quarta-feira, 31 de agosto de 2005
Leviathan is Alive and Growing in Europe (inclui uma entrevista a Victoria Curzon-Price)
Czech President Warns Against “Europeanism”
Europe on the Road to Serfdom
post anteriormente publicado n'O Insurgente
sábado, 20 de agosto de 2005
E reza assim o pequeno texto que o acompanha.
" Nesta reedição [!, não conheco a primeira edição nem esta, mas vou procurá-la o mais rápidamente possível], o autor defende a tese de que os "direitos sociais de cidadania não devem ser identificados com uma teoria global de justiça". O estabelecimento de um limiar mínimo abaixo do qual nenhum membro da sociedade deve cair decorre do dever moral de ajudar, devendo constituir apenas um mecanismo supletivo de mercado livre, que garante o acesso do maior número de bens e serviços."
JCE 1, Hayek 0.
(informação via Stockholm Network)
sexta-feira, 19 de agosto de 2005
Um livro que promete e cuja leitura se aconselha principalmente às direitas: The Right War? : The Conservative Debate on Iraq
Com contribuições de, entre outros, Pat Buchanan, Francis Fukuyama, Victor Davis Hanson, Robert Kagan, Henry Kissinger, Charles Krauthammer, William Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, George Will e Fareed Zakaria.
Post anteriormente publicado n'O Insurgente
Assim disse Patrick J. Buchanan. Não creio que seja o caso de CAA, mas ...
O argumento parece ser que a adesão voluntária a uma organização livre e suportada pelos seus "associados" como a ICAR provoca efeitos colectivistas estatistas inevitáveis.
Diz CAA: "Ser católico significa, antes de tudo o mais, a submissão à ICAR; a diluição do indivíduo na massa dos "fieis" seguidores dos dogmas e das regras comportamentais impostos de fora para dentro - todos insindicáveis, claro."
Mas então e os efeitos da adesão involuntária ao centralismo democrático moderno suportado pelo aparato estatista, que mais não faz que a cada década combater a autonomia individual, das familias e comunidades? Será invenção católica? E aqueles países sociais-democratas protestantes na Europa do Norte? E a pobreza relativa da protestante Escócia (isto por causa da alegada inferioridade económica católica, se isso fosse critério que não é - relevante é o respeito pela propriedade privada).
Históricamente, a "submissão" à ICAR, induziu positivamente na mente da civilização europeia que não existe um monopólio de poder e até de "Lei": existia a lei do Principe/Rei e a lei da Igreja (e ainda outras camadas de auto-soberania, como as Cidades-Estado, os conselhos profissionais, etc) e ainda os senhores locais.
Talvez um dos males (que não o é) da ICAR seria o seu pacifismo crónico quando se depara com os seus criticos. Por isso é tão frequente e tão fácil a crítica à mais antiga e maior organização humana - e se o tempo e dimensão mede "menos imperfeição", a ICAR será a "menos imperfeita" de todas. Agora diz-se "A ICAR foi e é uma organização de poder". Todas as organizações são de "poder" em sentido lato. Por isso o anarquismo utópico pretende acabar com todas elas. Em sentido restrito (poder= coerção fisica) no entanto, a única organização que nasce do exercício do poder é o Estado.
Quando se diz: "Quanto mais poderoso for um Estado no que toca à facilidade de imposição de condutas aos cidadãos, mais desimpedido está o caminho da ICAR para conseguir os seus intentos através da conquista de posições de influência no aparelho desse mesmo Estado."
Mas isso é verdade para qualquer religião. Pergunto eu: quem proibiu o alcool na America, foi o "Catolicismo" ou o "Protestantismo"? Quem é o KKK - "Catolico" ou "Protestante"? E actualmente, o que dizer do cristianismo-ultra-sionista-americano e a sua interpretação biblica de que primeiro tem de se estabelecer uma Grande Israel para esta depois ser destruida pelo Armagaddeon. - o que os torna uns estranhos aliados de todas as politicas duras no médio-oriente?
[Não se trata aqui de atacar o protestantismo para defender a ICAR, que não faria sentido, mas na verdade é "apenas" à ICAR que se encontram defeitos e a sobre-valorização cabe a todos os outros]
Lembram-se sempre de atacar o catolicismo, por, apesar de nos países católicos a liberdade de costumes ser na prática maior que nos protestantes (experimentem estar à mercê do moralismo protestante), a ICAR ter uma posição de princípio sobre o aborto (e o casamento). Logo esse, onde na prática a morte de um ser humano é menorizada por conveniência económica.
Vamos agora a
"Muito por isso, é que, tradicionalmente, nos países católicos (por exemplo, os da Europa do Sul e os latinos-americanos) é enorme a propensão para a intervenção estatal em contraste com as preocupações de limitação da acção do governo que existem no mundo anglo-saxónico, particularmente na América"
Fácil e auto-evidente? Não. A realidade do século 20 é que foram os países anglo-saxónicos que menos sofreram (ilhas isoladas das destruição em massa) com as guerras e para cujo desastre muito contribuiram. O Papa Benedito XV (e as aparições de Fátima?) tentou por todos os meios evitar os males da Grande Guerra. Foi Woodrow Wilson (protestante) que, tendo uma particular repulsa pelo Imperio Austro-Hungaro, a monarquia ainda por cima Católica e lider da Contra-Reforma, tomou a decisão contra a sua plataforma de eleição, intervir numa Guerra que acabou por ser responsável pela destruição do legado civilizacional europeu, permitindo a subida do comunismo e o inevitável fascismo.
Tudo isso nasceu da ideia pouco católica (e contrária à pratica dos séculos anteriores e da Teoria - católica - de "Guerra Justa"), da vitória total. Na Grande Guerra, tornou o império "anglo-saxónico" britânico de maior do mundo, para ainda maior. Na segunda, pelas decisões de Churchill que tiveram o efeito contrário ao que desejava, destruiu o Império Britânico mas ficamos com a emergência EUA.
