2500 paintings, some of which are worth a million dollars or more.

When asked why he spends the way he does, Elton replied: "I have no one to leave the money to. I'm a single man. I like spending money" (p. 74). He's gay and childless, and so he naturally has a high rate of time preference" via LRCBlog.

Nota: Parece que a afirmação de Hans-Herman Hoppe, de que em geral, os homosexuais (como outros grupos - pessoas idosas, etc) , tendem a poupar (relativamente a outros) menos (ou seja, têm uma alta preferência temporal) se encontra demonstrada.

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The Unpredictability of Revolutions 

"(...) When we Americans think of revolution, we think of the Spirit of '76 and the republic that came out of our War of Independence. But when Louis XVI was dethroned in 1789, that revolution gave us the guillotine, the Terror, and the Napoleonic wars. When kings depart, democracy is not always at hand.

What is critical in a revolution is the character of the men who make it. When the czar abdicated, a democratic socialist took power, but a weak Alexander Kerensky was soon run out of the Winter Palace by Bolsheviks. After World War II, there came the Chinese and Cuban revolutions that looked to the Russian as the model. As did Pol Pot's revolution in Cambodia, which came out of an earlier American intervention.

In the Middle East, rebellions and revolutions do not have Hollywood endings. In 1952, King Farouk of Egypt was ousted in a colonels' coup from which the dictator Nasser emerged. In 1958, King Feisal of Iraq was overthrown, his body dragged through the streets of Baghdad. Saddam came out of the pile. In 1968, King Idris was overthrown. Enter Ghadafi. In 1974, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia was ousted by Col. Mengistu. A million perished. In 1979, the shah fell to a revolution that butchered all remnants of his pro-American government.
It is this history that causes one to smile at the giddiness of neocons who see events in Palestine, Iraq, and Lebanon as vindication and harbingers of two, three, many "Prague springs" sweeping the Islamic world. (...)

Though from the look of that Beirut crowd of 500,000, roaring for Sheik Nasrallah of Hezbollah, it may be premature to call this democracy. A day after that monster rally in a land of 4 million, the pro-Syrian prime minister, ousted after the assassination of Rafik Hariri, was voted back into office by parliament, an in-your-face defiance of America and "the international community."

Rather than democracy, revolution may be on the march. If the May elections in Lebanon are free, Hezbollah could move closer to power. While that might constitute pure democracy, is it something we Americans should applaud, subsidize, or fight for?

In elections thus far in the Middle East, the returns have been mixed. In Iraq, Kurds voted for autonomy now, independence later. Shias voted as Ayatollah Sistani told them. Whether the new regime will be pro-Iranian, we know not. It will surely be less pro-American than the ousted Alawi regime. But the cost of a Shi'ite government in Iraq is already known: 1,500 U.S. dead, 10,000 U.S. wounded, 200 billion U.S. dollars gone." Patrick J. Buchanan


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2005/03/13

Destaques 

1) Jaime Nogueira Pinto em "A (re)fundação da direita (1) " no Expresso, cita Russel Kirk "...dizia que «as ideias têm consequências» ...Olhando os resultados do «centro-direita», eu diria que a sua falta (das ideias) também!"

[Nota: e como era bom que existisse uma direita portuguesa atlantista mas alternativa e mais imune ao neoconservadorismo - onde certas ideias se arriscam a terem consequências que as tornam próximas de Napoleão e Trotsky - e que pudesse rever-se no conservadorismo tradicional americano (e que ao contrário do europeu tradicional contém muitos princípios liberais clássicos, por um lado, mantendo o pessimismo em eleger a vox populli a qualquer fim em si mesmo, por outro) de Russel Kirk e Robert Nisbet]

No fim, JNP estabelece alguns princípios gerais:

"
Não sei se estes valores são património exclusivo da direita. Por mim, penso que a defesa dos princípios cristãos, do valor da nação como comunidade solidária dos cidadãos e da família e da propriedade ...

[esta sentença tem muito de Robert Nisbet, que dizia ser a reverência à propriedade , como um elemento de continuidade e ordem, uma das características obrigatórias da sensibilidade conservadora e que torna possivel a soberania da familia e comunidade - o que por sua vez faz com que essa sensibilidade olhe com desconfiança para qualquer intromissão nesses domínios por parte de qualquer poder político - visivel na Idade Média e no Feudalismo até ao advento do absolutismo antigo e do novo - o do Estado Moderno. Eu diria que o problema da direita actual é ter capitulado perante o centralismo e por culpa própria, porque caiu na falácia de ver nesse centralismo um meio de proteger a sua "familia, comunidade e propriedade" - o problema é que depois de criada essa fonte de poder, foi depois tomado de assalto adoptadas outras prioridades - o igualitarismo, relativismo, etc]

da sua liberdade. Esta é a direita com que me identifico - patriótica, realista, solidária, livre, mas consciente de que o bem comum existe e é superior à soma e à subtracção dos bens e interesses individuais"

2) João Carlos Espada, num artigo intitulado de "Burke e a tradição anglo-americana da liberdade" fala de Edmund Burke que "condenou todas as tentativas políticas ou governamentais de redesenhar a ordem social com vista a fazê-la conformar com um visão abstracta. Fê-lo em defesa dos direitos dos católicos irlandeses, em defesa dos colonos americanos, em defesa dos súbditos nativos da Índia sob administração inglesa; e finalmente, em defesa da liberdade dos franceses contra o despotismo iluminado dos jacobinos"

Burke era também prudente quanto ao crescimento do Império Britânico (já agora Burke nasceu em Dublin o que provávelmente contribuiu para o capacitar de apreciar e criticar...). Nos dias de hoje talvez se afirmasse que alguém como Burke apoiava causa separatistas (e quem sabe até "terroristas" - afinal a revolução americana, como as lutas irlandesas...), mas o essencial não está nas classificações (ou seja, de "separatismos" em si) mas num correcto julgamento:


"...The surge in royal executive power during the 1760’s and 1770’s alarmed the colonists and they feared that their way of life might be destroyed. In order to preserve their "English liberties" as they called them, the colonists decided to withdraw from a governmental entity they saw as a threat to their value system. They did not wish to engage in regicide or to indulge in vengeful slaughter. They only sought to conserve a system they feared would be taken from them. Edmund Burke saw this clearly from the Parliament in London. Burke could appreciate that American politics, American values, and even American religion was not like that which existed in England. As the conflict drew on, Burke predicted that if the British were to win the war, the American colonies would have to be remade in a new image in order to remain a part of the British Empire. That which made America what is was would have to be expunged from the earth. Burke did not wish to revolutionize America or anywhere else. The fact that Burke supported the American Revolution while condemning the French Revolution is a compelling fact. While the French Revolution sought to overturn and destroy an established order, the American Revolution sought only to conserve an established order which was being destroyed by British intrusion. " (1)

Eu acho que tudo o JCE diz é correcto, só não tenho a certeza que Burke embarcaria no actual cruzeiro neoconservador (nem cruzada) e porventura seria mais prudente em reclamar mudanças aceleradas induzidas exógenamente (e na ponta da baioneta) a bem de uma nova ordem mundial (até porque quem pediu uma Nova Ordem Europeia, utilizando a força, a mudanças de regime, a influência na escolha de governantes de terceiros, etc, foi Napoleão). Creio mesmo que nem no conflito israelo-palestiniano podemos ter a certeza que os seus olhos veriam com a mesma simplicidade de quem costuma caracterizar um conflito por domínio territorial como de sendo de "democracia versus terrorismo" ou coisa do género.

Edmund Burke apreciava a imagem dum "...English garden, a parable for a decentralized, diverse and lovely place where individuals and families and communities produce, create, and find joy – as they work to gently govern themselves in ways that satisfy their higher values, culture and tradition – is never found in statist "order."
(2) o que elege como qualquer liberal clássico sem antagonismo com a tradição ainda que preparado para advogar a mudança com realismo, tendo dito “change is the means of our preservation".

E por isso mesmo, JCE fala de Burke como o "primeiro teorizador dos partidos políticos parlamentares modernos" (se bem que não sei se é mais adequado falar do parlamento em si mais do que em partidos).

JCE diz que "Gertrude Himmerfarb sugeriu recentemente que esta ideia de um poder central unitário, intérprete infalível da razão contra os interessses particulares dos indivíduos e das instituições particulares, permeia todo o pensamento francês do século xviii"...e acaba mais À frente com "...porque são os povos de lingua inglesa os primeiros a levantar-se em defesa...".

Eu observo apenas que da cultura francesa saiu muito do pensamento liberal clássico e também da produção de teoria económica, muita dela, antecedente da Escola Austriaca (que corrigiu alguns rumos da teoria económica clássica com origem inglesa).