Já a Austria, o centro da influência Católica na Europa Central (com mais de mil anos, centro de um imperio ultra-descentralizado) foi completamente destruida como imperio relevante na Grande Guerra e entregue à influência do nazismo. Vamos lembrar que Mussolini se opôs enquanto pode à anexação de Hitler da Austria (e até pediu secretamente a excomunhão de Hitler), mas foi desprezado pelo domino Anglo-Saxonico da Liga das Nações, com os resultados que se viram?
Mas...já agora, recordem-me, qual o nivel de vida da actual Austria e as zonas Católicas Suiças e Alemãs?
Agora, à ICAR, perante a destruição, e a ameaça comunista, conviveu como todos com o único poder alternativo - o fascismo, que trouxe o corporativismo, etc. Mas é preciso recordarmos que a Europa pré-Grande Guerra era livre. O nivel de comercio internacional, só nos anos 90, se equiparou aos anos de pré-grande Guerra.
À ICAR não cabe o papel de definir regimes ou abraçar ideologias, tal com não cabe às outras religiões, mas de conviver com a realidade humana tal como ele se apresenta, fazendo as escolhas e tomando as acções dentro da ponderação do "deve ser" e "pode ser". Acima de tudo que a realidade social seja mutável mas preservando-se dentro do que "pode ser" a alternativa mais "natural" (e a alternativa fascista era mais natural - e assim aceite pela maioria da população -que o comunismo).
Usando referências a propósito do livro How the Catholic Church Built Western Civilization, de Thomas Woods:
* "We find within the Church the first political theorists demanding that all human beings, both Christian and non-Christian be recognized as possessors of rights to self-government and basic natural rights. It is within the Church where we find the greatest oppositions to the increasingly destructive wars of the modern world, and it is in the Church where we find the first discourses on private property as the extension of the sacred self-ownership possessed by all men. "
* Sobre o episódio de Galileu (umda das fontes preferidas anti-ICAR):
"Galileo was only one of a large community of clergy and laypersons who had been seeking to further explore and explain the Copernican system of a heliocentric universe. Galileo’s observations were routinely confirmed by Jesuit astronomers who possessed their own telescopes, and Roman clergy held activities in honor of his scientific achievements. Galileo only ran into trouble when he insisted on teaching his theories as established facts in spite of the fact that Ptolemaic geocentric astronomy still better explained a number of phenomena better than Galileo’s own theories. Convinced (rightly) by a number of scientists that Galileo had yet to make his case using established methods, the Holy See censured Galileo.
Unlike in the Protestant world where Galileo was savaged for teaching a theory that was allegedly unbiblical, Galileo was free to research and write anything he pleased provided he admitted that his theories had yet to establish practical superiority over the theories of Ptolemy. It was hardly the witch hunt contemporary junior high school teachers would have us believe, yet the image of the Catholic Church as an enemy of science has endured."
* o papel dos monges:
"Among other things, the monks taught metallurgy, introduced new crops, copied ancient texts, preserved literacy, pioneered in technology, invented champagne, improved the European landscape, provided for wanderers of every stripe, and looked after the lost and shipwrecked. Who else in the history of Western civilization can boast such a record? The Church that gave the West its monks also created the university..."
A ler, um documento de "Defensa Science Board" do Pentagono, que mostra uma reflexão prática e realista da história e as lições a tirar, e que mostra que os militares têm essencialmente uma atitude prudente ponderada e são os politicos (nos últimos tempos intoxicados intelectualmente pela ideologia wishfull-thinking-neo-conservador) que induzem ao piores erros de análise para quem quer assumir os custos de ser o bom império.
PART I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ......................................................... 3
Chapter 1: Introduction........................................................................3
Chapter 2:Panama Case Study: “Just Cause” and “Blind
Chapter 3: Israel in Lebanon 1982-2000 ...........................................20
Chapter 4: French in Algeria .............................................................26
Chapter 5: Experiences Post WWI and WWII ................................33
Chapter 6: British Presence in Iraq and the Middle East,
Chapter 7: Post Reconstruction: The American Civil War............53
Chapter 8: The Roman Experience ...................................................59
Chapter 9: Lessons of History ...........................................................63
PART II. POSTCONFLICT ACTIVITIES ...................................................... 83
Chapter 1. Introduction......................................................................93
Chapter 2. An Effective Process for Government-Wide
S&R Operations ............................................................................99
Chapter 3. Empower Department of State ....................................107
Chapter 4. Enhance Department of Defense Capabilities
for S&R Operations ....................................................................115
Um destaque da página 74 (via antiwar blog):
"The only way to understand the motivations of an opponent is by having a real understanding of the historical and religious framework that has molded his culture. It is clear that Americans who waged the war and who have attempted to mold the aftermath have had no clear idea of the framework that has molded the personalities and attitudes of Iraqis. Finally, it might help if Americans and their leaders were to show less arrogance and more understanding of themselves and their place in history. Perhaps more than any other people, Americans display a consistent amnesia concerning their own past, as well as the history of those around them."
quinta-feira, 18 de agosto de 2005
Churchill's admirers seem to assume that it is in the regular course of ; nature, a thing calling for no particular explanation, that a nation like ' Britain should gain its most complete military victory and simultaneously find itself in the most dangerous position in its history.
But there exists by now a large body of evidence and expert opinion to the effect that the practical defeat of England in the Second World War is largely traceable to Churchill's decisions.
The root of the fateful error was Churchill's famous "single-mindedness," a not especially valuable trait in those dealing with complex issues, and certainly not in someone underaking to shape world history. When his secretary questioned him, inJune, 1941, on the decision to give all-out aid to Stalin, Churchill replied:"I have only one aim in life, the defeat of Hitler, and this makes thingsvery simple for me."
In February, 1943, Franco transmitted to Churchill a memorandum warning of the dangerous spread of Russian power on the Continent. Churchill responded by ridiculing Franco's fears, adding: "I venture to prophesy that, after the war, England will be the greatest military Power in Europe. I am sure that England's influence will bestonger m Europe than it has ever been since the days of the fall of Napoleon."
This fantasy of perpetual and overwelming British power,then, was the foundation of of Churchill's wartime policies. As LiddellHart has said: "Britains's leader was too excited by the battle to lookahead, and see the inevitable consequence of the smashing victory forwhich he thirsted. It makes no sense."