Diz em "
Richard Cantillon and the French Economists: Distinctive French Contributions to J. B. Say*" by Leonard P.Liggio, Institute for Humane Studies George Mason Universiry:

"...Stanley Jevons made reference to this supriority of the French over the English schocls in the Preface to the Theory of Political Economy:
The true doctrine may be more or less clearly traced to the writings of a sucession of great French economists, from Condillac, Baudeau, and Le Trosne, through J. B. Say, Deshin de Tracy, Stroch, and others, down to Bastiat and Concerlle Semeille.

(...) The Physiocrats were concerned to treat the economy as a natural phenomenon, a natural order, a process, in comparison to the mercantilists who emphasized the need for artificial and extraordinary government measures to achieve their objectives.

In this the Physiocrats were following the lead given by Cantillon. Starting with their foundation in a theory of property, the Physiocrats constructed a science around the natural harmony of interests. Property owners should be those or their heirs who cleared and drained land for its cultivation. From Cantillon's analysis, including his contribution on entrepreneurship, the Physiocrats derived their sense of harmony of interests. Le Mercier de la Riviere, L'Ordre naturel et essenciel des societes politique (1767), described how competition is the means by which diverse economic interests are reconciled.' According to Le Trosne, Del ínteret social (1777): It is competition which conciliates all interests: it is perfect only under the absolute reign of freedom of trade, which is the premier consequence of the right of pmperty, and in consequence one of the most essential laws of the social order.'


The Physiocrats shared with Cantillon a system of thought based on methodological individualism. Cantillon's assumption that autonomy of the individual leads to harmony of interests was suggested by Mandeville's Fable of the Bees."

Outro aspecto a propósito tem que ver com o papel da França na história das guerras: combateu a tentativa de hegemonia continental por Carlos V, foi a primeira a derrotar a Prússia (Napoleão), combateu a Alemanha de Bismarck em 1870, depois na Grande Guerra começou a mobilização mal a Rússia declarou guerra, e na Segunda declarando Guerra a Hitler por causa da Polónia sem ter um canal para a proteger...e não ficaria mal lembrar que a França foi o primeiro aliado da Revolução Americana (mais tarde, em 1812, James Madison declarou guerra à Inglaterra e quando esta se empenhava na luta contra Napoleão... tendo os ingleses conseguido incendiar Wasghinton").
O preço pago pela França foi, ao longo da sua história, sempre muito elevado, o que por vezes não custava nada ser reconhecido - em West Point o francês ainda é lembrado como a lingua das manobras militares (tal como os Prussos também a usavam) e hoje os neocons falam na criação de uma "legião estrangeira" que como não podia deixar de ser, só podiam (propor) baptizar de "legião da liberdade".


Talvez a América seja hoje, apenas uma nova França. Não que isso sejam boas notícias.

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2005/03/12

The Welfare State We’re In 

As Agruras do Estado Social, por Miguel Noronha, no site da Causa Liberal.

Recensão da obra The Welfare State We’re In (Politico’s, 2004), de James Batholomew.

A causa maior do declínio está na progressiva intromissão do Estado na sociedade substituindo funções anteriormente desempenhadas pela sociedade civil. Por outras palavras, a construção do Welfare State. Esta “infiltração” teve como consequência a desresponsabilização do indivíduo perante o seu próximo e mesmo perante o seu próprio destino. Os sucessivos programas de “engenharia social” levados a cabo pelos responsáveis políticos destruiram as intituições, formais e informais, anteriormente vigentes (e que, reconhecidamente, no caso britânico, tinham dado provas da sua eficácia) causando autênticos pesadelos dignos de países do Terceiro-Mundo.

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The Meaning of Security 

"(...) In the world of ideas, a vigorous debate is taking place about the extent to which private enterprise is capable of providing security, not only as a supplement but as a full replacement for state-provided security.

Advocates of fully privatized security point out that in the real world, most of the security we enjoy is purchased in the private sector. Vast networks of food distribution protect against starvation, private agents guard our homes, insurance companies provide compensation in the event of unexpected misfortune, and the locks and guns and gated communities provided by private enterprise do the bulk of work for our security in the real world.(...)

The message of this school of thought is that liberty and security (real security) are not opposites such that one must choose between them. They go together. Liberty is the essence of the free enterprise system that provides for all our material needs, that helps us overcome the uncertainties and contingencies of life.(...)" Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.

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Aumento de Impostos? 

Taxation Is Robbery, by Frank Chodorov
[From Out of Step: The Autobiography of an Individualist, by Frank Chodorov; The Devin-Adair Company, New York, 1962, pp. 216–239.]


THE Encyclopaedia Britannica defines taxation as "that part of the revenues of a state which is obtained by the compulsory dues and charges upon its subjects." That is about as concise and accurate as a definition can be; it leaves no room for argument as to what taxation is. (...)What sanc­tion, in morals, does the State adduce for the taking of property? Is its exercise of sovereignty sufficient unto itself?

On this question of morality there are two positions, and never the twain will meet. Those who hold that political institutions stem from "the nature of man," thus enjoying vicarious divinity, or those who pronounce the State the key­stone of social integrations, can find no quarrel with taxa­tion per se; the State's taking of property is justified by its being or its beneficial office.

On the other hand, those who hold to the primacy of the individual, whose very existence is his claim to inalienable rights, lean to the position that in the compulsory collection of dues and charges the State is merely exercising power, without regard to morals.(...)

If the State has a prior right to the products of one's labor, his right to existence is qualified. Aside from the fact that no such prior right can be established, except by declaring the State the author of all rights, our inclination (as shown in the effort to avoid paying taxes) is to reject this concept of priority. (...)

In principle, as the framers of the Constitution realized, the direct tax is most vicious, for it directly denies the sanc­tity of private property. By its very surreptition the indirect tax is a back-handed recognition of the right of the indi­vidual to his earnings; the State sneaks up on the owner, so to speak, and takes what it needs on the grounds of neces­sity, but it does not have the temerity to question the right of the owner to his goods. The direct tax, however, boldly and unashamedly proclaims the prior right of the State to all property. Private ownership becomes a temporary and revocable stewardship. The Jeffersonian ideal of inalienable rights is thus liquidated, and substituted for it is the Marx­ist concept of state supremacy.(...)

Taxes cannot be compared to dues paid to a voluntary organization for such services as one expects from membership, because the choice of withdrawal does not exist.(...)

If the State supplies him with all his needs and keeps him in health and a degree of comfort, it must account him a valuable asset, a piece of capital. Any claim to individual rights is liquidated by society's cash invest­ment. The State undertakes to protect society's investment, as to reimbursement and profit, by way of taxation.(...)

(...) They insist that the State is a contributing factor in production, and that its services ought properly to be paid for; the measure of the value of these services is the income of its citizens, and a graduated tax on these incomes is only due compensation. If earnings reflect the services of the State, it follows that larger earnings result from more services, and the logical conclusion is that the State is a better servant of the rich than of the poor.(...)

The State does not give; it merely takes. All this argument, however, is a concession to the obfus­cation with which custom, law and sophistry have covered up the true character of taxation. There cannot be a good tax nor a just one; every tax rests its case on compulsion."

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Libano IV 

"(...) He was talking about the great betrayal at the end of World War I.The Arabs had been promised an independent country if they fought the Turks. It was a lie. The British and French negotiated a secret agreement that divided up the Middle East between them. France got Syria and, by chopping off the mountainous, coastal region, created Lebanon, just as the British created Jordan by severing Palestine east of the Jordan River.

Saladin was a Kurd, born in Tikrit, where Saddam Hussein was born. Saladin whipped the Crusaders and drove them out of Jerusalem.

The point of this story is that nothing is as simple in the Middle East as it appears to be to the president and his neoconservative ideologues. Lebanon remains part of Syria in the minds of many Syrians and, indeed, in the minds of some Lebanese. It's no big deal for France to join the United States in calling for a Syrian withdrawal. France is not popular in either Syria or Lebanon. The president of Syria has taken no public notice of the president's demands. He is not, as it has been erroneously reported in some outlets at this writing, withdrawing the troops from Lebanon. He is redeploying them along the border – on the Lebanese side.(...)

But even if Syria decides to withdraw, that won't end Syrian influence. Lebanon has many factions. There are the Druze, the Maronite Christians, the Eastern Orthodox Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims and Palestinian refugees. They were embroiled in a terrible civil war in the 1970s, and it was the Syrians, invited in, who finally brought it to a halt.