The most direct expression of the demand for total, smashing victorywas Roosevelt's policy, from early 1943 on, of exacting unconditonal surrender from Germany, Italy and Japan (the demand was afterwards dropped in Italy's case). When Roosevelt made the announcement at Casablanca, Churchill's sycophantic reaction was to look thoughtful, grinand then say: "Perfect! And I can just see how Goebbels and the rest of'em'll squeal! " (In fact, Goebbels considered the slogan a godsend, since it identified the German State with the Nazi regime.)
The doctrine of unconditional surrender necessarily led to Communist control of EastCentral Europe and the Balkans, and of Manchuria and North Korea.
After it had begun to work its inevitable effects, Churchill desperately tried to block them-this, ironically, is another cause for his high reputeamong conservatives-by pushing for invasion by Anglo-American forces of the Balkins and the Danube basin (the famous "soft underbelly ofEuropev-the Italian campaign showed that concept up for the idiocy itwas).
To pose a fairly basic question: what actually did Churchill believe he was fighting against in the Second World War? Was it a crusade against the diabolical Hitler of the death-camps and the medical experiments?This later, more sophisticated view of what World War II was about played no role at all in Churchill's thinking.
Instead, it was a question inhis mind of a "gangster" regime threatening the "liberties of Europe"(that is, the right to rule of the various parasitic regimes in the individual countries), and, equally, of-Prussian militarism! "The core of Germanyis Prussia. There is the source of the pestilence . . . . Nazi tyranny andPrussian militarism are the two main elements in German life which must be absolutely destroyed," he proclaimed.
The Allies were battlingthe same mad Junker dream of world conquest, he went or. to say, whichhad "twice within our lifetime, and three times counting that of our fathers . . plunged the world into their wars of expansion and aggression"
This is a serious man? If his words are to be believed, Churchill's interpretation of the great epic of World War I was the one ground out by some bored French press secretarty in the Washington Embassy. Forget about a tyrant and "blood-stained usurper" (as John Stuart Mill calledhim) named Napoleon III, who was, equally with Bismarck, responsible for the Franco-Prussian War.
Forget about the Tsarist Russian imperialists and their French allies who, more than anyone else, brought about World War I. Wars are caused by Prussians, and this war is no different from any other. Thus, according to Churchill, the Second World War was no singular confrontation with the hair-raisingly demonic,(...).
Naturally, with this prespective, Churchill could have no sympathywith or appreciation for the heroes of the German opposition to Hitler. Even the Tory publicist, Constantine FitzGibbon, is compleased to say that, after the officers' plot of July 20, 1944, "Churchill in the House ofCommons exactly echoed Goebbels's speech about the conspirators, describing them as a small clique of officers and expressing a certain satisfaction that 'dog eat dog.' "
Churchill's fanatical-really,brainless-anti-Germanism blinded him to the possibility that a Germany run by Beck and Goerdeler might conceivably be more desirable from aWestern point of view than one controlled either by Hitler or Stalin.
And' as for Prussianism, let this be said: the Prussina officer class (those mad / dogs, infinitely worse, of course, than the products of Sandhurst, St. Cyrand West Point) no longer exists, and Prussia-which, after all, was Humboldt as well as Hegel-now is not even a name on a map.
But Prussianism's final act was the attempt to kill Hitler and to salvage something of the honor of Germany-a not unworthy way to leave, for the last time, the stage of history." Ralph Raico
quarta-feira, 17 de agosto de 2005
"Russia and China begin joint war games Thursday, for the first time adding military muscle to a burgeoning partnership that some experts see sweeping away old strategic verities, from the Taiwan Strait to central Asia and beyond.
The week-long maneuvers off the Pacific coast are widely viewed as Moscow lending a mail-gloved hand to China's efforts to warn the United States away from involvement in any future crisis over Taiwan. But preparations to deal with potential unrest in Central Asia may also figure, some say. Last month, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Hu Jintao pledged to work together to prepare their armed forces "to deal with new challenges and threats," listed as extremism, terrorism, and separatism."
* quando um imperio aparece, surgem logo mais um ou dois (e depois o conflito é uma questão de tempo?)
* O que o comunismo não conseguiu, o semi-capitalismo (de Estado) consegue
* "Tomaram" conta (com as várias revoluções a cores) dos jardins da Rússia, esta volta-se para o o vizinho das traseiras
Barak's response was this: "The freely elected government of Israel has a right to impose its will."
There you have it: The magical, mystical word "democracy" gives politicians license to do whatever they damn well please to us (...)." Via LRCBlog
PS: E quem tem o poder para dar tem também o poder para tirar
"(...)First, we need to clarify once again, that a federal system consists of two or more territories coming together voluntarily on common grounds where they have shared interests for some common goals. (...)
We have to admit that the Iraqi model of federalism that has already being agreed upon, can be called (Asymmetric federalism), where states are granted different powers, or some possess greater autonomy than others do.
While (Symmetric Federalism) means that, every component state of a federation possesses the same powers. This is often done in recognition of the existence of a distinct culture in a particular region or regions. In Spain, "historical communities" such as Navarre, Catalonia, and the Basque country have more powers than other autonomous communities, partly to deal with their distinctness and to appease nationalist leanings, partly out of respect of privileges granted earlier in history.
Naturally, Kurdistan should follow the suit for the same reasons mentioned above. By the same token, there is another common issue in federal systems where there is a conflict between regional and national interests, or between the interests and aspirations of different ethnic groups.
In some federations, the entire jurisdiction is relatively homogeneous and each constituent state resembles a miniature version of the whole; this is known as 'congruent federalism'.
On the other hand, incongruent federalism exists where different states or regions possess distinct ethnic groups. This latter is what apply to Kurdistan in relation to Iraq.
The ability of a federal government to create national institutions that can mediate differences that arise due to linguistic, ethnic, religious, or other regional differences is an important challenge. The inability to meet this challenge may lead to the secession of parts of a federation or to civil war, as it occurred in United States and Switzerland.