(...) The latest administration talking point that is worming its way into what is fondly called the news media is that democracy is breaking out all over the Middle East. The people in the Middle East have been having elections for decades. The president conveniently forgot that Yasser Arafat was elected in a free and fair election. The trouble is, the results of elections don't last very long. There is no reason to believe the Iraqi elections will be any different. The Middle East is full of ruins left by past superpowers. As a Palestinian friend of mine likes to say, pointing to those ruins: "They are all gone. We are still here." Charley Reese


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2005/03/11

"If Tyranny and Oppression come to this land, it will be in the guise of fighting a foreign enemy." – James Madison


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Libano III: Spectator - "A revolution made for TV" 

Mary Wakefield

"'Out Syria! Out Syria! Out Syria!' cried the crowd. 'We're revolutionaries!' said my friend happily. But I felt a bit gypped. Everybody around me was young, good-looking, having fun, but that wasn't really what I had had in mind. Only 1,000 or so people? I thought it was the whole of Beirut. Why was everybody under 30? Even in the middle of the crowd, right at the front, it felt less like a national protest than a pop concert. Bouncers in black bomber jackets wore laminated Independence '05 cards round their necks, screens to the left and right of the platform reflected the crowd back at itself, and up against the Virgin Megastore wall were five plastic Portaloos. To the left of the main speaker, a man in a black flying suit with blond highlights, mirrored Oakley sunglasses, and an earpiece seemed to be conducting the crowd. Sometimes he'd wave his arms to increase the shouting, sometimes, with a gesture, he'd silence them. The upturned faces of the revolutionaries were bathed in white light from the TV arc lamps. "

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Libano II 

Harry Brown (libertarian) enfrenta as criticas ao seu artigo (e como é dificil temperar os excessos de entusiasmo pela "liberation" e a "revolution" dos outros...aqui como na Ucrania (onde os "oprimidos" votaram em 44% pelo outro candidato)...:

"My article "The Syrian Hoax" – on the Syrian-Lebanese situation – has provoked more criticism than any article I've published in a long time.

Some of the responses have been of the scholarly variety . . . "You are an absolute idiot. With reporters like you we don’t need any other enemies." , "Keep pushing the liberal propaganda on us Harry. You are good at it. We know at least 50 percent of the American public are clueless. Just like you. Now if we can convert the rest of us to sniveling cowards like you, we'll be in real good shape for the future."

It's obvious from what they say that these people know much more about the Syrian situation than I do. It's quite cruel that they don't pass on to me any of their superior knowledge. They hinted that they know things I don’t know, but they refuse to tell me what those things are.

Syrian Occupiers & American Occupiers

I pointed out in my article that the 13,000 Syrians "occupying" Lebanon are nothing compared to the 150,000 American troops in Iraq – and yet George Bush is demanding an immediate withdrawal of all 13,000 Syrians. (Yes, I know that Bush isn't the only "world leader" calling for Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, but he's the only one making a lot of noise about it.) Someone wrote to tell me that there is no comparison between the Syrian and American occupiers: The difference is that Syria has no interest whatsoever in promoting freedom for the Lebanese, whereas the US has allowed open protests, free speech, and a landmark vote involving dozens of political parties. The Syrians have turned Lebanon into a complete client state.

But Zvi Bar'el has pointed out in the Israeli publication Haaretz: Just to calm those who note the "historic moments" in the Middle East, Lebanon is the freest country in the region. Its parliament has real power and its newspapers and electronic media demarcated the boundaries of freedom of expression before Al Jazeera did so. Anti-establishment satire has existed there for a long time and its citizens, even more than the citizens of Turkey, regard themselves as more Western than Arab.

In fact, if the Syrians won't let the Lebanese express themselves, why are the American media making such a big thing out of a few thousand people holding rallies in Martyrs Square, rooting for the Syrians to leave Lebanon.

We've all read about such demonstrations and seen them on television. From the media, we could easily draw the impression that there isn't a single Lebanese who doesn't want the Syrians out of Lebanon by High Noon. But it might help to add some perspective if the media just as ardently covered the pro-Syrian demonstrations – which, in fact, are considerably larger than the anti-Syrian rallies. As with the anti-Syrian demonstrations, some of the participants have been urged to join the demonstrations by various organizations and some are everyday people who want to express their opinions.

And as to the idea that the Iraqi people under American occupation are much freer than the Lebanese, please take a closer look at the police state the American military has established in Iraq.

Not Much Knowledge Is a Dangerous Thing

Syria is not my idea of a nice country. But it's also not a threat to anyone – not even to the Lebanese. Few Americans understand the long relationship between Syria and Lebanon – a relationship that began way before George W. Bush was born.

But neither reality nor history mean anything to George Bush or to the sycophants who are willing to follow him down the barrel of a cannon. As the Israeli writer Uri Avnery has pointed out, "George Bush, the (not-so-)Quiet American, runs around the world hawking his patent medicines, 'freedom' and 'democracy,' in total ignorance of hundreds of years of history." Avnery's article "The Next Crusades" is an excellent summary of U.S. and Israeli meddling in the Middle East.(...)

P.S. One correction: In my previous article I said "Syrian troops first invaded Lebanon at the time of the Gulf War." This was wrong on two counts. The Syrian troops were invited in by the Lebanese government, and that was in the mid-1970s. Several readers noticed my carelessness, and I'm grateful for the correction. March 11, 2005"


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Greenspan: Budget deficits pose big threat 

Ou as consequências da política do "Guns and butter".

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Destaque 

LEGISLATION AND THE DISCOVERY OF LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY
N. Stephan Kinsella*

I. Introduction ....................................................... 134
II. Centralized and Decentralized Legal Systems ................ 135
A. Civil Law and Common Law .......................... 135
B. Civil Law, Rationalism, and Libertarianism ......... 137
III. Law, Legislation, and Liberty ................................. 140
A. Anarcho-Capitalism ..................................... 140
B. Certainty .................................................. 141
1. Certainty, the Rule of Law, and Legislation 141
2. Decentralized Law-Finding Systems ......... 144
a. Limits of Courts’ Decisions:Jurisdiction, Scope of Decision,and Precedent ...................... 144
b. Government Courts:Extra-Market Powers andDisguised Legislation ............ 146
3. Civil Codes ...................................... 148
a. The "Special" Status of a Civil Code 148
b. Diluting Effect of SpecialStatutes ............................. 149
4. Negative Effects of Uncertainty ............... 150
a. Sanctity of Contract .................... 150
b. Time Preference and theStructure of Production ........... 151
c. Time Preference and Crime ............ 153

C. Central Planning and Economic Calculation .......... 154
1. Central Planning and the Impossibilityof Socialism ................................. 154
2. Legislation as Central Planning ................ 157
3. Special Interests and the UnrepresentativeCharacter of Legislation ................... 160
4. Decentralized Law-Finding Systems ......... 162
D. The Proliferation of Laws .............................. 163
IV. Naive Rationalism and The Primacy of Legislation ......... 166
V. The Role of Legislation and Codification ..................... 169

A. The Role of Legislation ................................ 169
1. The Secondary Role of Legislation .......... 169
2. Alleged Deficiencies of DecentralizedLaw-Finding Systems .................... 170
3. Structural Safeguards to Limit Legislation .. 174
B. The Role of Commentators and Codes ............... 176
VI. Conclusion ...................................................... 180

Algumas passagens que destaco:

1) "Because the classical common law and Roman law developed the large bulk of their legal principles through the decision and discussion of cases, they serve as rough examples of decentralized systems of "judge-found" law, as do largely private customary law systems like the Law Merchant.4

Unlike Roman law and the common law, however, modern civil law principles are embodied in a statute called a Civil Code, and the civil law enshrines legislation as the primary source of law.5 The modern civil law is thus a good example of an explicitly centralized legal system, even though much of the substantive provisions of civil codes are based on legal principles discovered in decentralized fashion in Rome many centuries ago. Roman law thus has more in common with the common law and customary law than with the Roman law’s offspring, modern civil law, since the former were decentralized law-finding systems, while the latter are centralized, legislation-based law-making systems.6 Today’s common law, while based on the classical and mostly decentralized Anglo-American common law, is also coming to be more and more dominated by legislation, and, to that extent, is gradually being centralized as well. "

2) Under the libertarian conception of individual rights, the virtues typically cited in favor of the civil law are certainly necessary requirements of a just legal system. The virtues of economic liberalism, private property, freedom of contract, individualism, natural law, and justice, are really only secondary derivations of the basic individual rights to person and property. Natural law is nothing more than the objective truth that each individual has certain rights — i.e., to own himself and to homestead unowned property. Justice is nothing more than giving a person his due, but what a person’s “due” is depends upon what his rights are. Individualism has meaning and validity, because it is individuals that have rights. Economic liberalism, private property, and freedom of contract are only the playing out of the fact that individuals have a right to own, and thus trade, private property, and indeed have a right to do anything that is not coercive."