Generally, people with distinct identity going through such an experience are prune to record their rights in most details within the intended constitution. This process of detail recording helps guaranty those rights against any possible present and future misinterpretation of their rights. The best example on that would be South African Constitution, which thoroughly details the rights of all with no exception. The Kurds definitely need to have their rights stated in details in the new constitution without leaving any room for misapprehension or misconception. The same goes for the others as well. Since Iraqi people with all their ethnicities, religions, sects and factions have chosen to build a new federal country, and then the people ought to be able to decide, lead the way and choose how they want to be part of that union.
Often, there are issues that democratic countries do not trouble to endorse in their constitutions; nevertheless, they become reality, as it is the case with Christianity religion in the United States of America, which has flourished, more than any other country despite the fact that the American constitution does not specify Christianity as the official state religion. In fact, it has clearly separated between state and religion.
There are also other issues that need to be paid some attention. Take a glance at the compact theory of Jefferson -one of the major writer of the American constitution, that states, federalism is to have contracted one another to establish a federal government and to have delegated some of their powers to it, reserving the rest for themselves. The federal government often merely issues broad directives to the Länder (self-governing regions), which then have broad discretion as how to implement them.
In Germany, the division of powers is less one of content than of administration: For example, article X of the Bill of rights to the American constitution provides that: (The powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people).
That means any powers not covered in the constitution are left to the states in U.S. This is one of the significant issues and under no circumstances should it escape the attention of the Kurdish delegates to the constitutional committee. It is essential to have one single separate article that clearly state this principle.
In some system, it is stipulated that since the union is truly based on voluntarism, then the states should have the right after certain numbers of years to secede from the union, naturally after following a quantity of procedures such as conducting a free referendum to let the people decide their own fate. There is no reason why Kurds should not request the same thing.
Finally, it is common that during the historical evolution of a federation there is a gradual movement of power from the component states to the centre, as the federal government acquires additional powers, sometimes to deal with unforeseen circumstances. The acquisition of new powers by a federal government may occur through formal constitutional amendment or simply through a broadening of the interpretation of a government's existing constitutional powers given by the courts,( the Supreme Court). Usually, this is the case with true democratic federal unions such as United States of America where initially the federal government was granted little powers while most of the powers were retained by the states. When the reverse is the case, it gives reverse results also. Whilst the federal government keeps most of the powers, the states gradually and overtime slips away from the center into secession and the union dissolves.
[...FDR railing against a Supreme Court decision to throw out his fascistic American Agriculture Administration as unconstitutional]
* "I think if I give (Joe Stalin) everything I possibly can and ask nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace."
[FDR tells U.S. Ambassador to Russia William Bullitt]
Via Simpering Statists Hate This Book by Vin Suprynowicz
terça-feira, 16 de agosto de 2005
Two days after the dropping of the bomb, Hoover wrote, "The use of the atomic bomb, with its indiscriminate killing of women and children, revolts my soul." He testified to Congress later that year that the act was "barbaric." President Hoover was not alone. As Leo Maley III and Uday Mohan demonstrate at the History News Network, virtually all conservative voices from Human Events to the Chicago Tribune and even National Review continued to criticize the decision well into the 1950s. "
In 1948, Henry Luce, the conservative owner of Time, Life, and Fortune, stated that "[i]f, instead of our doctrine of 'unconditional surrender,' we had all along made our conditions clear, I have little doubt that the war with Japan would have ended soon without the bomb explosion which so jarred the Christian conscience."
A steady drumbeat of conservative criticism continued throughout the 1950s. A 1958 editorial in William F. Buckley, Jr.'s National Review took former President Truman to task for his then-current explanation of why he had decided to drop an atomic bomb on the city of Hiroshima. The editors asked the question that "ought to haunt Harry Truman: 'Was it really necessary?'" Could a demonstration of the bomb and an ultimatum have ended the war? The editors challenged Truman to provide a satisfactory answer. Six weeks later the magazine published an article harshly critical of Truman's atomic bomb decision.
Two years later, David Lawrence informed his magazine's readers that it was "not too late to confess our guilt and to ask God and all the world to forgive our error" of having used atomic weapons against civilians. As a 1959 National Review article matter-of-factly stated: "The indefensibility of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima is becoming a part of the national conservative creed."
PS: Hoje em dia, a nova direita, não faz outra coisa que não defender esquerdistas comprometidos que trouxeram o socialismo aos EUA e o prática da Vitória Total conseguida pela destruição total (Churchill teve um papel nisso, quer no socialismo, quer na prática da guerra total). Recordemos que tudo levaria a pensar que seria à direita que estaria reservado o papel de defender as boas práticas das leis da guerra, determinadas ao longo de séculos da boa tradição monárquica europeia. Hoje, internacionalismo, soberania limitada do Estado Nação, mudança de regime e vitória total (como quem diz revolução social total) parecem fazer parte de uma direita infectada pela doença da ideologia.
segunda-feira, 15 de agosto de 2005
Como sempre, seja no diagnóstico dos males do terceiro mundo (e já agora, dos males do segundo e primeiro também), seja nas constituições, seja no estudo das ciências sociais, o mais básico e importante direito humano, reponsável pela parte pacifica das relações humanas e o seu desenvolvimento económico... o direito de propriedade (condição essencial para a cooperação voluntária e divisão do trabalho) é impronunciável (a não ser para defender o aborto porque o corpo, sabem, ...é propriedade da mulher). Existe tipo "aquele direito que ninguém ousa pronunciar". Um tabu. Todos sabem que o é, ninguém ousa falar ou estudar.
PS: Do fundo da minha ignorância, conhecem algum autor de sociologia/antropologia que tenha analisado a importância desse pequeno detalhe (como a instituição voluntária da propriedade determina mas também define as culturas, comunidades, civilizações)?
PS2: Ok, já sei que consta do "Artigo 17.º 1. Toda a pessoa, individual ou colectivamente, tem direito à propriedade. 2. Ninguém pode ser arbitrariamente privado da sua propriedade. ".
Todos os raciocinios sobre a representatividade partidária da proporcionalidade está baseada na falácia da doença da ideologia abstracta de que a partidocracia se recorre para manter o actual grau de centralismo democrático.