3) Certainty, which includes clarity and stability in the law, is a necessary feature of any just legal order, as it is a crucial component of the rule of law itself. “The rule of law” is a phrase that is used with varying meanings: “(1) the absence of arbitrary power on the part of the government to punish citizens or to commit acts against life or property; (2) the subjection of every man, whatever his rank or condition, to the ordinary law of the realm and to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals; and (3) a predominance of the legal spirit in English institutions . . . .”25 The rule of law is necessary because a government with arbitrary power to inflict violence on its subjects is a standing threat to individual liberty.(...)Yet, as Leoni points out, there is much more certainty in a decentralized legal system, than in a centralized legislative system. When the legislature has the ability to change the law from day to day, we can never be sure what rules will apply tomorrow.


4) By contrast, judicial decisions — whether by private arbitrators in an anarcho-capitalist society or by judges in a governmentestablished common-law system — are much less able to reduce legal certainty than is legislation. This is because, as Leoni explains, the position of common-law or decentralized judges "is fundamentally different from that of legislators, at least in three very important respects.":

First, judges can only make decisions when asked to do so by the parties concerned.
Second, the judge’s decision is less far-reaching than legislation because it primarily affects the parties to the dispute, and only occasionally affects, third parties or others with no connection to the parties involved.(...)
Third, a judge’s discretion is further limited by the necessity of referring to similar precedents. This does not necessarily mean that a judge is automatically bound by a prior judicial decision on similar facts, but that at least such precedents are influential. When law is viewed as being found rather than made, it makes sense that one court would refer to principles already discovered and developed over the centuries by other judges.

5) Yet increased uncertainty causes an increase in time preference rates. With the very possibility of legislation, the future is made more unpredictable than it would be without the possibility of legislation. Future goods are always less desirable to individuals than present goods. But if the future becomes more unpredictable, future actions and goods become less certain to occur, and thus future goods become relatively even less desirable, and present goods therefore become relatively more desirable.

As explained by Hoppe, [T]he mere fact of legislation — of democratic law-making — increases the degree of uncertainty. Rather than being immutable and hence predictable, law becomes increasingly flexible and unpredictable. What is right and wrong today may not be so tomorrow. The future is thus rendered more haphazard. Consequently, all around time preferences degrees will rise, consumption and short-term orientation will be stimulated, and at the same time the respect for all laws will be systematically undermined and crime promoted (for if there is no immutable standard of ‘right’, then there is also no firm definition of ‘crime’).57

6) In a free market, in which there is by definition private ownership of property, the free exchange of goods by individual human actors in accordance with their subjective utilities establishes relative prices, in terms of money (which historically was gold and other precious metals). These money prices are the indispensable tool of calculation for rational coordination of scarce resources, since “monetary economic calculation is the intellectual basis of the market economy.”65 Without market prices, how can a central planning board know what or how many products to produce, with which techniques and raw materials, and in which location?(...)
In the words of Mises, “Where there is no market there is no price system, and where there is no price system there can be no economic calculation.”68 “The paradox of ‘planning’ is that it cannot plan, because of the absence of economic calculation. What is called a planned economy is no economy at all.”


7) The legislator, like a communist central planner, can only grope in the dark. (...) Further, not only can legislators not know the actual situation of the individuals they intend to cast their legislative net over, but they cannot predict the often far-reaching effects of legislation. Legislation routinely has unintended consequences, a fact that cannot be gotten around since it is necessitated by the systematic ignorance that legislators face.72

The ultimate reason that the legislator and central planner are both ultimately doomed to failure is that "there is more than an analogy between the market economy and a judiciary or lawyers’ law, just as there is much more than an analogy between a planned economy and legislation."73 There is "more" than an analogy because legislation and central planning are really the same thing: coercively-backed commands emanating from the government that order individuals to act in certain ways that the government prefers.

8) A crucial reason for the systematic ignorance of central planners and legislators alike isthe decentralized, fragmentary character of knowledge.”76 This makes central planners and central law-makers systematically unable to ever have enough knowledge to make informed decisions that affect entire economic or legal systems. Moreover, not only is a central planner “unable” to gather information only present in a dynamic price structure, but the attempt to plan actually destroys the price structure because the private property system at the base of a price structure is outlawed. Similarly, not only does a legislator face a severe ignorance problem — he could never hope to have a comprehensive and continuallyupdated view of all the interactions, rules, relationships, and customs that exist among the people — he also subverts the very spontaneous legal order that would form in the absence of legislative interference.

9) As Professor Aranson puts it, "Legislation saps the social order of spontaneity."78
Just as a decentralized, free market economy is essential to the coordination of resources and the production of wealth, so a decentralized law-finding system is a prerequisite to allowing true Law to develop. This does not guarantee that the law will be just — there are no guarantees — but at least it is possible in a decentralized law-finding system, while in a legislated system it is not.


10) Conclusions: (...) Both the Roman law and common law have been corrupted into today’s inferior legislation-dominated systems. The primacy of legislation should be abandoned, and we should return to a system of judge-made law — a private system, ideally, but in the direction of systems like the old common law and Roman law, at least. Scholars who codify naturally-evolved law have a vital function to serve, but they should not ask for the governmental imprimatur on their scholarly efforts. Ultimately, the form of a legal system does not guarantee that just laws will be adopted. We must always be vigilant and urge that individual freedom be respected, whether by legislator or judge.

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2005/03/10

Mises Institute influencia jornalismo económico português 

1) "Porque cai o dólar?" Sérgio Figueiredo - Jornal de Negócios. Artigo publicado a 9/03/2005.

"Confrontados com os lamentos sobre a queda do dólar, os americanos reagiam: «o dólar é a nossa moeda, mas o problema é vosso». A resposta não é de agora, mas de 1971. E é atribuída a um político, John Connally, na época o secretário do Tesouro de Nixon. O dólar continua a ser a moeda dos EUA, mas a queda persistente da sua taxa de câmbio não constitui uma dor de cabeça apenas para os outros.

É também um problema dos Estados Unidos.

Na época de Nixon, eles exerciam um poder monopolista de emissão de moeda, porque fixavam unilateralmente a paridade do dólar face ao ouro e, por arrasto, face às restantes divisas.
Mesmo com o colapso do padrão-ouro, a hegemonia era garantida pelos elevados graus de liquidez e de integração dos seus mercados financeiros. Franco suíço, iene ou marco alemão, moedas ligadas a mercados sem profundidade, não conseguiam rivalizar sequer com a sombra do dólar.

Sucede que, a partir de 1999, o euro mudou esta constelação. Além da dimensão geográfica, a moeda europeia começou a ganhar relevância económica.

Países não-alinhados, com a China à cabeça, adoptaram, ou anunciam a intenção de adoptar, o euro como taxa de câmbio de referência para as suas moedas. Outras nações, sobretudo produtoras de petróleo, anunciam a intenção de cotar as suas exportações na moeda europeia.
Dito de outra forma, está em causa o papel do dólar como única reserva cambial e como principal divisa para o comércio internacional.

Existe hoje um consenso no sistema financeiro internacional de que a queda abrupta do dólar deve ser evitada. Já se conhecem as razões dos europeus: quanto mais fraco estiver o dólar, menos capacidade exportadora têm a Alemanha e outras economias que precisam do estímulo externo.

Japão e China não desejam igualmente o crash do dólar. Os japoneses, como principais credores dos EUA, por serem os que mais investiram em activos americanos. A China também não, pelo menos enquanto não trocar por petróleo, matérias-primas ou outras divisas, parte significativa dos dólares que acumula em reservas.

O contraste entre a realidade e os desejos de ministros e de banqueiros centrais é, contudo, abissal. E as explicações que se procuram para o facto de o dólar cair, quando todos querem que ele suba, são ainda mais extraordinárias.

(...)

2 )
Why the Dollar is Falling, By Antony P. Mueller - Mises Institute 8/03/2005

When confronted with complaints about the falling value of the dollar, the U.S. official is said to have responded to his European visitors: "The dollar is our currency, but it's your problem." That was in 1971. The politician to whom this statement is attributed was John Connally, who at that time served as the secretary of the U.S. Treasury. His boss was Richard Nixon, the same President who used a word for the Italian lira which politeness prohibits repeating. Nevertheless, Connally and Nixon made clear how matters were.

(...) After some initial weakness—probably due to fears that the new arrangement might fail—the euro has gained markedly in value against the U.S. dollar over the past three years. The American currency is facing a rival. An increasing number of central banks announced plans to shift part of their international reserves into the European currency. The dollar is still the currency of the U.S., but a sinking dollar is no longer just a problem for foreigners, it is also a problem for the United States.

In the past, the United States could count on having the monopoly of issuing the currency with the highest degree of liquidity and financial market integration. Although there were stronger currencies than the U.S. dollar, such as the Swiss currency or the Japanese yen and the German mark, these currencies could not rival the U.S. dollar because of their limited market share.

The existence of the euro has changed this constellation. As to its market size, the euro area is up to the U.S. dollar with the tendency of further augmenting this position when new members of the European Union will adopt the single currency, some non-EU countries will peg their exchange rates to that of the European monetary union or when oil producers will change to euros when pricing their exports.

(...) There is a consensus currently among the major players in international finance, particularly among the relevant governments and central banks, that an abrupt fall of the dollar should be avoided. Japan, the largest foreign holder of U.S. assets, depends on U.S. protection in the face of the growing muscle of China in its region. China itself most likely would also like to avoid a dollar crash at least as long as it has not yet spent a considerable part of its dollar reserves in the effort to secure future supplies of food and oil around the world. The Europeans do not want a much weaker dollar because as of now it is mainly exports that are booming in the major economies of this region.(...)"

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Liberalismo e politica externa e de defesa 

Do meu ponto de vista, um liberal, deve apontar tantos defeitos a uma politica de intervencionismo externo como em qualquer outro assunto económico ou social. E quando vêm com a conversas morais e idealistas, ainda especialmente mais. E quando nos apontam timidos e ainda incertos resultado depois de, por exemplo, se gastarem 300 bilióes de dólares, milhares de mortos e significativa destruição material e moral, ainda mais ainda.

Não é preciso ir mais longe na história do que a Grande Guerra para observar como as decisões aparentemente legitimas e racionais de todas as partes produziu o maior desastre da civilização, provocando quer o aparecimento do comunismo, do fascismo como no final da social-democracia centralizada em geral (e uma guerra adicional) - foi o que se chama a revolução total. E os conservadores olhando para os resultados das guerras do século 20 deviam ter já cultivado a maior dos pessimismos quanto aos efeitos inesperados e "unintended consequences" que só se vislumbram no longo prazo (como em qualquer programa de planeamento económico e social).

Na actual senda neo-conservadora pela revolução mundial (que muito se deve às origens revolucionárias dos seus mentores), está-se a percorrer os mesmos caminhos que outros impérios de outros tempos,que descobriram tarde demais, que de repente, se tornam reféns dos acontecimentos. Por exemplo, Churchill que desde o inicio do século procurou impedir as ambições de uma Alemanha ainda civilizada (isto é monárquica e efectivo federalismo), viu-se envolvido no fim de todas as monarquias europeias relevantes (e em especial, o Austro-Hungaro - um factor de equilibrio), para depois vir a combater uma república nazi (tendo como aliado uma república estalinista), a cujo combate, provocou o fim do seu querido (e nosso) Imprério Britânico.


A razão para a situação no Iraque ser ainda, apensar de tudo, gerivel, é porque os interesses xiitas e kurdos vão no sentido de esmagar a influência sunita. Sunitas que são a influência mais secular e menos radical do mundo islâmico, incluindo na Siria (quem não perceber isto não vai conseguir perceber nada).

Entre democratização e caos o caminho é curto, e mesmo que a curto prazo se percepcionem sinais positivos, temos que nos lembrar que a Segunda Guerra que fez do mass-murder Estaline um aliado do Ocidente e entregou de bandeja o comunismo ao mundo por 50 anos, resultou do que parecia ser a Guerra para acabar com as Guerras e fazer o mundo mais seguro para a democracia, e tudo isso, em grande parte resultado das decisões de um Presidente idealista referência incontornável dos Neo-Cons.

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2005/03/08

MSNBC: Nearly half a million pro-Syrian protesters rally in Beirut 

"Nearly 500,000 pro-Syrian protesters waved flags and chanted anti-American slogans in a central Beirut square Tuesday, answering a nationwide call by the militant Shiite Muslim Hezbollah group for a demonstration to counter weeks of massive rallies demanding Syrian forces leave Lebanon.

(...) Rally eclipses opposition protests

Tuesday’s rally was far bigger than the more than 70,000 anti-Syrian protesters who filled the nearby Martyrs’ Square on Monday. That was the biggest rally yet of anti-Syrian furor, as demonstrators waved Lebanon’s cedar-tree flag and thundered, “Syria out!”

Entretanto:

1) Bush vows 'freedom will prevail in Lebanon'
2) Também parece que "...he demanded fast and complete Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, noting that no country can have free elections under foreign military occupation."

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Feminism 

" (...) does feminism preach, as it has for decades, that there is no difference whatever (except the famed le petit difference) between the two sexes, that their capacities, traits, etc. are all equal, "(...) the same, or are they saying, as feminists have recently taken to arguing, that women are very different, that they are nurturing, caring, etc., and therefore superior to men? And how can they say both at the same time, or have it both ways?

These are cogent questions, but they have not penetrated to the heart of the feminist agenda. Here is how these seemingly embarrassing contradictions and double standards can be resolved: men are the evil, victimizer sex; women are the good, victimized sex. The two genders are ineluctable enemies. Therefore, all tactics and strategies are permissible and valuable if they result in the victory of women over the Male Enemy. Hence, attack one-sex colleges if they are male, proclaim their greatness if they are female. If you are talking about qualities such as career advancement, intelligence, success, proclaim women as exactly man's equal and denounce as "sexist" any intimation to the contrary; but if you are talking about such good things as nurturing, peace, etc., proclaim women's innate superiority. Don't worry about such "objective" qualities as fairness, logic, truth, or non-contradiction; remember, all's fair in hate and war" The Irrepressible Rothbard


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A Grande Guerra e o Socialismo 

"(...) Last year, Cambridge published a collection of 500-plus pages on one of the most exhaustively examined subjects in the whole history of historical writing, the origins of the First World War. As for general works, in the past few years at least six have appeared in English, by both academic and popular historians. The Western Front: Battle Ground and Home Front in the First World War (New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2003) by Hunt Tooley, who teaches at Austin College, in Texas, falls into the academic category, and for such a short volume (305 pages) it offers a very great deal indeed.

Tooley traces the roots of the world-historical catastrophe of 1914–1918 to the Franco-Prussian war, which, while achieving German unification in 1871, understandably fostered an enduring resentment in France, "a country that was accustomed to humiliating others during 400 years of warmaking and aggression" (p. 5). Bismarck sought to ensure the Second Reich’s security through defensive treaties with the remaining continental powers (the ones with Austria-Hungary and Italy constituted the Triple Alliance). But under the new (and last) Kaiser, Wilhelm II, the treaty with Russia was permitted to lapse, freeing Russia to ally with France. The over-ambitious Wilhelm’s extensive naval program was perceived by the British as a mortal threat; starting in 1904 they developed an Entente cordiale (cordial understanding) with France, enlarged in 1907 to include Russia. Now the Germans had good reason to fear a massive Einkreisung (encirclement).

A series of diplomatic crises increased tensions, aggravated by the two Balkan wars of 1912–1913, from which a strong Serbia emerged, evidently aiming at the disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy. With Russia acting as Serbia’s mentor and growing in power every year, military men in Vienna and Berlin reflected that if the great conflict was destined to come, then better sooner than later.

(...) Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s assassination in Sarajevo by a Bosnian Serb set "the stone rolling down the hill," as the German chancellor bleakly put it. Mobilizations and ultimatums followed, and a few days later the giant conscript armies of the continental powers were in motion. In democratic Britain, the commitment to France had been hidden from the public, from Parliament, and even from most of the cabinet.

The German declaration of war on Russia and France placed the Asquith government in a grave quandary, but, as Tooley writes, "the first German footfall in Belgium salvaged the situation" (p. 39). Now Foreign Secretary Edward Grey could deceitfully claim that England was joining its entente partners simply to defend Belgian neutrality.

(...)The war was greeted as a cleansing, purifying moment, at least by the urban masses, whose enthusiasm easily outweighed the rural population’s relative passivity. (...)Especially ecstatic were the intellectuals, who viewed the war as a triumph of "idealism" over the selfish individualism and crass materialism of "the trading and shopkeeping spirit" (...)Socialist parties, except in Russia and later Italy, added their eager support, as did even celebrated anarchists like Benjamin Tucker and Peter Kropotkin.

(...)The German strategy in the event of war on two fronts, the famous Schlieffen plan, foolishly assumed the infallibility of its execution and ignored the factors that doomed it: active Belgian resistance, the rapid Russian mobilization, and the landing of a British Expeditionary Force (those mercenaries who, as another poet, A. E. Housman, wrote, "saved the sum of things for pay").(...) In 1916 "the butcher’s bill," as Robert Graves called it, came due, at Verdun and at the Somme. Ill-educated neoconservatives who in 2002–2003 derided France as a nation of cowards seem never to have heard of Verdun, where a half million French casualties were the price of keeping the Germans at bay. On the first day of the battle of the Somme, the brainchild of Field Marshal Haig, the British lost more men than on any other single day in the history of the Empire, more than in acquiring Canada and India combined.