Precisamos também de acesso fácil de deputados independentes a esses circulos. E ainda impedir que as regras de financiamento das campanhas (assim como as regras de distribuição monetária pelos partidos pelos resultados das eleções) funcionem como bloqueio prático dessas candidaturas.
E pode ser que com circulos uninominais, os deputados passem a ouvir os seus constituintes, a começar por pelo menos por lá estarem presentes.
Vasco Pulido Valente pela segunda vez e respondendo ao que parece a Miguel Portas, revisita no Público de ontem os seus argumentos pelas WMD (enquanto Vasco Rato e José Manuel Fernandes o fazem pelo seu neo-con-anti-anti-americanismo, VPV quer realçar o seu frio-racional-militarismo - ainda que seja uma decisão de um civil democrata de esquerda que esteja em causa).
Quais as ideias centrais?
1. Devaloriza as opiniões contrárias de Macarthur e quase ridiculariza o General (conservador e depois Presidente dos EUA) Eisenhower que em 1963 , retirado, reiterou a sua posição à Newsweek, dizendo, "The Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing.". Mas sim, o que dizer de um general-conservador-presidente que humilhou a Inglaterra, Israel e a França no caso Suez?
2. E agora o pior: que o uso de armas convencionais nas cidades Alemãs e Japonesas já tinham incinerado muitas mais vitimas civis e portanto já estavamos numa Guerra Total. Assim tipo, quem mata mil mata dez mil. Quem mata dez mil mata cem mil. E por aí adiante. Mas o problema esteve aí precisamente, na assunção pela ocidente-cristão (supostamente) em uma acção após a outra a assumir o extermínio de civis até ser coroada com 2 bombas atómicas.
Não existem guerras boas quando é preciso "kill you in order to save ou". Da Segunda Guerra, sabemos que Hitler estava já derrotado 3 anos depois de começar (tendo estado apenas 12 anos no poder), enquanto Estaline (que morreu em paz e sossego) depois das suas piores "práticas" foi foi um aliado, acabando nas mãos com metade da europa cristã (a qual, tal como a Rússia no meio da falência moral da Grande Guerra - mais uma "vitória" aliada - caiu na ilusão soviética, se deixou pacificamente adormecer na ilusão do pan-comunismo), e na Ásia, com a insistência da "Rendição Total", colocou a zona à mercê do comunismo (ex: a Coreia - antiga colónia do Japão). Uma grande "vitória" para o qual as WMD contribuiram gloriosamente.
Para um liberal, seria anacrónico pensar que desde a recolha do lixo até ao planeamento social, as decisões estatistas correm sempre mal, mas miraculosamente, naquelas em que as decisões afectam tudo e todos, o estatismo (dirigido pelas massas) até funciona razoavelmente bem. Ah, mas porque é que me parece que vamos continuar a testar esta tese ainda mais vezes?
Vasco Pulido Valente fez aqui, o papel do Victor Davis Hanson (o intelectual-historiador-militarista-neo-con):
"Among pundits currently urging Americans to embrace an eternal state of war, I find Victor Davis Hanson one of the most disturbing. Hanson is obviously far more intelligent than shills like John Podhoretz or Charles Krauthammer, and on the surface he seems more reasonable. But closer analysis of his writing exposes that "reasonableness" as a mere patina over the same martial infatuation possessing his less able comrades. His recent column defending the atomic bombing of Hiroshima reveals the Mr. Hyde lurking within our Dr. Jekyll.(...)
So what justified unleashing the A-bomb on the world and melting a large city along with its unfortunate inhabitants? Hanson says: "Truman’s supporters [argued] that, in fact, a blockade and negotiations had not forced the Japanese generals to surrender unconditionally.(...) Hanson leaves unanswered the question of why the US would only accept an unconditional surrender. Just war theory, which is an application of the broader moral theory of aggression, says that such a course is unacceptable.(...)
Hanson would claim that the US had to demand unconditional surrender in order to prevent the possibility that a revived Japan might undertake aggression again in the future. (One wonders how near he believes that future must be – can one wipe every member of an enemy nation to ensure safety from it forever?)(...)
In terms of the particulars of the time, the main bone of contention was apparently whether or not the Japanese emperor would be allowed to remain on his throne. However, after Japan did surrender unconditionally, he was permitted to do so anyway. Oops-a-daisy!
What's more, there is a growing realization that Japan's ability to continue fighting was about nil. As a veteran of the Pacific war recently wrote: "The truth is, I now believe, that in August of 1945, the Japanese Imperial Army could not have defended its homeland against a well-trained troop of Eagle Scouts."
Hanson next moves on to the "we'd done worse" argument: "Hiroshima, then, was not the worst single-day loss of life in military history. The Tokyo fire raid on the night of March 9/10, five months earlier, was far worse, incinerating somewhere around 150,000 civilians, and burning out over 15 acres of the downtown. Indeed, "Little Boy," the initial nuclear device that was dropped 60 years ago, was understood as the continuance of that policy of unrestricted bombing – its morality already decided by the ongoing attacks on the German and Japanese cities begun at least three years earlier."
To be fair, Hanson makes a good point: If unrestricted bombing is moral, then there is no fundamental basis for qualms at going nuclear. But it is fatuous to declare that the morality of unrestricted bombing already had been decided simply because it had been employed. If a serial killer switches from a sword to a gun as his weapon of choice, what sort of defense is it to claim that the morality of serial killing was "already decided" when he was using the sword?
Hanson continues: "Americans of the time hardly thought the Japanese populace to be entirely innocent." Here we have morality by opinion poll embracing a grim collectivism. Because some Japanese civilians were more or less involved in the war effort, all of them, even infants, were fair game to be slaughtered. Note that this sort of thinking is exactly how Osama bin Laden justifies striking civilian targets in the US, Britain, or Spain.(...)
Once analyzed, none of these "moral arguments" are very convincing. The reason that such a smart fellow makes such weak moral arguments is that they are red herrings. The truth is that he and his cohorts just really love war, and love does not stop to ask "Why?" Michael Ledeen can only urge that wars arrive "faster, please." Hanson criticizes both sides of conflicts for not getting down to fighting sooner. But they know they have to talk the good talk, to cloak their raw aggression in some ethical finery, or else the public will turn from their views in disgust.