(...) In Britain, France, and later the United States, proponents of centralization and planning gleefully exploited the occasion to extend state activism into every corner of the economy. (...). The deluded patriots who purchased government war bonds were crippled by inflation, now "introduced [to] the twentieth century…as a way of life" (p. 113). Tooley cites Murray Rothbard on one of the hidden detriments of the war: it initiated the inflationary business cycle that ended in the Great Depression.

(...) The aggrandizement of state power in the combatant nations reached, Tooley notes, a kind of reductio ad absurdum in what was probably the war’s worst result: the establishment of a terrorist totalitarian regime by the Bolsheviks in Russia.

American entry had been virtually determined in the wake of the sinking of the Lusitania, when the terminally Anglophiliac Wilson administration declared that the Germans would be held "strictly accountable" for the loss of any Americans’ lives through U-boat action, even when those Americans were traveling on armed British merchant ships that carried munitions of war.

(...) British propaganda was, as always, topnotch. Its high point was the mendacious Bryce report on the "Belgian atrocities."

(...) The Bolshevik coup d’état of November, 1917 led to an armistice in the East, and the Germans launched their final, va-banque push on the western front.(...) By the summer, the American expeditionary force under John G. Pershing amounted to 2 million men, many of them keen to make the whole world safe for democracy.

(...) century earlier, after the Napoleonic wars, the aristocrats at the Congress of Vienna fashioned a viable system that avoided general war for another hundred years. At Paris in 1919, the diplomats, now answerable to their democratic constituencies, set the stage for a virtually inevitable future conflict. Tooley very correctly places the word "peace," as in the Versailles "peace" treaty, in ironic quotes.

(...) In U. S. history it has been crises, most often wars, that result in a great expansion of state power. Once the crisis is over, the state and its budgets, deficits, functionaries, and regulations are cut back to more normal levels, but never to what they were before, and they go on from there. Ideology, the underlying political mentality of the people, is also permanently skewed in a state-receptive direction. As Tooley sums up: "If the twentieth century became the century of managerial control, of the prioritizing of group goals and group efficiency over the autonomies of individuals, families, and regions, then we will find in World War I the accelerator of processes which were emerging before then" (p. 267)." The Great War Retold by Ralph Raico

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Guilt Sanctified II 

Rothbard neste artigo fala da boa nova que nos foi anunciada pelo que chama de left-liberalism - a libertação de qualquer sentimento de culpa ....pelos nossos desejos reprimidos, ou seja estamos

"...repressed, inhibited, guilt-ridden for giving in to their natural desires and impulses. We come to preach you a joyous removal of guilt, hammered into you by repressed ministers and priests. We preach hedonism, the end of guilt, following your desires, and to put it in a common rebarbative phrase of the 1960s Sexual Revolution: "if it moves, fondle it." Sex, furthermore, is "only a drink of water," natural and harmless."

Mas como diz, "apenas durou 6 meses", porque logo a seguir os mesmos afundaram-nosem todo o género de culpas.

"...guilt for centuries of slavery, guilt for the oppression and rape of women, guilt for the Holocaust, guilt for the existence of the handicapped, guilt for eating and killing animals, guilt for being fat, guilt for not recycling your garbage, guilt for "desecrating the Earth." Note that this guilt is never confined to the specific individuals, say, who enslaved or murdered or raped people. (...) Some groups are accorded the status of Official Victims; everyone not in the Victim groups are, therefore, criminals and Official Victimizers."

No fim nem o o próprio sexo (a motivação original para a libertação de todas as culpas) se salvou: "even sex, the last bastion of hedonism, is no longer guilt-free; with the onslaught of "sex exploits women," and ravening condomania in the interest of "safe sex."

Dei-me ao trabalho de falar novamente neste artigo porque no Diário de Notícias leio que num estudo dum tal "Observatório da Imigração" se chega à estatística que a taxa criminal entre estrangeiros é quase o dobro dos nacionais. A conclusão óbvia do estudo é que a explicação reside toda na....DISCRIMINAÇÂO.

Portanto, somos todos culpados. Sempre. Colectivamente. De tudo o que de mau acontece debaixo do sol (e da lua). Basicamente, a solução provavelmente passa por começar a pagar ainda mais impostos, talvez uns 99%, para expiar a nossa culpa com programas que atraiam de forma ilimitada todo e qualquer despojado do mundo para o qual a simples possibilidade de passear e vaguear pleas ruas (enquanto espera por uma habitação social num bairro feito à medida) representa provavelmente uma enorme subida da sua qualidade de vida. Principalmente se ainda puderem cometer um ou outro crime apontando os culpados: Nós mesmos. Os assaltados.

Em resposta, diz, Rothbard: "..the only way to save the day is to raise the banner high and engage in a frontal and all-out onslaught against the left guilt-inducers. In such an onslaught lies the only hope of taking back our lives and our culture from these malignant pests and tyrants"

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2005/03/07

Pensamento do dia 

Os Conservadores morais (eutanásia, suicidio, homosexualidade, aborto, multiculturalismo imposto, droga, prostituição, religião, castidade, fidelidade, casamento, familia, comunidade, tradição, lei intemporal, abstenção do consumo e acumulação de capital, etc) precisam de recuperar o seu sentido de anti-estado-poder-central porque não lhes vai restar mais nada senão exigir a mais completa descentralização politica e a protecção da propriedade e contrato, de forma a permitir o crescimento de comunidades privadas em livre associação e segundo os seus próprios valores. Será a única defesa que restará contra o inevitável relativismo imposto a todos particularismos por parte de qualquer poder politico central legitimado pela vox populli, principalmente quando perde a escala humana (e a tendência do momento, são a criação de espaços uniformizantes de decisões democráticas-maioritárias-politicos cada vez maiores).

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Libano 

1) Haaretz: End the occupation - but only in Lebanon

"(...)Just to calm those who note the "historic moments" in the Middle East, Lebanon is the freest country in the region. Its parliament has real power and its newspapers and electronic media demarcated the boundaries of freedom of expression before Al Jazeera did so. Anti-establishment satire has existed there for a long time and its citizens, even more than the citizens of Turkey, regard themselves as more Western than Arab.

But this is not the main point. Three occupying countries remain in the Middle East: Syria, Israel and the United States. The two Western occupiers are now demanding that the Arab occupying state desist from occupying. In its honor, they pushed for the Syria Accountability Act - legislation enabling sanctions to be applied, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559.

The status of this resolution is no different than that of resolutions 242 and 338, which call for Israel to withdraw from the territories it conquered. Israel countered these resolutions with a legalistic argument, claiming it was not a case of occupation, but rather of liberation - or at most, a case of administered territories. That is, a deposit. Syria has a literary argument similar to that of Israel: the government of Lebanon invited it into the country. And the United States, of course, came to Iraq to destroy weapons of mass destruction. But without any such weaponry, it will make due with establishing democracy.(...)

It may suddenly dawn on Israel that the weakening of Syria's control in Lebanon enhances the power of the more dangerous enemy, Hezbollah.(...)"

2) So What’s Doing in Syria & the Rest of the Middle East?, Harry Browne

1. There are 13,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon. (...)

Sirios (embaixador) : Actually, if anyone with a sense of fairness would look at the history of our presence in Lebanon, you could easily tell that we had 42,000 troops in Lebanon 10 years ago, and we started a series of withdrawals and redeployments. Today, we have only 13,000 troops, and they — all of them are outside major Lebanese cities. So we have done this in the past, and we have explicitly said that we will continue doing this. . . . And we have repeatedly said on the record in the past three years, not because of this pressure now, the moment the Lebanese government will ask us to leave, we will leave. And we are leaving, absolutely.

2. The Syrian troops in Lebanon are all in the countryside — ready to help restore order if needed, but generally out of sight of the Lebanese people. The American troops in Iraq are all over the place — killing insurgents and civilians alike while devastating cities like Fallujah.

3. There are no reports of Lebanese insurgents fighting the Syrian troops, while there are daily clashes between Iraqi insurgents and American troops.

4. As Pat Buchanan has pointed out, it would make no sense for the Syrians to have assassinated the Lebanese ex-Prime Minister — since they had to know that they would automatically become the #1 suspect and bring the wrath of Bush down upon their heads.

5. Syrian troops first invaded Lebanon at the time of the Gulf War. And while Syria was overrunning Lebanon, President George H.W. Bush was proudly listing Syria as a member of the coalition of nations fighting Saddam Hussein.

6. The Bush administration, as usual, won’t negotiate anything with anyone. The Bushies prefer to make accusations in the media, assert that they have evidence that no one ever gets to see, and incite Americans to hate another nation of human beings.

(...)8. The TV pictures of a Lebanese crowd celebrating the fall of the pro-Syrian Lebanese government no more demonstrate the attitudes of all Lebanese than do the TV pictures of U.S. pro-abortion rallies demonstrate that all Americans (or even a majority) are in favor of abortions.

9. Despite the State Department’s human rights report of torture and other ghastly conditions inside Syria, the U.S. government has sent some of its "War on Terror" prisoners to Syria for interrogation — and, presumably, torture. And not one American politician is embarrassed by the contradiction."


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Libertarianism 

"(...) Libertarian societies in all their variety would not be utopias, of course. Libertarianism does not propose an end to evil or even to coercion, but only the flourishing of civilization in the absence of institutionalized coercion. Crime would not disappear, poor taste would still exist, and even conservative communities would remain beset with imperfection. Removing the privileges of the state would make these evils smaller, less centralized, and more manageable, however. This picture is no abstraction or economic construct; it arises from the practice of actual institutions.

The record of civil society and the free market is as old as the human race. The libertarian idea of society would hold true even if a degree of coercion were absolutely necessary and ineradicable: the more authority residing in civil society rather than the state, the better. But there are at least a few prima facie considerations that lend weight to so-called radical libertarianism.

The most widely agreed upon of all so-called public goods, national defense, is not what it seems. The mightiest military on earth failed to prevent the atrocity on 9/11. On the contrary, U.S. interference in the Middle East and support for thuggish regimes has endangered Americans. Is a country ripe for invasion without a standing army? The last 200-odd years have shown many instances, including our own Revolutionary War, where guerrilla forces have been more effective than regular armies. Nor is there any need for conscription when people want to defend their homes; conscription is what states need to make people fight for causes in which they don’t believe.

A libertarian order is not coming any time soon, but it should be plain to anyone who undertakes the investigation that the solution to war, bureaucracy, taxation, personal irresponsibility, and the rot of culture is not more government, it’s less."


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Guilt Sanctified 

Earlier in this century, left-liberalism came to Americans preaching the alluring gospel of Liberation from Guilt. Americans, they boldly proclaimed, are repressed, inhibited, guilt-ridden for giving in to their natural desires and impulses. We come to preach you a joyous removal of guilt, hammered into you by repressed ministers and priests. We preach hedonism, the end of guilt, following your desires, and to put it in a common rebarbative phrase of the 1960s Sexual Revolution: "if it moves, fondle it." Sex, furthermore, is "only a drink of water," natural and harmless.

The era of guiltlessness under our left-liberal culture lasted, as I remember, about six months. Now, the entire culture is characterized by massive collective guilt, and if anyone fails to give due public lip-service to a long list of solemnly avowed guilts, he is literally driven from public life. Guilt is everywhere, all-pervasive, and brought to us by the same scoundrels who once promised us easy liberation. A brief rundown: guilt for centuries of slavery, guilt for the oppression and rape of women, guilt for the Holocaust, guilt for the existence of the handicapped, guilt for eating and killing animals, guilt for being fat, guilt for not recycling your garbage, guilt for "desecrating the Earth."

Note that this guilt is never confined to the specific individuals, say, who enslaved or murdered or raped people. (...) Some groups are accorded the status of Official Victims; everyone not in the Victim groups are, therefore, criminals and Official Victimizers. The Victimizers are expected to feel guilty about the victims, and therefore – because there is no point to guilt without a payoff – to pay through the nose in money, privileges, and "empowerment" forever and ever without end. Amen.

There is never a way of getting out from under. And this is what our liberators have brought us. In return for old-fashioned Christianity and guilt about sex, they have brought us a new religion of Victimology and of the Goddess Nature. And even sex, the last bastion of hedonism, is no longer guilt-free; with the onslaught of "sex exploits women," and ravening condomania in the interest of "safe sex," it might be better to scrap the whole thing and go back to Christian guilt. Certainly it would be simpler and more peaceful.

As in all other aspects of our rotten culture, the only way to save the day is to raise the banner high and engage in a frontal and all-out onslaught against the left guilt-inducers. In such an onslaught lies the only hope of taking back our lives and our culture from these malignant pests and tyrants." Murray N. Rothbard


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2005/03/06

Afghanistan now nearly 'a narcotics state' 

"WASHINGTON - More than three years after a pro-U.S. government was installed, Afghanistan has been unable to contain opium poppy production and is “on the verge of becoming a narcotics state,” according to a presidential report."

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2005/03/04

Michael Meacher no The Spectator: One for oil and oil for one 

"Yes, our man (Yushchenko) and our system (democracy) won in Ukraine, and once again good triumphed over bad. Yet this presentation, so characteristic of the Western media, misses the point about what the struggle is really about.

If the issue was fair elections, there would have been an equal furore about the grossly rigged elections by which Ilham Aliyev assumed the presidency of Azerbaijan in 2003 from his father, a ruthless KGB hardman in the former Soviet state. In fact the West turned a blind eye, in order to maintain access to Azerbaijan’s oil supplies after a $13 billion contract had been signed with BP in 1998. Equally, there would have been uproar when the pro-Russian Shevardnadze was ousted as President of Georgia in 2003 and the West’s favoured candidate won 96 per cent of the vote to replace him. But nobody raised any complaint.

If the issue was legitimate government, much more attention would have been focused on Yushchenko’s aides and the tenor of his administration. His closest aide, Julia Timoshenko, known as Ukraine’s ‘gas princess’, and now appointed Prime Minister, has been widely accused by both the Russian and Ukrainian authorities of bribery and embezzlement.(...)

What has been at stake in Ukraine is less a fight over democracy than a struggle over the geopolitics of oil and military reach. If Ukraine is absorbed into the Nato orbit, Russia will be deprived of access to its naval bases in the Crimea, and Russian oil and gas exports will be squeezed by a new US straitjacket.

But the significance of the Ukrainian confrontation goes even wider. China remains the sole long-term challenger to US hegemony, and while the Chinese economy has been expanding at a phenomenal rate, its weakness continues to be its energy supply. (...)"


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The compulsory old age insurance system 

By subsidizing with tax funds (with funds taken from others) people who are poor, more poverty (bad) will be created. By subsidizing people because they are unemployed, more unemployment (bad) will be created. By subsidizing unwed mothers, there will be more unwed mothers and more illegitimate births (bad), etc.

Obviously, this basic insight applies to the entire system of so-called social security that has been implemented in Western Europe (from the 1880s onward) and the U.S. (since the 1930s): of compulsory government "insurance" against old age, illness, occupational injury, unemployment, indigence, etc. In conjunction with the even older compulsory system of public education, these institutions and practices amount to a massive attack on the institution of the family and personal responsibility.

By relieving individuals of the obligation to provide for their own income, health, safety, old age, and children's education, the range and temporal horizon of private provision is reduced, and the value of marriage, family, children, and kinship relations is lowered.

Irresponsibility, shortsightedness, negligence, illness and even destructionism (bads) are promoted, and responsibility, farsightedness, diligence, health and conservatism (goods) are punished.

The compulsory old age insurance system in particular, by which retirees (the old) are subsidized from taxes imposed on current income earners (the young), has systematically weakened the natural intergenerational bond between parents, grandparents, and children.

The old need no longer rely on the assistance of their children if they have made no provision for their own old age; and the young (with typically less accumulated wealth) must support the old (with typically more accumulated wealth) rather than the other way around, as is typical within families.

Consequently, not only do people want to have fewer children—and indeed, birthrates have fallen in half since the onset of modern social security (welfare) policies—but also the respect which the young traditionally accorded to their elders is diminished, and all indicators of family disintegration and malfunctioning, such as rates of divorce, illegitimacy, child abuse, parent abuse, spouse abuse, single parenting, singledom, alternative lifestyles, and abortion, have increased.

(...) Subsidies for the ill, unhealthy and disabled breed illness, disease, and disability and weaken the desire to work for a living and to lead healthy lives. One can do no better than quote the "dead Austrian economist" Ludwig von Mises once more:

being ill is not a phenomenon independent of conscious will. . . . A man's efficiency is not merely a result of his physical condition; it depends largely on his mind and will. . . . The destructionist aspect of accident and health insurance lies above all in the fact that such institutions promote accident and illness, hinder recovery, and very often create, or at any rate intensify and lengthen, the functional disorders which follow illness or accident. . . . To feel healthy is quite different from being healthy in the medical sense. . . . By weakening or completely destroying the will to be well and able to work, social insurance creates illness and inability to work; it produces the habit of complaining—which is in itself a neurosis—and neuroses of other kinds. . . . As a social institution it makes a people sick bodily and mentally or at least helps to multiply, lengthen, and intensify disease. . . . Social insurance has thus made the neurosis of the insured a dangerous public disease. Should the institution be extended and developed the disease will spread. No reform can be of any assistance. We cannot weaken or destroy the will to health without producing illness.4" Hans-Hermann Hoppe


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The Spectator: A despotic act 

"It is unfortunate, though perhaps inevitable, that people who have lived only in conditions of liberty and democracy should have limited interest in the legal provisions that keep societies free. That much is clear from the public’s response to the Prevention of Terrorism Bill. The past week saw one of the gravest parliamentary debates of modern times, on a measure which would undermine an 800-year-old principle of English law: that no man should face imprisonment without trial. And yet to judge by the opinion polls, most citizens seem to care little about the issues involved. Inasmuch as they have followed the debate at all, it is simply to absorb the glib suggestions of the Prime Minister that the only ‘civil liberty’ which matters is personal protection from a terrorist bomb.(...)