In the end, they are children in adult bodies, who never lost their fascination with moving little plastic soldiers and tanks around their bedrooms." Hanson Agonistes by Gene Callahan
quarta-feira, 10 de agosto de 2005
A ler, um "paper" de Carlo Lottieri (University of Siena and Istituto Bruno Leoni), denominado (pdf) Vatican City as a Free Society. Legal Order and Political Theology., da secção Working Papers do Mises Institute.
Fica aqui o final do texto:
"3. Conclusion: a society without State, a community without coercion
Despite its official self-description, the State of Vatican City is not a State.
In 1929 he adopted this denomination because the 20th century legal culture was not in condition to accept the idea of a political institution refusing the State model.
However Vatican City is exactly a free organization (not coercive) oriented to realize its projects in the international arena.
With the Lateran Treaty, post-Christian idea of secular sovereignty did not modify the theology of the Catholic Church. For this reason, Vatican City is not a sovereign State. Moreover, the Holy See exercises its formal sovereignty over the City and for this reason when we consider Vatican City as a State we are obliged to imagine a State which is not a subject of sovereignty, but an object (a real absurdity, in the logic of the contemporary legal and political culture).
Legal positivism induced the Catholic Church to adopt a State terminology, especially in the
prospect to be accepted by the international community. But this religious institution cannot be
classified in the group of the modern State organizations.
On the contrary, it is possible to put Vatican City in the set of legal and economic entities marked by a voluntary collaboration of individuals (as the families, the companies, the associations, and so on).
Vatican City is the outcome of free and spontaneous relationships, in absence of any kind of violence, and there is a big difference between this type of interactions and the bounds imposed by a State with the violence and the threat.
If Catholic people of the different countries would understand the nature of the organization
charged to defend the independence of the Pope and his preaching, they could act with more
determination for the transformation of their political institutions.
The hope to live in societies not completely dominated by an arrogant ruling class would be
Gostei desta: "...Rose finds that there is startlingly little evidence that the WTO has done anything to enhance trade."
e desta (a prova que existe ordem legal na ausencia de monopolio de lei - o ambiente do comercio internacional):
"...in the international arena, emerged private arbitration, private international commercial law, and customs for dealing with disreputable traders. These spontaneously emerged private institutions are ultimately responsible for the boom in international trade--not government."
Many economists I've discussed this with are surprised that state enforcement is so unimportant for trade. But for those familiar with the Menger-Mises-Hayek line of reasoning, there is nothing particularly unusual about this finding at all. In fact, for some, like Murray Rothbard, who emphasized the superiority of private enforcement to public enforcement, this is precisely what we should expect."
terça-feira, 9 de agosto de 2005
Foi este mesmo pensamento que levou a clique neo-conservadora a tentar conseguir um "first strike" à URSS (felizmente Reagan - e ainda menos Tatcher - nao era propriamente "neo"). Se tivesse ocorrido e mesmo que tivesse corrido bem segundo o seu calculismo, iriam tentar provar até ao fim dos tempos que combatiam o mal absoluto e era inevitavel.
A famosa "Team B" (um departamento alternativo autónomo dentro da CIA) de que fazia parte Wolfitz, nos tempos imediatamente anteriores à queda do "Muro de Berlim" produzia documentos de como a URSS estava no máximo da sua força e perigosidade e o mundo corria o maior risco de sempre. Ou seja, "não havia alternativa".
Mas existiu, o sistema caiu por dentro, pacificamente e aparentemente as "massas oprimidas" (que o eram) nem se deram ao trabalho de perseguir quem quer que seja. Quando uns diziam "better dead than red", o que queriam no fundo dizer era "better others dead than others red".
Todas as tretas sobre como se pouparam vidas, com foram feitos "calculos", são isso mesmo, tretas. E depois, quer estas tretas , quer o resultado da Segunda Grande Guerra (a queda do imperio britanico, o estabelecimento do dominio comunista em metade da europa e na asia) são o resultado de decisões de democratas (a esquerda americana - Roosevelt nao teve problemas em estabelecer aliança com Estaline a quem tratava por "Uncle Joe", Churchill como desde antes da Primeira Guerra ja odiava os alemaes assim, como qualquer pequena sombra que surgisse sobre o seu Império...até ofereceu uma espada autêntica das "Cruzadas" a Estaline ...é bom notar que as piores atrocidades de Estaline foram cometidas nos anos 20 e 30...), porque tanta preocupação da direita "liberal" em defender o indefensável praticado por esquerdistas comprometidos?
"...Hiroshima was a city, inhabited by some three hundred thousand people, which contained military elements. In any case, since the harbor was mined and the U.S. Navy and Air Force were in control of the waters around Japan, whatever troops were stationed in Hiroshima had been effectively neutralized. (...)
Moreover, the notion that Hiroshima was a major military or industrial center is implausible on the face of it. The city had remained untouched through years of devastating air attacks on the Japanese home islands, and never figured in Bomber Command’s list of the 33 primary targets.(...)
Thus, the rationale for the atomic bombings has come to rest on a single colossal fabrication, which has gained surprising currency: that they were necessary in order to save a half-million or more American lives. These, supposedly, are the lives that would have been lost in the planned invasion of Kyushu in December, then in the all-out invasion of Honshu the next year, if that was needed. But the worst-case scenario for a full-scale invasion of the Japanese home islands was forty-six thousand American lives lost.93 The ridiculously inflated figure of a half-million for the potential death toll – nearly twice the total of U.S. dead in all theaters in the Second World War – is now routinely repeated in high-school and college textbooks and bandied about by ignorant commentators.(...)