Mercifully, it is unlikely that the average law-abiding citizen will fall foul of the provisions in the Prevention of Terrorism Bill. But that should not blind us to their potential. They are levers of despotism, no matter how worthy the intentions of those ministers who have conceived them. Coming from any government this Bill would be a disgrace. Coming from a government which has so often trumpeted its commitment to human rights, it is also, of course, the height of hypocrisy."


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2005/03/03

Intolerâncias 

No Público: No reino (não santo) da intolerância Nuno Pacheco diz que

"(...) Infelizmente, a história costuma ser manchada de sangue precisamente por aqueles que vivem até ao limite o que acreditam. Sem qualquer comparação com o caso actual, que apenas revela uma cega (e inaplicável, diga-se) intolerância, ditadores e terroristas vivem, sempre, até ao limite aquilo em que acreditam. Mentem por isso, matam por isso. E não consta que se arrependam"

Mas quando essa grande conquista da humanidade que é a liberdade de abortar for estabelecida universalmente porque o "corpo é da mulher" (ver socialistas e sociais-democratas de todas as cores a defender de forma tão absoluta um direito de propriedade é quase enternecedor para um anarco-capitalista como eu), não irá essa imensa tolerância democrática obrigar todos os que acreditam que tal acto é profundamente imoral, a financiar compulsóriamente a gratuidade de tal acto?

Não minta a si mesmo sobre a sua imensa tolerância nem me venha com essas tretas que o aborto não é uma morte (porque arrisca-se a precisamente a estar de alguma forma a mentir e a matar). O pobre padre (com quem você se mostra tão intolerante) não apelou a o "Estado de direto" para impor a sua moral. Os tolerantes (sociais) democratas fazem-no (para financiar a sua própria moralidade) com a ameaça de prisão e hipócritamente acham-se puros e iluminados e citando-o a si, todos os puros e iluminados "vivem, sempre, até ao limite aquilo em que acreditam. Mentem por isso, matam por isso. E não consta que se arrependam".

Todas as entidades privadas (igrejas, associações, empresas, etc) devem poder descriminar àcerca do aborto ou qualquer outro valor moral se assim o entenderem. Indo mais longe, até localmente isso deve ser possivel (quando os inevitáveis N referendos necessários para legalização forem efectuados), ou seja, os municípios devem passar a poder regular individualmente (no limite se assim o entenderem, proibindo) a prática de aborto. Na prática, dirá, é ineficaz porque o do lado pode permiti-lo, mas com sabemos, em questões morais, o exemplo é a melhor forma de propaganda.

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2005/03/02

Ruanda, desarmamento das populações e o BI 

"Over 800,000 Christian Tutsis in Rwanda were hacked to death with machetes between April and July of 1994 by the Hutu-led military force after the Tutsis had been disarmed by governmental decree in the early 1990s, of which disarmament decree the United Nations helped to enforce. On several occasions, United Nations soldiers stationed in Rwanda actually handed over helpless Tutsi Christians under their protection to members of the Hutu military. They then stood by as their screaming charges were unceremoniously hacked to pieces. This massacre happened one year after the United Nations helped to put in a national ID card in Rwanda, and it was that very national ID card system which the Hutus used to track-down and identify the Christian Tutsis. Needless to say, all of the subject populations of the above mass murders had been disarmed beforehand."

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Alexis de Tocqueville 

...observou em Democracy in America, "The Union was formed by the voluntary agreement of the States; in uniting together they have not forfeited their nationality, nor have they been reduced to the condition of one and the same people. If one of the states chooses to withdraw from the compact, it would be difficult to disapprove its right of doing so..."

Lincoln entendeu que não. Os Chineses parece que também não.


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Isto, provavelmente, explica algumas coisas 

"O consumo de medicamentos antidepressivos aumentou 45 por cento nos últimos cinco anos: em 2000 foram compradas em Portugal cerca de quatro milhões de embalagens, no ano passado foram quase seis milhões.

(...)Carlos Lopes Pires, professor de Psicologia da Saúde na Universidade de Coimbra, considera o consumo de antidepressivos como "um problema de saúde pública".

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Re: Corrupção e impostos municipais 

Como, e que hipóteses se podem colocar, quanto ao auto-financiamento das autarquias, num cenário de uma revolução administrativa?

1. O auto-financiamento das autarquias pressupõe uma forte descida dos impostos nacionais.

2. As Juntas de Freguesia devem constituir-se como as entidades de gestão do património comum, financiadas por algo semelhante a um I.M.I (ex contribuição autárquica), e com regras estatutárias semelhantes aos dos condomínios. Seria natural serem aqui regulados diversos assuntos que dizem respeito aos residentes e que afectam a sua tranquilidade e a boa gestão comum.

3. Os Municípios agregam os interesses das Juntas de Frequesia (na verdade, a Assembleia Muncipal devia ser constituída por representantes legais de cada uma das Juntas de Freguesia) e são financiados parcialmente pelas Juntas de Freguesia e por taxas sobre as vendas (prática comum nos grandes centros comerciais).

Nota: Esta visão de uma revolução administrativa não tem de passar própriamente por um "big bang" nacional. Deve é ser dada a possibilidade de cada uma das autarquias e respectivas Juntas de Freguesia poder livremente decidir constituir-se desta forma quando o bem entenderem.

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2005/03/01

Re: A Islândia e a UE 

No Insurgente.

São os países pequenos que dão o exemplo. Tudo o que aqui está dito (como "It's a customs union. It protects itself from outsiders with walls of tariffs.") é aplicável em maior ou menor grau a qualquer zona económica, que mais tarde ou mais cedo, trás consigo o germe da união política e a inevitável tendência para fazer um mercado interno "livre" à custo de regulamentação e de protecções que seriam impossíveis de implementar sem a criação em primeiro lugar da tal "zona de comércio livre".

E em geral, é nos países muito pequenos que algumas das liberdades antigas (e que desapareceram com o advento da Grande Guerra) ainda sobrevivem (impostos muito baixos, comércio livre, banca desregulada, livre imigração profissional, etc) e a Ordem subsiste, até no Médio Oriente (Dubai, Koweit, Qatar, Monaco, Lichestein, Andorra, Gibraltar, etc).

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Os espinhos das revoluções 

"(...) it seems that the growing opposition to the Syrian presence in Lebanon may pose another threat to the stability of the Lebanese economy. According to the Kuwaiti Al Siyasa newspaper, Syrians, including senior officials, have withdrawn recently some US$3.5 billion deposited in Lebanese banks. One bank owner told the newspaper that out of US$10 billion held in Lebanese banks by Syrian officials, senior officers and businessmen, some $3.5 was withdrawn in recent days. According to him, the CBL has ordered not to publish this information in fear that the local economy will collapse."


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Re: Ideias II 

Parece causar estranheza propor a distribuição das acções das empresas públicas pelos contribuintes, mas não vislumbro porquê.

Partindo do princípio que não falamos de empresas públicas com origem em "nacionalizações" (caso em que a solução legal deve passar em primeira análise, não por re-privatização, mas pela devolução aos donos legítimos) e que não têm um carácter municipal (caso em que a possibilidade de municipalização deve ser considerada), a distribuição de tal propriedade colectiva pelos contribuintes que a financiaram deve ser considerada.

Um método perfeitamente aceitável seria usar a colecta de IRS registada de cada contribuinte como critério de distribuição dessa propriedade. As acções podem ser cotdas em bolsa e depois cada um saberá o que fazer com elas. Potenciais investidores interessados na aquisição de tais empresas poderão considerar lançar Ofertas Públicas de Compra, sendo os novos accionistas livres de decidir da bondade (ou não) de tal oferta. Ou então a nova equipe de gestão consegue manter a independência do negócio.

Vantagens:

1. Devolução de propriedade aos seus financiadores.
2. Poupa-se mais um processo de venda intermediado pela classe política.

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