The bombings were condemned as barbaric and unnecessary by high American military officers, including Eisenhower and MacArthur.96 The view of Admiral William D. Leahy, Truman’s own chief of staff, was typical:
...the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. . . . My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make wars in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.97
By early summer 1945, the Japanese fully realized that they were beaten. Why did they nonetheless fight on? As Anscombe wrote: "It was the insistence on unconditional surrender that was the root of all evil."101
That mad formula was coined by Roosevelt at the Casablanca conference, and, with Churchill’s enthusiastic concurrence, it became the Allied shibboleth. After prolonging the war in Europe, it did its work in the Pacific. At the Potsdam conference, in July 1945, Truman issued a proclamation to the Japanese, threatening them with the "utter devastation" of their homeland unless they surrendered unconditionally. Among the Allied terms, to which "there are no alternatives," was that there be "eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest [sic]." "Stern justice," the proclamation warned, "would be meted out to all war criminals."102
To the Japanese, this meant that the emperor – regarded by them to be divine, the direct descendent of the goddess of the sun – would certainly be dethroned and probably put on trial as a war criminal and hanged, perhaps in front of his palace.103 It was not, in fact, the U.S. intention to dethrone or punish the emperor.
But this implicit modification of unconditional surrender was never communicated to the Japanese. In the end, after Nagasaki, Washington acceded to the Japanese desire to keep the dynasty and even to retain Hirohito as emperor.
For months before, Truman had been pressed to clarify the U.S. position by many high officials within the administration, and outside of it, as well. In May 1945, at the president’s request, Herbert Hoover prepared a memorandum stressing the urgent need to end the war as soon as possible. The Japanese should be informed that we would in no way interfere with the emperor or their chosen form of government. He even raised the possibility that, as part of the terms, Japan might be allowed to hold on to Formosa (Taiwan) and Korea. After meeting with Truman, Hoover dined with Taft and other Republican leaders, and outlined his proposals.104
(...) Now, applying conjectural history in this case: assume that the Pacific war had ended in the way wars customarily do – through negotiation of the terms of surrender. And assume the worst – that the Japanese had adamantly insisted on preserving part of their empire, say, Korea and Formosa, even Manchuria. In that event, it is quite possible that Japan would have been in a position to prevent the Communists from coming to power in China. And that could have meant that the thirty or forty million deaths now attributed to the Maoist regime would not have occurred.(...)
The distinguished conservative philosopher Richard Weaver was revolted by the spectacle of young boys fresh out of Kansas and Texas turning nonmilitary Dresden into a holocaust . . . pulverizing ancient shrines like Monte Cassino and Nuremberg, and bringing atomic annihilation to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Weaver considered such atrocities as deeply "inimical to the foundations on which civilization is built."108
Today, self-styled conservatives slander as "anti-American" anyone who is in the least troubled by Truman’s massacre of so many tens of thousands of Japanese innocents from the air. This shows as well as anything the difference between today’s "conservatives" and those who once deserved the name. (...)" Hiroshima and Nagasaki by Ralph Raico
quarta-feira, 3 de agosto de 2005
A Brief Overview of the American Arbitration Association
"The American Arbitration Association is available to resolve a wide range of disputes through mediation, arbitration, elections and other out-of-court settlement procedures. That the AAA has flourished for over 75 years affirms an unparalleled commitment to progressive leadership in alternative dispute resolution (ADR), and the Association's facility for change and service innovation. The history, mission and not-for-profit status of the AAA are unique in the field of alternative dispute resolution. It is, however, the Association's ADR resources -- its panels, rules, administration, and education and training services -- that provide cost-effective and tangible value to counsel, businesses and industry professionals and their employees, customers and business partners.
While many of the more than 230,255 cases administered by the American Arbitration Association in 2002 were resolved through mediation or arbitration, less formal methods of dispute resolution -- such as fact-finding, mini-trial and partnering -- are clearly coming into wider use. To serve your dispute resolution needs, the AAA provides a forum for the hearing of disputes through 34 offices nationwide and two International Centres in New York and in Dublin, tested rules and procedures that have broad acceptance, and a roster of over 8,000 impartial experts to hear and resolve cases." Via The Possibility of Private Law by Robert P. Murphy
BAGHDAD, Iraq - Iraqi legislators accused Kuwait of stealing their oil as well as chipping away at their national territory on the border — allegations similar to those used by Saddam Hussein to justify his invasion of Kuwait that began 15 years ago. An Iraqi delegation was scheduled to head to Kuwait on Wednesday discuss the incidents along the Kuwaiti border. "There have been violations such as digging horizontal oil wells to pump Iraq oil," legislator Jawad al-Maliki, chairman of the parliament's Security and Defense Committee, told the National Assembly on Tuesday.
terça-feira, 2 de agosto de 2005
Em qualquer arranjo de propriedade comum (empresas, condomínios), os interesses patrimoniais e o desejo de uma "ordem interna" que o valorize excedem os outros (o que não quer dizer que são os únicos em jogo).
A decisão de gestão e o pagamento das despesas (preservação, manutenção, investimetno) em comum são por vezes dificeis (principalmente, no caso português, onde a tradição era escassa e onde o processo de condicionamento do mercado de arrendamento produziu o maior dos desastres, um deles, a falta de cultura na gestão do património), mas mais tarde ou mais cedo os interesses práticos acabam por prevalecer (mesmo em Portugal, os condomínios entregues a empresas especializadas começam a funcionar relativamente bem - ainda que como disse, exista o problema cultural).
Agora, a Revolução Democrática seria estabelecer que todos os residentes maiores de idade votam em Eleições "Livres" para gerir os destinos comuns do condomínio, incluíndo:
- a forma de financiamento, o que inlcui - como nas democracias politicas - a capacidade de impor a redistribuição de rendimentos interna
- definir o aparato coercivo (tribunais e judicial) de impor essas decisões (ou seja, quem nao cumpre, tem o arresto dos bens e a ameaça de rapto - ou seja, prisão, na linguagem estatista).
A isto, os democratas (politicos) chamam de única forma de governo "legitima" e em "paz". Um sistema que ultrapassa os proprietários, onde os maiores de idade-quando não os menores - ganham a independência do "dono da casa" (normalmente os pais/etc) e podem até, pelo efeito da maioria - condicioná-los - e se sentem "livres" da educação e autoridade do patriarca (proprietário) - o Estado central para se impor precisa de "libertar" o individuo da familia e comunidade (para isso condicionou - começou com Napoleão - a tradição da herança primogénita para forçar à decadência das propriedades de familia).
Não pode existir liberalismo ou qualquer espécie de saudável conservadorismo no igualitarismo do estado social-democrata. "Um homem um voto" em tese parece uma boa ideia para determinadas decisões colectivas, mas por alguma razão todos os liberais clássicos do século 18 e 19 alertaram para o despotismo do centralismo democrático e o igualitarismo de voto universal.
Remédio? A descentralização política e administrativa. Mesmo que num condomínio se institua o voto universal, é mais dificil que se transforme numa social-democracia alargada porque:
- a proximidade dificulta a agressão confiscatória
- o direito de "sair" é fácil de exercer
- o interesse em manter o condomínio atractivo (ou seja, valorizado) para potenciais compradores impede tentações suicidas
A última pergunta, quem é que compraria uma residência num condomínio com o voto universal de todos os residentes com maiores de 18 anos no sistema "Um homem um voto"?....Bem me parecia.
Rabbi David G. Dalin received his rabbinic ordination from the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. He is the author or co-author of several books. His most recent book, and the subject of my interview with him, is The Myth of Hitler’s Pope: How Pope Pius XII Rescued Jews from the Nazis.
"(...)The campaign of vilification against Pius XII’s conduct during World War II began as easily dismissed Communist agitprop against the strongly anti-Communist pontiff. But the campaign of vilification became a major issue after the 1963 Berlin premiere of a play called The Deputy, written by a young left-wing German writer named Rolf Hochhuth. Hochhuth vilified Pius XII as a Nazi collaborator and an icy and avaricious pontiff guilty of moral cowardice and inexcusable silence as Europe’s Jews were being murdered by the Nazis. Promoted as “the most controversial play of our time,” The Deputy was fictional, highly polemical, and offered no historical evidence. It nevertheless became a sensation and ignited a firestorm of controversy, and first created the myth that Pius XII was “Hitler’s pope,” [which] has continued to this day.That was more than forty years ago. And yet the myth that Pius XII was "Hitler’s pope" persists.
It persists despite well-documented historical evidence that Eugenio Pacelli was one of Hitler’s earliest and most consistent critics and that, as both the Vatican Secretary of State and subsequently as pope, was in fact a friend of the Jewish people who was instrumental in rescuing and sheltering a great many Jews from the clutches of the Nazis.
In The Myth of Hitler’s Pope I ask and try to answer the question of why this malicious myth, [which] has no basis whatsoever in historical fact, continues to persist. In part, at least, the persistence of this myth is attributable to the anti-Catholic diatribes of an increasingly left-wing (and secularized) intellectual class that seeks to denigrate not only traditional Catholicism, but Christianity and even Judaism as well.
It is no coincidence that the most extreme of the pope’s attackers — including James Carroll (author of Constantine’s Sword) and Garry Wills (author of Papal Sin) — are also outspoken critics of the late Pope John Paul II."
segunda-feira, 1 de agosto de 2005
"What if Clinton were to become hereditary king of the U.S.; wouldn't this
make matters worse than they are now with him as president? The answer is a decisive No.
First off, given Clinton's obviously high degree of time preference, by making him owner rather than caretaker of the U.S. his effective rate of time preference would fall (as high as it might still be).
More profoundly and importantly, however, the transition from a Clinton presidency to a Clinton kingship would require substantial institutional changes (for instance, the abolition of Congress and congressional elections, the elimination of the Supreme Court, and the abandonment of the Constitution), and these changes could not possibly be implemented without King Clinton losing thereby most of his current power as president.
For with everyone except Clinton and the lintonistas barred from politics and political participation, and with Clinton installed as the personal owner of all formerly public (federal) lands and properties as well as the ultimate judge and legislator for the entire territory of the U.S., popular opposition against his and his clan's excessive wealth and power would bring his kingship to an end before it had even begun.
Thus, if Clinton really wanted to hold onto his royal position, he would have to give up most of the current - democratic-republican - government's property, tax revenue, and legislative powers.
Even then, in light of Clinton's less than exemplary and shining personal history and family
background, his United Kingdom of America would almost certainly be faced with an immediate
upsurge of secessionist forces all across the country and quickly disintegrate, and Clinton, at the
very best, would end up as King Bill of Arkansas."
On Theory and History, in: Gerard Radnitzky, ed., Values and the Social Order, Vol.3 (Aldershot: Avebury, 1997) Hans-Hermann Hoppe
With a logic reminiscent of a generation earlier, statists argued that the gold standard was largely to blame for the credit debacle which led to the Great Depression. If the gold standard had not existed, they argued, Britain’s abandonment of gold payments in 1931 would not have caused the failure of banks all over the world. (The irony was that since 1913, we had been, not on a gold standard, but on what may be termed "a mixed gold standard"; yet it is gold that took the blame.) But the opposition to the gold standard in any form – from a growing number of welfare-state advocates – was prompted by a much subtler insight: the realization that the gold standard is incompatible with chronic deficit spending (the hallmark of the welfare state).
Stripped of its academic jargon, the welfare state is nothing more than a mechanism by which governments confiscate the wealth of the productive members of a society to support a wide variety of welfare schemes. A substantial part of the confiscation is effected by taxation. But the welfare statists were quick to recognize that if they wished to retain political power, the amount of taxation had to be limited and they had to resort to programs of massive deficit spending, i.e., they had to borrow money, by issuing government bonds, to finance welfare expenditures on a large scale.(...)
In the absence of the gold standard, there is no way to protect savings from confiscation through inflation. There is no safe store of value. If there were, the government would have to make its holding illegal, as was done in the case of gold. If everyone decided, for example, to convert all his bank deposits to silver or copper or any other good, and thereafter declined to accept checks as payment for goods, bank deposits would lose their purchasing power and government-created bank credit would be worthless as a claim on goods. The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves.
This is the shabby secret of the welfare statists’ tirades against gold. Deficit spending is simply a scheme for the confiscation of wealth. Gold stands in the way of this insidious process. It stands as a protector of property rights. If one grasps this, one has no difficulty in understanding the statists’ antagonism toward the gold standard." Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal.